

Interview with G. Thomas Eisele, U.S. District judge, Little Rock, Arkansas, June 12, 1974, conducted by Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, transcribed by Linda Killen.

NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION

Q-Who was Sid McMath?

Eisele: He was a war hero and came back and along with many other G.I.s who got involved in politics came on very strong. Ran for prosecuting attorney in Hot Springs. Defeated a great machine politician, Leo McLaughlin, who'd been mayor over there for years and who had a terrible reputation as a machine candidate. I recall going to school at the time, but he got into the primary and got beat in the primary contesting the election practices and so forth. Then ran as an independent and won in the general election. And as a consequence vaulted right into the state, into state politics and became governor I believe before he completed his term as prosecuting attorney. Maybe he'd finished one. Well, what questions do you have for me?

Jack Bass: Did you grow up as a Republican?

Eisele: Well, I come by it partially naturally. My grandfather, Martin A. Eisele, was a leading Republican in this state from the time he came here in 1871. Went to all the Republican conventions I think from around 1880 to 1944. I think he cast the first vote for Wendell Wilkie and was elected honorary vice president of the convention and things of that nature in his senior years. But my grandfather, Will Martin, was a very active Democrat. A very prominent Democrat. And I believe was the state chairman of the Democratic party. He was appointed United States attorney for this district by Woodrow Wilson and served in

that period, 1915 along about there to 1920. So I had them. . . both sides. My father was a Republican and I've been a Republican since I got out of law school, to the extent that I got identified. And when I got identified it was on the Republican side. My chief interest, coming in as a youngster at that time, was in the potential development of the two party system, which was kind of a latent affair until Mr Rockefeller came along. Although I became very involved in the Eisenhower election prior to that time.

[Interruption in tape.]

Walter De Vries: Your grandfather was a Republican; your father was a Republican; and you are a Republican. Were they all active in the party before Rockefeller?

Eisele: My grandfather, as I indicated, was very active and was either a national committeeman or state chairman on the Republican side. And my grandfather Martin was state chairman of the Democratic party some time.

W.D.V.: When did you get active?

Eisele: When I got back from law school. . . . I graduated in '50 and stayed and got my master's degree at Harvard in 1951. Then, as I recall, Gen Eisenhower was still in NATO and the Democrats were trying to get him to run and the Republicans were trying to get him to run. And I became active in the effort to get him to run as a Republican before he announced. This involved some citizen activity, what not, over in Hot Springs. That's where I lived. . . when I first came back I practiced over there associated with my grandfather's old firm, Martin, ??? and Martin. But by that time it had changed. My grandfather was dead, my uncle was dead and it was Hooten, Land and Mathews. So I got involved in that. I was over there for about a year and a half or a couple of years

before I came over here as an assistant United States attorney. So it was during the period of time when I was over there. And then during President Eisenhower's campaign, which was what, '52?

W.D.V.: '52 and '56.

Eisele: So the campaign would be what, '51 or '52? Anyway, that's when I first got involved. And then I was, you know, incidentally involved thereafter. I'm not sure in his second campaign against Adlai Stevenson. Let's see now, when did he go against Truman?

J.B.: Didn't--

Eisele: Didn't run against Truman. After he succeeded Truman, and I guess Stevenson was the first--

J.B.: Ran against Stevenson twice.

Eisele: That's right, he ran against Stevenson twice. Well, I can remember the election night, still in Hot Springs, so I was over there at the time.

W.D.V.: But you were the United States attorney through the eight years--

Eisele: Assistant United States attorney. No, for just three years, during Eisenhower's administration. Then I went into private practice with a law firm here.

J.B.: First administration or second?

Eisele: First. From. . . . Up til around the end of '53. I guess it was two years. Then I went into private practice with a law firm here until '59. Then went out on my own and was out on my own in a solo practice until I, until 1970, really, when I became federal judge. August of 1970.

W.D.V.: When did you get involved in Rockefeller's campaign?

Eisele: Well, I met him and as he got more and more interested

in the possibility of a two party system, started working at the grass roots and county committees and otherwise just trying to make it an active, viable party. I visited with him from time to time. He knew of my interest . But then it was not actually until he asked me to be his campaign manager for his first campaign in 1964 that I [became] really active in the Republican party. All over the state. And I was his campaign manager in that unsuccessful effort in '64. And then thereafter I was very much involved with him in terms of providing him with legal advice on a private basis all the way through his successful campaign in '66 and '68 and while he was governor and even after he was governor. And before I was appointed in 1970.

