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This is an interview with Ray Jenkins, Editor of the Alabama Journal. The interview was conducted by Jack Bass on February 5, 1974 and was transcribed by Susan Hathaway.

RAY JENKINS: The primary is conducted in a peculiar way. I guess the Democrats engineered this, but we don't have party registration, but when you go to the polls, the poll taker says that you have got two machines, and the poll taker says, "Do you want to vote in the Republican primary or the Democratic primary." If you elect to vote in the Republican primary, that means you give up your right to vote on virtually every local office. You might be voting for no more than a Congressman in an unimportant election because it is just the primary and the Congressman is going to win it anyway. They have extremely low votes in those things. It seems like the last time that out of a million votes cast, only 25,000 were cast in the Republican primary. So someone throws out this possibility, what if a black decides to run as a Republican against the Republican Congressman? Now the blacks don't give a damn about those other county

offices. They give a damn, but by gosh they could mobilize one hell of a vote in that circumstance. They could easily offset 25,000 votes in a district without any problem at all and dislodge a Congressman for his seat. This would be most interesting, and then they would be the Republican nominee running against the Democrat in November.

J.B.: Ray, you know what the book is basically. I mean, you have seen the outline and the standard opening question is, what have been the major changes since 1948? And the standard opening response is the change in the race situation. Why don't you just tell me a little bit. How does Alabama politics operate right now and what has led up to it? I don't care if you want to start at '48 and go forward or start now and go backwards. Usually it is better to start at the beginning and go forward, but sometimes it is easier to do the other and set the stage. What is the state of the development of the Republican party? Why don't we start with that.

Jenkins: Well, generally speaking, you know, you can get what happened in Alabama and V. O. Key gives you an absolutely flawless jumping off point. He has it down as pat as anybody does in his chapter on Alabama in '48. Well, since then there has been a struggle between Dixiecrat and Loyalists and what have you, and

generally speaking the Loyalists have maintained dominance. They've done it mostly, I'd say, by their superior mastery of the political process than they have through the winning of the hearts of the people and that sort of thing. They are just a hell of a lot smarter than the Dixiecrats are. There was, for example, in '58 one of these gigantic battles, this always centered on the control of the Democratic state executive committee, which I maintain is an unimportant thing. The party politics and structure is relatively unimportant and that applies today as it did then, but they still had these titantic battles over it. It is important to the extent that they do control, or can control, the Presidential election to a large extent. But in any case, there were always these very close battles with, generally speaking, South Alabama - this is a thread that runs back through Alabamas history, the conservative South Alabama voting Dixiecrat, and the somewhat liberal North Alabama voting Loyalist. Even in '58, when the states righters won control of the Democratic Committee, the Governor that year, Patterson, who is a Loyalist, largely through the ineptitude of the states righters and also through some very shrewd political pressure within the committee was able to turn the result around and elected a Loyalist chairman and kept the party Loyalist. Of course, just

throughout in the Presidential election, it's always been back and forth between Dixiecrats or unplaced electors and what have you, as illustrated the closest of all, and I think this is the only time this has ever happened in the history of perhaps any state where the divisions were so close on Dixiecrats and Loyalists that in the 1960 election, we actually elected six electors pledged to Byrd and five elected John Kennedy.

J.B.: Were they on the ballot that way?

Jenkins: Not as that way. The eleven candidates were on the ballot. It is extremely complicated, but electors in Alabama, Democratic electors are selected by the people to go on the ballot. They are even selected by the people in voting before the nomination is made, and so they simply run as pledged or unpledged electors and it was so close that year that the Democrats nominated in May a mixed slate of pledged and unpledged electors which went on to the ballot in November. So the upshot of this meant that everyone in the state, if a million people voted in the state, they voted for six people who were against Kennedy and five people who were for him. Just completely an absurd situation, really, and that's the way they voted. Then came Wallace, and it looked as if the Republicans were gaining ground pretty substantially just like they were throughout the

whole . . .

J.B.: back on Wallace.

Jenkins: Yeah.

