

This is an interview with Albert Brewer, former governor of Alabama, conducted on July 9, 1974 by Jack Bass and Walter De Vries. Transcribed by Sarah Geer.

W.D.V.: One of the questions we ask is, is there a difference between the South as compared with the other regions of the country? Are there any southern qualities or characteristics that differentiate it from the rest of the country?

Brewer: I think it would be difficult for anyone in the South to answer that, unless he had lived in a part of the country, or had had broad experience in other parts of the country. We're told, and we think, that fundamentally southerners tend to have greater feeling for people. That is, to be perhaps more outgoing, generally, personality. Perhaps seek out and make friends more readily. To enjoy a more harmonious personal relationship, perhaps, than we think of as existing in urban areas in the north and east. But it's inconceivable to be to think that people in the South have any greater concern for the future, or the children or the education they'll get or for the economic opportunity they'll enjoy, than people do anywhere. I think that, whether it's because of climate or heredity or habit or custom, or whatever it might be, that the way of life in the South is perhaps more leisurely, less hurried. But that would be because . . . or have contributed, at least, by less density of population and a world of factors like that. People, I think, in the South, are people who generally are emotional. People in the South may be emotional about other issues. People in the South traditionally

have had a strong sense of history, pride, perhaps, in their forebears and what has gone before. Many in the South have had instilled in them, perhaps, a pride in an era a century ago that, if they . . . or perhaps I should say we - had lived in, then, we would have been not a part of the ruling caste in which we express pride today. It's a strange thing. I can't believe that, fundamentally, that different people in their ambitions, wishes, problems and desires, that there might be a difference in their way of life.

J.B.: Could you sketch for us just your own political background?

Brewer: Yes. I was elected to the legislature in '54.

J.B.: You were how old then?

Brewer: Twenty-five. And served in the state house three terms. I was speaker of the house my third term. Then ran for and was elected lieutenant governor in 1966. Served there until '68, when Mrs. Wallace died and I succeeded to the office of governor and served there until '71. Since then I've been a private citizen, who is still interested in public life.

W.D.V.: During that period of time, what are the basic political changes that have occurred in the state?

Brewer: Really remarkable, like a roller-coaster. I think back to . . . well, when I was in law school and undergraduate school, I was interested in politics, of course, and I can recall then that the state was probably a pretty good example of populism. Governor Folsom was governor, when I finished high school, actually, so during all the years when my interest in politics was whetted most strongly, he was in office. I can remember the emphasis, at that time, with economic . . . massive road-building programs, the evidence and interest in old age pension programs, and things

of this nature. Social welfare programs, that were very fundamental, sophisticated programs such as Medicaid and things of the present era, were just unthought of then. But we went through that period. I can remember the first political . . . first time I voted in a political campaign, in a presidential campaign. I voted for Stevenson, who carried Alabama handily. Probably the . . . I think I would say probably certainly as liberal, if not more so in the strict sense of the word, as McGovern, yet he carries Alabama overwhelmingly against a popular military figure, Eisenhower. Supreme Court decision in '54, in Brown, was my first campaign. And the court had not ruled. It ruled in late May and the primary was in early May. But all the candidates were running against the anticipated ruling, even then. But in spite of that, in all the furor about it in '56, Stevenson carried Alabama again, handily, over Nixon . . . I mean, over Eisenhower. And then in '60, still, Kennedy got . . . we had one of those crazy situations with our independent electors. We then had eleven electoral votes. Five of the eleven electors defected and voted for someone else. But six of the eleven voted for Kennedy. But the Democratic ticket carried the state, and it carried the Nixon race in '60. And, again, rather handily, the Democratic electors were elected. I'm honest, I don't recall now whether they were committed publicly, some for Kennedy and some uncommitted, so to speak, or how it lined up, but the people voted the rooster, as we call it, then anyway. That was in '60 and we'd already had some violence. We'd had the Lucy incident at the University in '56, when she was admitted, attended class for three, four, five days, and then was expelled. But a lot of feeling then. No difference electionwise. We were still on the pocketbook