W.D.V.: You were his legal adviser while he was in office.

Eisele: I was a legal adviser in a private capacity. I didn't take a state position, administrative assistant, or anything in terms of a state position.

W.D.V: You weren't part of the administration as such?

Eisele: Not in the terms of what you're talking about. But I was very active and very much involved and on almost a daily basis. I helped him with his legislative program and administrative program and attempt to select good people to man and staff the various of government. Through the whole. . . all the problems which the governor faced. So that was really my [role?] More of a private counselor and with respect to the problems of state government.

J.B.: How do you assess the impact of his administration on the state of Arkansas?

Eisele: I'm going to be biased but I think it was the most dramatic and important thing in Arkansas politics. It's completely turned the

state around. It was like a new breath of fresh air. He brought out into the open and subjected to discussion all the old accepted ideas of politics, of race, of economics and got the people thinking about them in constructive and different ways. And he could do it when nobody who had been born and raised here locally could have really. I mean it was very easy for an Arkansan to disagree with him to accept him as a northerner who came in here with all those ideas and to hear him espouse them and to not resent it. And then ultimately to come to discuss and to be convinced and changed. But I don't believe anybody here, any local person, could have as dramatically confronted the traditions of the state. And we must remember what we're talking about. We're talking about the six terms of Orval Faubus and that he was following. Central High. All of the things that had occurred after the United States Supreme Court's decision in the Brown case. But he had a dramatic impact on the thinking of the business community in terms of what was necessary for the development of the state while he was head of the Arkansas Industrial and Development Commission under, appointed by Gov Faubus. In a period of his administration he doubled the per capita income. I say he, it's a little too strong. But he was responsible for the programs and the directions and the industrial development, the type of industrial development that has resulted in this. . . . Which was extremely important. Of course he immediately. . . and we're fully aware of this. . . . He more than anyone else in the South I think by that time opened the door to blacks. Completely. It was not with condition And particularly as a Republican. . . . He was offering an alternative which we felt had the potential of saving the whole Republican party on a national basis. Which would be, in effect, to really involve the blacks in the Republican party. And he was alone in that respect. The

South was at that time developing a Republican party. In most states what they were doing was trying to outconservative the conservative Democrats and say we're more reactionary than you are reactionary, you know. That was the vote getting appeal that they offered. He in turn was turning it all around and saying "No, that's not the way to go." I think on the whole he did not prevail during that period--and I haven't taken a good look at the southern states and you have. I don't know what all the facts are now in terms of the Republican party, but I imagine not many of them are in it. There may be exceptions. And of course. . . . You think of the party situation. . . . When he became governor he, by necessity, had to neglect the party. Parties were always falling into the hands of those who usually are willing to do all the hard tedious daily work. Very few people. Usually not of the quality that you want. But if you're not looking at it, next thing you know your party is back in the hands of the same type of people who controlled it before, interested in patronage, usually working hand in hand with the local Democratic organizations. Develop a don't rock the boat attitude. If a national Republican happens to get elected, fine, we'll get the spoils and work with the local Democratic organization. With the assumption being that the Democrats will always be in control. And over a period of time, to a certain extent--and this is also --the people with a lack of imagination got back into control. Not necessarily those who were not very conscientiously, sincerely wanting to develop a two party system, but who were, you know. . . thought of it kind of as a closed shop and didn't want to expand it too much.

W.D.V.: Isn't that, though about what's happened, judge?

Eisele: Yeah.

W.D.V.: Prior to 1966 there was no Republican party except maybe

a post office kind of a party. Then Rockefeller comes in and spends all that time and money and energy for four years. Now if you look back at the party again you see one representative in the house, one state senator, one Congressman.

Eisele: Yeah, you wonder was it all worth while in terms of his great objective.

W.D.V.: I'm talking about the state now, talking in terms of the party. Of building a two party system. Yet it tended to revert back to where it was.