J.B.: Just a little bit. My image of Wallace and like reading is that Wallace basically ran as a moderate out of some populist tradition for Governor.

Jenkins: Yeah.

J.B.: As a judge, and he got beat. Do you know whether the story is true about his alleged thing, you know, "I won't be out seged again," or whatever he said?

Jenkins: He denies ever having said that. Marshall Fraity maintains that he has talked to someone who actually heard the statement made. I know where it is alleged to have been said. I think whether it was said or not is beside the point because that exactly was his frame of mind. He represented his frame of mind whether he said it or not. In any case, he wasn't out seged after that. So whether he said it or not, I doubt if he used the term out seged. I've heard the term, "I'll never be out Niggered again," and that sounds much more like Wallace. But I think it is inconsequential whether he said it. When he came along, in any case, Wallace had the effect of obliterating the old Dixiecrat - Loyalist split. He just didn't fit into either one at all,

and he just completely obliterated it. His support cut completely across the board of Dixiecrats and Loyalists and what have you and the split no longer exists really. Although there is a tendency to think the Dixiecrat elements support Wallace, I am not at all sure this is true. At the same time, the thing that he did by this phenomenal political control that he had over the state managed to totally arrest the development of the Republican party. It didn't proceed nearly as far as it, for instance in Georgia and even in Mississippi. It didn't proceed that far, I don't think as weak as they are there. In the Goldwater year we did manage to elect some Republican Congressmen, but that is only because Wallace didn't take any part in it, he didn't really give a damn who was elected to Congress.

J.B.: That was five and there are three remaining, is that correct?

Jenkins: That's right, yeah. Five Republicans elected and two only served two years, and then when their mistake of running against George Wallace, they were just totally demolished. They are not a significant political force in Alabama, and this was demonstrated, although he was a weak candidate in many many respects, by Red Blount's extremely poor race against John Sparkman. Blount lost his own home county by a huge vote. Of course,

he had both newspapers against him in his home county. We supported Sparkman. They just cannot be regarded . . .

J.B.: Was the post office a big issue in that race?

Jenkins: A minor one. There were a lot of jokes about Blount screwing up the mail service and that sort of thing, but it was not a significant issue at all. The big issue as far as Blount was concerned was trying to tie John Sparkman to McGovern. The McGovern crowd type thing. You know, he was part and party of the same system, and I mean, that is just a little bit too much bull shit for the most unsophisticated Alabama voters. It was an insult to them in a way.

J.B.: So the post office thing was sort of significant insofar as drawing the issue of Blount being inept?

Jenkins: Yeah. It was to the most minor degree. It was more of a joke than anything else.

J.B.: It was successful as a joke because he was trying to bull shit on politics and so people would laugh at him because of the post office. It came across as his being inept. Is that basically correct?

Jenkins: Very much it is. Now I think it would be very difficult to prove this, but even Blount own people began to say that this hurt him. This particular strategy that he tried to make that he was just an average Alabamian and he showed pictures of himself in

his short sleeves with no tie on standing by the fence out in the country, a totally opposite picture of what Red Blount was. He was a multi-millionaire, living in a \$750,000 house with what Wallace said had 26 bathrooms in it. Actually, there were only eight bathrooms, but that was enough. His people kept saying, "Forget this business and say 'I'm a self-made man and I am proud of it, and I am not ashamed of the fact that I have made some money in my life in a very honorable way and we are going to conduct this campaign on the basis of the issues and not on the basis of how much money I made.'" That is what they wanted and he never did that. He tried to go the opposite route and tried to look like a common man and this kind of thing. I really believe that was the principal issue coupled with his, well, he was so arrogant, he would put up billboards, "Red Blount stands for getting the welfare freeloaders off their asses." It wasn't printed off their asses, but that sort of thing. He'd use "welfare freeloaders," and that kind of thing. He really came very close to insulting the intelligence of the voters by suggesting that a man that they had had in the United States Senate since 1946 and was voted in many many times with overwhelming majorities was guilty of all of these sins, that he was part of the McGovern crowd and that sort of

thing. So, as I say, he was just obliterated in the thing. Even the polls were wrong on just how one sided. It was about a two to one victory for Sparkman. I frankly think now they are going to pick up a few seats in the legislature as a result of reapportionment, but that is not going to be terribly significant.