issue, so to speak. Then, of course, in '64 Goldwater, it all flip-flopped. But we made the gamut from traditional populist politics, there, twenty-five years ago, in a period of about fifteen years, and rather dramatically, to the "New South" horror, the Southern Strategy, or whatever we might want to call it, But we saw the influx of . . . suppose . . . want a better word . . . racial politics in the electorate. In '58, race played a significant part in the governor's race in Alabama. There were other factors, to be sure, but this was a factor. '54, Governor Folsom, who enjoyed such black support as there was then, and I remember this vividly, when he was questioned about his attitude on integration of public schools, passed it off by saying he wasn't going to make little black children go to school with white children. Stated the reverse of it in a way that really minimized the detrimental effect . '58, Patterson was elected with undertones of . . . strong undertones. In fact, Wallace, when he defeated that year, accused him of having the support of the Ku Klux Klan. Made that the primary issue in the run-off. It was not so significant then. '62, Wallace took that mantle and carried it. Of course, it stayed dominant, really, until a couple of years ago.

W.D.V.: When did that change?

Brewer: It's hard to say.

W.D.V.: Was it the primary consideration in your campaign?

Brewer: Yes. It was dominant in ours, in '70. So the change has been since then.

W.D.V.: Do you see it operating at all at the state level now? Is it open?

Brewer: The racial issue? Not as an open factor. It's still there beneath

the surface. But the way it is now, I don't know. There is still a great deal of racial feeling, animosity. I hear casual comments all the time, and you will if you're around a few days. And statements are made, racially disparaging. May be criticism of a court order in a school case. It may be criticism of a black being in a restaurant or in a room with a white in a hospital or just any number of places. You hear these things. They're there. They're basic human feelings, I suppose, but as a factor in a . . . in political races now, I'm just not sure. Strange how integrated work conditions, plants and factories and so forth, may have accelerated some of this feeling. It may have cast the races together in circumstances, conditions, where they have never been exposed to each other before, and might not have developed this feeling had they not been exposed that way. But I'm not certain that it's so much racial as it is just human nature. Some people get along with other people, and some don't. Strange how well the school situation has gone in the South.

W.D.V.: Do you feel that the systematic exploitation of that issue in '70 was the principal reason for your election?

Brewer: Yes.

W.D.V.: Do you think it could be done again today?

Brewer: No.

W.D.V.: Has there been that much of a change in attitude in four years?

Brewer: Yes.

W.D.V.: How do you explain that?

Brewer: I think people are tired of it. In fact, I think the people realize, enough people realize, that they had been had, so to speak. That they had been used, themselves exploited, through fear - people are afraid

of the unknown -that they have been exploited, in effect, by the racial issue. And I think there was some resentment of it, when it was all over, on the part of people. When you run into things like Well, I remember one of the most effective . . .

W.D.V.: Well, how do you feel about that personally? You, in effect, really were the last person to really be, in a sense, exploited on that issue. Now, it's not at that issue, but in terms of an open, public debate. It's gone.

Brewer: How do I feel about that?

W.D.V.: How do you feel about that?

Brewer: Well, of course, in a sense I feel that perhaps we helped end it. That maybe the approach we took helped end it. You know, it was a strange thing in Alabama prior to 1970, no candidate dared give bumper stickers to blacks to put on their car. You didn't dare solicit their support. In fact, if they were supporting you, you asked them to keep it quiet, please. Because this would be utilized. We had I remember vividly on the day that someone from our campaign staff came in in the spring of 1970 and said, "We've got a horrible decision to make. We're getting ready to put bumper sticker crews out there, and these blacks are going to want bumper stickers on their cars. What do we do with them?" And I said, "You put them on." And it was such a simple thing and today, you know, you wouldn't say put them on, you'd say, "Beg them to take them, like you do everybody else." But then, this was a major decision, because of the p.r. effect of it. The thing that was really devastating to us was not so much an open campaign to all the people, and put it on that basis, but radio advertising, and you may have heard of one particular one of a voice comes on in a sort of an undertone and says, "How would you like for

your wife to get stopped on a dark night on a lonely road by a black state trooper?" And this sort of thing, you know, and just lay on the fears of the people. Just what sort of fears, I guess And it was effective. And it was told and advertised that if I were elected in '70 that we'd have black state troopers all over Alabama. Or that - it got to be a joke, really - they'd say, "If you vote for Brewer, you're going to have black state troopers all over Alabama." And a fellow told me about a year later, he said, "Well, I voted for you, and sure enough, they have black state troopers all over Alabama." But a court order had something to do with that. It was effective. Strange thing that where it was most effective was in the over-whelmingly white counties of the state. We carried every black belt county, whether blacks were in a majority or not, but where the heavy populations of blacks were. We carried them. These were the people who lived with them, associated with blacks daily and all, so they knew there was nothing to fear. But in the predominantly white counties, and many of them in the mountainous rural areas, where there were no blacks at all, we'd just get beat to pieces on the race issue. It was a real strange thing.