Eisele: It did. And I think. . . . Of course also it is the victim of its own success. Of Rockefeller's own success. He completely changed Arkansas politics. The people he was fighting, the old moss backs and reactionaries. . . they've lost out. And Dale Bumpers came along and he adopted Rockefeller's program and we've had eight years, in effect, of good government. Probably going to have four more years of the same. I don't know, but it looks to me like all of it is Rockefeller program. So once the Republican party was no longer in effect the moderate , or in this context, the liberal party, offering to attract the liberal as opposed to the traditional Democratic conservative, then it lost its appeal. As soon as you were able to reform the Democratic party and bring in moderate to liberal leaders who carried on the policies and programs of Winthrop Rockefeller, then the Republicans. . . . There had not been the time necessary to establish firmly, and all the way down through the courthouse level, the two party system. And when you cut that off at the top, then it just started dying. That was coupled with the fact that Rockefeller, for the four years he was in office, even during that period while he was there, he was not able to pay attention to the party. And so then, after he got out of office and after his

death, it's still struggling and there are a lot of good people in it. But it almost looks like he'd been prompted. You lost because you won.

W.D.V.: Isn't that the paradox that you end up with a rejuvenated and stronger Democratic party after--

Eisele: Well, that's been the effect. I think that the Democrats, had the old guard persisted and been a little more successful for a few more years, where the people finally came to the conclusion that, well, there's no hope for the Democratic party. After all, they lived with them. This was home. You know, if you'd had 10-15 years, something of that nature, then I'm sure that they would not have gone back. They would have found their salvation in the Republican party. But too quickly the Democrats came around to realizing that in effect his views were the views of the future and they just adopted them and carried them forward. So. . . when you ask the significance, it seems perfectly obvious to me. That you have Arkansas, a southern state, with now what has to be considered a moderate-liberal tradition of good government. And I just don't know enough about the other states right now to know whether, maybe besides Carter--they're doing some good things over in South Carolina. And I think the blacks are forcing their way into Democratic politics in great numbers. And they're going to reform the Democratic party through that route. But they're not going to. . . it looks to me like at this point, they're not going to the Republican party to seek their salvation.

J.B.: Do you think the Republican party missed a real opportunity in not becoming the progressive party in the South?

Eisele: Yep. I think they missed the boat in a way from a national basis in not becoming the party that would represent the aspirations of minorities. All minorities. Particularly the blacks. And champion

those causes which traditionally, you know, Lincoln and others, you know, have been. . . . It's simply been the way of the Republican party. It's lost its way when it became too much dominated by big business and big fiscal interests. And it needs to get back to the people. Now I think. . . . I don't mean by that that the next president's not going to be a Republican. *[It depends on]* who the Democrats might choose to nominate. Because I don't see that the whole country is necessarily moving to the left. . . very little. Seems to me a strong conservative trend in this country. And although they may be disenchanted with the Nixon administration. . . I don't think the Democrats can just count on 1976. I think Bumpers made a good point there. If they get themselves a veto proof Congress in November, they may be giving up the presidency in 1976, because then there'll be no question as to the responsibility for programs. But when I talk about opportunity, I really think of my attitude. I look upon myself as kind of an Eisenhower Republican. Somewhat conservative and middle of the road in terms of economics, but liberal in terms of human rights. And this, I think, is what the party should stand for. And it would form a great appeal if it could. Of course within our party there are people--just like within the Democratic party, the whole spectrum is there. And it could change. And it still could change. But I think that was an opportunity in the '60s in which the whole South could have become, in effect, a very

on a national basis. The party's doing well in some of the southern states, but. . . until it really turns around in that area it's not going to be able to compete effectively with the Democrats. Certainly not in the South.

W.D.V.: Wasn't Rockefeller's approach in the South atypical of all the other southern states?

Eisele: I think so.

W.D.V.: You go back to the Goldwater thing in '64.

Eisele: Yeah. He was trying all along. Tried to get them, you know, to take a different approach. I was trying to think of some of the statistics that, you know, really substantiated his point about how the South should go. [Pause.] I know what it was. [Pause.] While he was governor, more blacks called themselves--by polls that we had taken--identified themselves as Republicans, in the state of Arkansas, percentage wise than in any other state in the United States. Came out and said "I am a Republican." Not. . . . See what happened was. . . . actually the big tendency was to go. . . . See he cut in, the polls would indicate that those people who would call themselves Democrats started shrinking. And more and more people started calling themselves independents. But it's a big, big step to call yourself a Republican. And then gradually the ones that were calling themselves Republicans. . . . it never got too big. You know, I think the heyday of the Republicans was not 15% who were calling themselves or saying "I am a Republican." But considerably more than 50% by this time were saying they were either Republican or independent. Then among the blacks you had this phenomena of their coming and saying "I am a Republican." While he was here. So that shows, I think, that had they opened their arms and said "Come, join us," you know, that blacks. . . . You know, if they'd done it, if it hadn't been just an isolated in Arkansas. A party approach. And particularly a southern Republican approach. I think it would have had a long lasting effect. I think they missed one of the boats. Opportunities will come upon them again, I'm sure.

J.B.: The Goldwater movement almost made that impossible, south-wide, didn't it?

Eisele: Yeah--

J.B.: Because of the people it brought into the party.

Eisele: Large measure it did. And of course that's where he had his very strongest support. You know, among southern Republicans. Except here, really, and we were in the posture of supporting Goldwater. But fighting the attitudes that were prevalent in the Goldwater camp particularly in the South. A very difficult position to be in. And of course there was a landslide for Johnson. Once again, that should have been enough of an indication of what should be done, for practical, political if not from moral and ethical reason. But it didn't happen.

J.B.: It strikes me that there were two major things that grew out of Rockefeller's administration and campaign. One was that he just turned the light on to ideas, which allowed issues to emerge which had been submerged for years. Allowed issues to emerge, to be ventilated, to be discussed.

Eisele: Right, right.

J.B.: To come to the front. And the second thing was just to have a very much of a modernizing impact on this state in everything from management techniques to just--

W.D.V.: Personnel.

J.B.: --personnel.

Eisele: Everything he did was wrong politically in terms of the tradition of this state. He came in to a fiscally strapped situation. Mr Faubus did not run against him, you know. He walked off and left a mess. There had been a--what do you call it?--windfall tax, double collection of taxes under the legislature so that the legislature, in effect, budgeted those taxes. And when the next program came around the resources were not even there. He had to come in to a terrible economic

situation. He had to ask for taxes. And he championed additional taxes although [he knew it was] political suicide. He took on this drinking thing, you know, in Arkansas. They had the bottle. . . you know, you take your bottle in the restaurant in a brown bag and all. And he fought for the legalization and control of that. And it was passed. And he didn't because he brought in professional fiscal people and planners and experts in state government, many of them from out of the state. Subsidized their salaries. And that was very controversial. And modernized the structure of the executive branch to the extent that he could under the old 1874 constitution. And in effect turned over to Mr Bumpers, who is a fine man, almost an ideal situation in which he has, without. . . he's had tremendous surpluses ever since he got in. The problem has never been how to raise money to fund existing programs, but, you know, what do you do with. . . . You know, have the legislature come in and decide what to do with the excess, the surpluses that are coming in. In today's paper, you know, there's a headline. [Some sum of money.] It's just been a magnificent situation as far as the governor is concerned. He hasn't been forced to deal with difficult financial problems. Has been able, on the other hand, to solve many of the problems of the state because the resources were there. In terms of education. . . . Of course Win's great contribution was in education. He felt, you know, that was the real hope of the South, to bring it's educational resources, systems up to national averages. And fought in every way to do that. As I say, under, in a situation where the resources were just, just not there. But I cant. . . you probably, if you've done any research, you'll have to go back and go through all of the dramatic things. He inherited the worst prison system in the United States. I mean it was on his desk when he walked in the office.

And although from a national point of view. . . some of the adverse publicity that came out tended to reflect on it, it was not justified at all. He completely turned it around from one of the most inhumane systems in the world to first of all a humane system and then fought all the time he was in there for progress and change. Never was satisfied with what, of course. And there's still room for improvement. But he did more to change that around than anybody in the history of the state. And he had, of course, this strong humanity. He was the one, you know, that pardoned all the ones in death row. That was one of the last things he did before he left the office. I don't mean pardon; I mean commuted their sentences to life imprisonment.

W.D.V.: Yet by the time he got to that last year of the second term. . . I mean, showed that he was way down on the polls and the polls showed that he was going to be in trouble against any kind of a moderate Democrat. What happened? What brought that about?