W.D.V.: Would you do it differently, now?

Brewer: No, we wouldn't run the campaign any differently, because from the standpoint of taking a different position on this, this subject, it'd be impossible to serve effectively, I think, if you ran that kind of campaign. It's a divisive sort of thing, in fact, devastating to a state. Of course, it's one of the reasons why I stayed . . . lagged so far behind all these years. Spend so much time fighting each other and fighting imaginary enemies, these hidden fears and everything that

we have, that we've been unable to do things that needed to be done.

W.D.V.: Well, do you think that that issue . . . ?

Brewer: I would do some things differently, don't get me wrong. But insofar as approaches to issues, they'd be the same. We emphasized some issues.

W.D.V.: Does the removal of that issue mean the state has turned a corner on some of these other problems?

Brewer: No, not necessarily. The big problem, as I see it, and my theory is that the difference in states like Alabama and North Carolina has been leadership. North Carolina did things in the thirties that we're just now doing. It's remarkable. North Carolina had leadership that might have been criticized then, but had the foresight to borrow money and build highways and develop educational institutions and all this sort of thing, that just goes with economic growth. And some of the states weren't doing it. Now I know we're told that North Carolina is more prosperous than we are, and all that sort of thing. I daresay this was not true in the thirties. There wasn't any prosperity in the thirties anywhere in the South. But it takes leadership with vision to do things, and it takes some boldness and it takes some daring. So much leadership - and I have a theory about this - tries to find out which way the masses are going, and then runs around and gets in front of them, instead of by persuasiveness and ingenuity and ability leading the masses in the way that they ought to go. I think this has been the difference between the have and have-not states in the South.

J.B.: What's going to be the, both, economic and long range/^{political} effect of Tennessee Tom Bigley's project.

Brewer: It could be tremendous. I'm not an economist, and I'm not sure that any of those fellows are reliable, because I know when we were working on the initial construction program - that is, trying to get funds from Congress for actual construction - the states - and there're five who make up the compact, who contribute to the support of the compact - would hire economists, whose purpose was to show the cost/benefit ratio, and how attractive the project was. Well, of course, those figures were all slanted in favor of the folks that were paying the bill, which is something that you hire experts for. I think it's impossible to determine. But just on the surface, it opens up the entire mid-continent United States to the port at Mobile, in a real selfish way. Mobile ought to be one of the ten largest ports, and one of the ten busiest ports, in the country, with the completion of this waterway. And with the demands that we have on energy, on transportation facilities, and I'm thinking particularly now of rail. This offers a very attractive alternative. It ought to open the region up for industrial development. Not just in Alabama and Mississippi, but on through to the mid-west, because of the access through the waterway to the entire world.

W.D.V.: Can I get back to your point about Alabama not having leadership that some of the other states have had, but it's basically been a lull since 1963. A couple of years

Brewer: Oh, no. I'm thinking on back to the thirties, when people were doing

W.D.V.: Well, what about since '62? How do you assess that period?

Brewer: We've had . . . we've had a I think it's been an improved time. I'd say since World War Two it's been in improved time. World War

Two was good for states like Alabama and Mississippi and Georgia and the deep southern states. The young people saw the world. They saw this country and they saw the entire world. And they saw . . . and they associated with people everywhere. They saw another side to life, and they saw a great many advantages that we didn't enjoy here. And many of them came back determined that things were going to be better. I really think . . . well, prior to World War Two the leadership in Alabama had been very conservative. The politics of the state were dominated by the black belt, the landed gentry, so to speak, in association with your selfish business interests. And they wanted a laissez-faire governor and legislature and everything else. The main thing, the status quo. This was fine. Most of our lack of industrial development came from a lack of any desire for it, in . . . for new people moving in and all this sort of thing. One of the strongest supporters of the Tennessee Valley Authority I know, one of the most progressive people I know, is a fellow in North Alabama who fought TVA bitterly, just with every resource at his command [as a private] citizen. And he was just bitter about it. He said David Lilienthal came to Decatur one day and came to see him to express to him the purposes of the Tennessee Valley Authority. And he said when he came in his office he resignedly said to Lilienthal, "Well, what are you going to do for us?" And Lilienthal said, "Not a damn thing. We're going to make it possible for you to do something for yourselves." And over the years that area of the state, I think, has been a leader in Alabama, showing what could be done.

W.D.V.: Were you saying that World War Two produced a group of leaders

that had an impact on the state . . . ?

Brewer: I think so, yes. No question about it. Perhaps more than that . . . not just leaders, but citizens who were interested and willing to try to wrench control of things away from these who had dominated politics. Well, Jim Folsom's election was an example. He was elected in '46. merely by the veteran vote. Jim was a clown, he campaigned that way. I mean, he was a clown mentally, now. Very smart man. But he was a show-man, and he campaigned that way. It was the end of the war, and everyone had a happy, care-free attitude, and he just fit right into the mold. And his primary opposition was a tool of those who had controlled government in the state for a long time. And the masses just elected Jim. He really got them interested. He was the first campaigner who ever really went to the people with stump campaigning, out . . . he called it to the branch heads. But he'd do political rallies, you know, four or five a day, and they'd be in little rural communities rather than in the cities. People just flocked from miles around to hear him. But it brought people closer to government, gave them a sense of someone being interested in them, thinking about them. And it had to be good. Wallace does this. He has a . . . well, until he was injured, he had a tremendous capacity for attracting a feeling on the part of people that they have a stake in government together. He was interested in them. Admittedly, a lot of times he gained their interest by setting up straw men to attack, and joining with the people against a common enemy, whether it be the New York Times, or federal civil rights acts, or whatever it might be. Take whatever enemy or adversary is convenient at the time when you want to rally the people together, but it was a very effective thing. Jim Folsom did it

to some extent, with the G s, and folks like this. He always ran against the black belt plantation owners, or the land barons, in his heyday. Made the people feel that this was a group seeking to oppress the masses. That's more of a strategy thing. I see this emerging. You know, we didn't have nine months of school in Alabama till after World War Two. That is, a mandatory nine months school term in every school system, until after World War Two. In the . . . in those years, in the first decade after World War Two, a great many people, young people, got interested in politics, came to the legislature. They were concerned about things like education and industrial development, highways and . . . but you just see how massive government involvement, and programs of this kind, helped build the state. I know we had seen it in my home town of Decatur, didn't get a new industry until 1948, I suppose. But when we got one, everyone felt it, knew what it meant, and liked it. Liked the idea. J.B.: What do you . . . how do you assess the state of the Republican party in Alabama?

Brewer: Negligible.

J.B.: Has it come and gone?

Brewer: No, I don't think that. It's fragmented. It's afflicted with the little jealousies and envies that permeate organizations. I started to say small organizations. I should say organizations. It has had some attractive candidates, and has been able to hold those people, like the three congressmen who are very able, Buchanan, Edwards and Dickinson. They're very able, they're very popular with their people. Probably of the three, only Edwards had a genuinely Republican constituency. That is, a majority, in Mobile district. So many people in Alabama have left the traditional Democratic umbrella, and

now call themselves independent. And I think this is a national phenomenon, too. The Goldwater thing in '64 helped bring this to bear. It helped create this sort of climate. People didn't really want to call themselves Republicans. They said they were independents. There was some of this in '52 with Eisenhower, '56. They/called Eisenhower Democrats. Still only a few Republicans, but a great many Eisenhower Democrats or independents, as they evolved. I don't know what the . . . if we had a party registration bill or law in Alabama, we'd probably find maybe a hundred, hundred and fifty thousand registered Republicans. They don't have primaries, generally. And if people who would like to say they're Republicans want to participate in government, they have to vote in the Democratic primary, or else they're precluded. And so there's sort of half and half.

J.B.: The Democratic party still operates a primary, though?

Brewer: Yes. The Republicans had a statewide primary two years ago, when Blott ran for the Senate against . . . or for the Republican nomination, and got it, and then opposed Sparkman in the general election. That's the first statewide primary, I believe, they ever had. They've had county primaries before, and did this year, but I believe that's the first statewide primary. And it was disappointing. Goodness, there must have been 60,000 votes cast in the primary, the Republican primary. The Democrat primary probably had, I would guess offhand, 900,000 votes cast.