Eisele: He was always controversial. He was always. . . he did not shun or run from controversy. And four years of controversy and change and the people were, they wanted a breathing spell. Wasn't so much that they were dissatisfied with him. He's really a state hero right now, in my judgment. But he. . . they just said "Look, god'almighty, we just can't take any more of this right now. Let's just rest where we are." That was an attitude which was prevalent. However, his main motivation. . . and I perhaps already pointed. . . before his last race, before his last November race. . . . I was there when he made the decision to run. It was primarily based on his conviction that Orval Faubus would be his opponent. And it was just, you know, just almost happenstance that Dale Bumpers beat Joe Percell into the second place under Faubus in the run off by some 1,000 votes or less. And suddenly this

new face from Charleston was in the run off against Faubus. And I'm firmly convinced that he would have beaten Faubus. And would have had a third term, if that had been the race. But just as soon as the people had a chance. . . you know, like. . . . Of course there was a landslide against Faubus. Then wham! into the general election. It was just. . . . It was fore ordained.

W.D.V.: How did he feel about that? After all the work he'd done in the AIDC and all the work he'd done as governor.

Eisele: Oh, he was never bitter. You talking about losing?

W.D.V.: Yes.

Eisele: He was never bitter about it. I think that he recognized as soon as Dale Bumpers decisively beat Faubus in the run off that. . . . He was going to fight and I think he had some of the same attitudes and feelings that Mr Fulbright had in running against Mr Faubus, of frustration. . . . I mean running against Mr Bumpers. An inability to make him deal with the issues. But the people didn't, weren't a bit interested. I mean by this time they were, they wanted peace and quiet but they still wanted a continuation of the life that Rockefeller had brought to the state. And they looked upon Bumpers and about everytime you talked about a controversial issue he was saying "Me, too. I agree with the governor." "I think he did a good job of that. I think that's right. I think I'll continue that. It will be my purpose to continue the progress that's been made." And he wouldn't say a bad word about Win. And never has. He's always admired him. This is awfully hard to [unclear]. I don't think he. . . you may have to talk to some others to find out if he ever personally resented it. Certainly he wasn't a bit bitter. . . .

J.B.: How about the rejection of the Republicans in so far as his

becoming chairman after that?

Eisele: State chairman?

J.B.: Right.

Eisele: Well, you may know something that I don't know. I don't know that he ever wanted to be state chairman.

J.B.: Who was it told us--

W.D.V.: John Ward.

Eisele: Well, John would know.

W.D.V.: He offered himself as a candidate for state chairman.

Eisele: I think. . . . John would be the one to rely upon. He would really know. He was there. My impression. . . I do recall. . . was really. . . . He saw the thing coming apart and that he had spent all this time on. Not just since '64, but from earlier. And I think he was hoping that now he was out of office he could get it back on line and make this, you know. . . . And I think he was. . . kind of a gesture. But. . . don't. . . really, Ward, John Ward would know. [Something about being able to get more factual information, data from Ward.]

W.D.V.: You said Rockefeller did what nobody else in this state could

[End of side of tape.]

W.D.V.: It appears to us that you've gone back to where it was.

Eisele: Unfortunately. . . . Well, I, it's not [going/gone?] back to where it was because the whole state changed. But unfortunately we're circumstances in that respect. Unless the Democratic party fails to meet the challenge and the aspiration of the people and if it reverts to any type of thing it was prior to Win coming along, then I think it would be an excellent opportunity. Otherwise, I think, the hope

of the Republican party is to go the way, just the opposite from the way Win did, or tried to. And of course I think he did it the right way when he came along because he capitalized on his own self as a resource. But now I think it's going to be, depend on the ability of the party to attract young people who have imagination and constructive programs and are able to fight it out there on the local level and win elections.

W.D.V: Long process.

Eisele: And then. . . . And that's a long process. And of course it's more permanant if we succeed. I certainly don't want to be pessimistic about it, but I'm And things could change dramatically and quickly, just depending upon circumstances. But. . . local. . . . Now I mean as opposed to how many people we vote in to the Republican candidate in 1976 in Arkansas, [presidential?] candidate. . . . Might still be a majority, I don't know. Although it may well be that Mr Bumpers will be the candidate for the Democratic party, in which case [laughter] it may be that he'll get 70% or whatever he's used to getting here in Arkansas. But depending upon who the Democrats put up, we could easily still vote. . . its middle of the road somewhat conservative attitude. But that doesn't help the Republican party of Arkansas, which is what you're talking about. And I just. . . . Of course, as I say, it could change. If you really found some person who captured the imagination, came along and was a leader and. . . . It might go. But I don't see it in the near future.

W.D.V.: Does Win-Paul fit that category?