W.D.V.: How would you characterize the Democratic party in Alabama? Some say it's got ideological factions. Some say it's a geographical split north and south. Some say it's Wallace, anti-Wallace. How would you characterize it?

Brewer: (Chuckles.) Probably some of all of those things. The fundamental

thing goes back to '48, to the Dixiecrats. After '48, the old-line Democrats, so-called yellow dog Democrats, undertook to purge the Dixiecrats. And in '50 . . . no, in '52, adopted a loyalty oath. Those who had not voted the Democratic ticket could not run in a Democratic primary. Which is an interesting thing, and how I got in politics. I had a real good friend who we were trying to get to run for the legislature in '54, and he finally confessed that he couldn't run, because he had voted for Eisenhower in '52, and he couldn't take the oath. So I was made to run for this place that was opened up in our section. So, this was part of it, where the loyalists, so called, got control at that time, and have maintained it to this day. It's been a lack of general interest in the committee. Many instances, the same people have remained on the committees. And the loyalists have just maintained control. So-called loyalists. Who now have . . . both groups, the Dixiecrat group has come a great deal toward the middle, and is now more in a posture of wanting to work within the framework of the national party. The loyalists, primarily, were hung up on the idea that the people of Alabama were denied the right to vote for the Democratic nominee for president. I wasn't old enough in '48 to vote for president, but if I had been, I could not have voted for Harry Truman for president. And there's something to say for this sort of argument. In '68, the Democrats had to come in under a third party label to get Humphrey on the ticket, where the people of Alabama could even vote for him for president. So this has been their hang up. Well, now, as they have accommodated themselves, perhaps, more, and as the Dixiecrats have evolved more toward at least working within the framework of the national party, you find that

there's not such a great variety of interests. A lot of the difficulty now may just be pure habit. I think the reason for the split this spring, on the election of chairman, would be, one, distrust by the Wallaces . . . by the loyalists of Wallace. You might say right now he's within the framework, but the background . . . they're wondering if things don't go right if he'll take his ball and bat and go back to his third party home and leave them out in the cold again. So they're scared to go too far in accommodating him for fear they'll lose it all. And at the same time it's a matter of pride. The Wallace supporters feel like the government . . . the governor is titular head of the party and ought to have a voice in the selection of the chairman.

W.D.V.: Yet Vance's election was a clear defeat for Wallace.

Brewer: It certainly was.

W.D.V.: Why don't people read it that way?

Brewer: Two reasons. One, there's just not much interest in it. And two, the press really hasn't laid it out like that.

W.D.V.: But it is the case?

Brewer: Oh, sure. Sure.

W.D.V.: What does that mean to you? I mean, he was just re-nominated at the height of his popularity, yet in that executive committee did not bring off the election of his own chairman.

Brewer: Well, I'm not sure. It can mean one of two things. Either he didn't do his homework, because it's inconceivable to me that a governor who wants to couldn't elect his chairman, of the committee. Either didn't do his homework, or he got some real bad advice. Too, may not be that much difference. They were involved, I know, in the elections, trying to

elect people friendly to Wallace, to the committee. Trying to get control of the committee. Re-apportionment helped the Vance forces in many respects, because re-apportionment established some predominantly black districts and like this, that were fairly easy for the Vance group to control. But Wallace was there at the meeting, sitting on the front row, when he got clobbered. And he thought he was going to win, I believe, or he wouldn't have been at the meeting. Just don't get humiliated publicly like this. And particularly Wallace. It just doesn't happen. But no governor should. And if he does, whoever's responsible for his being there ought to have his head chopped off. He ought to be gone.

W.D.V.: Does the fact that none of the congressional delegation were at that meeting indicate a lack of interest in the whole executive committee?

Brewer: No. No. It indicates this to me, that if they were present, given the Wallace popularity, they'd have to be there in such a posture that it would indicate their support of him. And they didn't want to do that. And, now, I've really done some speculating. I know this would be true for some of them. For some of them there may be other reasons. I daresay they didn't want to be there because they didn't want to be in a posture of either group's pointing the finger at them and saying, "You're here to help that side, not this side." And there'd be no way . . . you know, a meeting like that is like the difficult admonition, you're either for me or against me. If you're not for me you're against me. Both sides might take that attitude. Wallace has made the job of the congressmen very difficult over the years. It has probably been better for them the last four years than any other time in the service of those who've been up there during this time, because always before, here they were, sitting

on the Democratic side of the aisle. Frankly, there's no other place to sit unless they sat in the aisle itself. And yet, at home, having to, at least on the surface, give support to him because of his immense popularity. Trying to maintain the friendly relationship with the party under whose auspices and from whose caucus they receive their assignments, and at the same time back home supporting what in effect is a third party or anti-Democratic stance. Very difficult task for them. One that would . . . that Congressman Preyer, for example, would not really face in North Carolina.

J.B.: How do you assess the meaning of Senator Kennedy's visit last year?

Brewer: I don't know how to assess it.

J.B.: Both the meaning and the impact.

Brewer; Well, I think from his standpoint, he had nothing to lose. I really feel, at that point, three years before the convention, primaries, everything, and as I analyze his following, it's so intensely loyal that he could afford to stray occasionally without alienating them. I think his following is loyal enough that he expressed a view that . . . or if they got the impression that an accommodation with Wallace was necessary to put him in the White House, that they would tolerate it. At the same time, Wallace's following is probably of like loyalty and intensity. That they'd excuse almost anything he did, if they were convinced that it would help toward whatever end they had in mind at that time. I'm not sure that either of them could get away with an extended campaign of this kind. Kennedy got many rumblings, and Wallace got many. Who got more, I don't know. Neither, I don't think, tried to make a secret of the fact that the reaction was negative, from mail and this sort of thing. Of course, folks who are upset are more likely to write you than people who are pleased.

Just works this way in politics. But the blacks, particularly, seem to be getting increasingly concerned about the willingness of some Democrats to accept Wallace. And a lot of Wallace's right-wing supporters are becoming increasingly concerned about his apparent ambition and his willingness to compromise some of the things they thought he stood for, in order to gain a place on the national ticket. Trying to equate that in terms of votes and delegates or something, I can't do it. I don't think anyone else can at this time.

W.D.V.: What do you think is the source of that immense popularity?

Brewer: Wallace

W.D.V.: Usually the longer the politician is around, the longer he's been in office and so on, *[the more he goes]* down hill.

Brewer: I don't know. I really think . . . I know this, that during my years in the legislature, and in the lieutenant governor's office while Wallace was governor, or while Lurleen was governor, but while he was there, he had many downs, the high points and the low points. When he got down, there would always be a crisis of some kind.

W.D.V.: You mean a real crisis, or . . . ?

Brewer: Well, an apparent crisis, that tended to rally everyone around. The . . . well, some of the out of state things. An appearance on Meet The Press could be enough. An attack by Richmond Flowers, who was then attorney general of Alabama, on Wallace for something, would be enough to bring the vocal supporters back, and

W.D.V.: How did he do that? How did he . . . after he this crisis, how did he rally the support around?

Brewer: Well, the support rallied automatically. Automatically. When he . . . well, now, I won't say that. Much of it was contrived. Letter writing

campaigns, letters to the news . . . to the editors, these call-in radio programs, this sort of thing. Utilized very effectively. This idea of it's us against them, Find a common enemy somewhere, it's us against them. All Wallace's speeches would be how many people he spoke to at

Hall in Detroit and what he told them, and that he was cultured and refined and so forth. And all this kind of thing. It was a phenomenon of the times.

W.D.V.: Doesn't that tend to exhaust people?

Brewer: It does, and it's evidence of this. We had a poll made in '72 . . . let me say it was a poll made in '72 that we had access to. Just a week before the shooting in Maryland. And Wallace's job rating was down somewhere around 50, 51, 52 per cent, favorable. It was the lowest job rating I've ever seen on an Alabama office holder, by far, which indicated a weariness with all of the . . . sort of the same thing, you know, for eight years, or ten. And then just a few days after the shooting, someone who was running for office had a poll made, and the job rating went up like 85 per cent, or some outlandish figure, just like a meteor. Then in a few weeks it had leveled on back down to 70, where it remained during the polling period of that election year. But it was real strange. But it indicated that people had tired, and had despaired, perhaps, somewhat. The legislature had been through an unproductive session in '71. Didn't even pass an appropriations bill. Arrangements were made with a bank to loan state employees money in lieu of their paychecks, that executed an assignment of

(End of recording.)