Eisele: He's really developing. You know, I don't know anything about his ambitions, political ambitions, if any. He's what, I don't know, 25 or 26? Something like that. And I should imagine. . . I think he thinks this is home and it is home and I think he'll get him-

self firmly established in his business. He's working hard at it. He's learning. And I think that maybe down the line he will--all the Rockefeller's I know, sooner or later, get involved in some aspect of public life. Not necessarily political life. I just don't know. I don't know. It would be. . . it wouldn't be in the near future unless you know something I don't know I wouldn't anticipate it happening soon. But the situation might change by the time he would be, where he might be interested. Of course he could provide that type of leadership. I think it needs both that type of person, a symbol, as well as conditions and circumstances got to be right. It's difficult being a Republican in the South, as you know.

W.D.V.: One of the things that generated, apparently, the controversy, was his relationship with the state legislature. What was the reason for that inability to get along?

Eisele: I think that's a complete misconception of what happened. It's just exactly the opposite. If you look at it. . . when he came in, I think his first term he had one Republican in the house and one in the senate. And I believe we passed a good 90% of the legislation that was proposed.

W.D.V.: I was referring to the second term.

Eisele: Well, then, in the second go around. . . . Even then, I think you'll find. . . . If you really compared it to the record of other governors, with the legislature, in terms of their program--and there are a few very popular governors and maybe Mr Bumpers is one of them--I mean he is one of them. Which might be an exception. But I think you'll find that his record is as good as, better than the average Democrat governor, in his second term. See, there have only been two governors in the history of Arkansas that have served more than two terms.

That was Jeff Davis back in the early 1900s and Faubus. Jeff served three and Faubus served six. But everybody else served two. . . one or two. So when he came along. . . . And when you're still in there fighting for taxes and your second term and still in there fighting for controversial measures, it's, you know, it's tough. Bumpers could have had a third term because his whole tenure has been marked by calm, lack of controversy, and good government, which reflected that they were solving problems, had the means to do it. And so he could of, I'm sure, walked into a third term if he'd wanted it.

[Interruption on tape.]

J.B.:--the psyche of the Arkansas voter. That more or less remarkable result in 1968 of electing Wallace, Rockefeller and Fulbright.

Eisele: And Fulbright, that's right.

J.B.: How do you. . . what does that mean?

Eisele: Well everybody speaks of it as evidence of the independence of the Arkansas voter. And I think it cannot be overlooked. I just think they do discriminate, in terms of the office a person is seeking, the policy issues which they identify and which are associated with that office, and the directions they expect the particular candidate to take. In other words I think they vote. . . . Very much involved with personalities but they're also involved to a certain extent, with issues and philosophy. Traditionally, except until now, you've had this phenomena. Why isn't it just as remarkable that you elect Fulbright and McClellan? Just constantly. . . over the years. There's no way of explaining that except possibly in that particular situation that I think is the politics of personality. We were impressed to have people of the stature of both of them their. And after they were there for a while they capitalized on it and they could beat, you know, practically anybody. Then you come along with a. . . . I don't think either one of

them ever faced the type of of opposition that Fulbright ran into during their entire careers. So . . . a lot of the dissatisfaction with Fulbright is opposition to the war and the Johnson administration and so forth. Then there never was anyone big enough to take him on.

J.B.: Could that be interpreted at all as a subconscious reaction to Lyndon Johnson? You had Rockefeller. At least he was a Republican. You had George Wallace who was, of course--

Eisele: Yeah.

J.B.: -- anti Lyndon Johnson. And you had Fulbright, who was anti-Johnson.

Eisele: Who was anti Johnson. I think Fulbright was a great beneficiary of timing. He took on Lyndon Johnson and the time his election came around, it was the most popular sport in America. And he had been in effect vindicated. And this . . . it just couldn't have worked out more beautifully from his point of view. By that time, like you say. And then there's this great populist feeling which Faubus represents in the South and here. And I think Wallace represented it in terms of the national issues at times. So I think they went that way. I think--although Faubus made a pretty good showing this last time. Still . . . what was it, 25%, so that's not much. I think that Wallace and others were hoping that he would storm in there and get into the run off and maybe possibly beat Pryor. In which case you would have had a Faubus-Wallace type of orientation. It would have made a significant impact in favor of Wallace in the South. I think what happened, actually happened here during the gubernatorial race, turned off, turned down the enthusiasm for Wallace. Probably throughout the South when they saw that happen. I don't know. But at least it lost the opportunity for a real shot in the arm.

[End of interview.]