J.B.: They already have two, don't they?

Jenkins: I believe that we now have two blacks and two Republicans in the legislature and both of them are going to pick up a good bit in the next session. So they are just really not a force at all, and don't stand to be one for a good long while. They just don't understand politics for one thing.

J.B.: Is it a question that they just lack leadership? Lack effective leadership rather?

Jenkins: Very much lack effective leadership and/or given to these profoundly boring ideological disputes and petty disputes at that. The Republican politics is characterized by petty personal hatreds of one another. These even override ideological differences and there are damn few ideological differences. It is basically Goldwater Republican philosophy. It is sort of a let them eat cake philosophy, you know.

J.B.: Are there any moderates in the party?

Jenkins: A very few and what few moderates have been

just about demolished. John ^{Grenier}~~Grenyah~~ represented the moderate element, a damn good man, and even he was a Goldwater man. But he represented the moderate element as well as anyone did, and just a few days ago I was talking to a woman who has been very active in Republican politics and she said that she had gotten just so damn fed up with and sick of trying to fend off and keep that John Birch Society under control that she got out of Republican politics. She is out now and is an Independent. She said that she is very likely to support Democrats the next go around and so on. You might want to talk to her.

J.B.: What is her name?

Jenkins: She is kind of windy. Her name is Virginia Garrott. She is from Montgomery. She has been on the state Republican executive committee and was a pretty potent force as they go in Republican politics.

J.B.: What happened to ^{Grenier}~~Grenyah~~?

Jenkins: I am not real clear on the details of it, because a lot of it was this personal petty stuff. But ^{Grenier}~~Grenyah~~ is not a presentable candidate. He ran for the U. S. Senate at the same time that Martin was running for Governor against ^{Lurleen}~~Lorraine~~ Wallace. That was in 1956. Some bad personal . . . '66, I'm sorry. Some bad personal things went on. It has been pretty clearly demonstrated that Martin tried to shaft ^{Grenier}~~Grenyah~~.

and this is something really that would need to be checked out. But my impression is that at one point, Martin seeing the disaster that was looming, actually tried to get ^{Grenier}~~Grenyah~~ to switch over to run for Governor and let him run for Senate, that kind of thing. In mid-campaign he wanted to do that. That is the kind of crazy stuff that they do to these Republicans. But anyway, ^{Grenier}~~Grenyah~~ has been pretty well pushed out all the way, I think he'd talk to you.

J.B.: Is he in Mobile?

Jenkins: No, he is in Birmingham. He is a Birmingham lawyer and a smart guy. He is a very bright guy.

J.B.: I remember talking to him back in '64.

Jenkins: He is mostly a machine type politician and manipulator of conventions and things like that. That is where he does the best work.

J.B.: Did they ever do any effective precinct level organization in Alabama even in '64?

Jenkins: No, absolutely none.

J.B.: I'll try to talk to Virginia Gar~~r~~^{ett}.

Jenkins: She is a real likeable . . .

J.B.: Is she a married woman? What is her husband's name?

Jenkins: Her husband is Wilmer. Wilmer Gar~~r~~^{ett}, but she is a real tiny little thing and just as vivacious as

she can be, about 42 or 43 years old, and her husband just hates politics. He is trying his best to get her out of it, but she won't do it. She is thinking about running for the city commission and would probably run as a Republican if she did. But she might run as an Independent, I don't know.

J.B.: Are the Republicans doing anything on the municipal level in major cities?

Jenkins: Of course, they have elected a Republican mayor in Birmingham. The importance of that could very easily be overstressed because it was sort of a non-partisan election and he was elected in. Besides that, Birmingham has a very heavy Republican sentiment up there, that's where it is.

J.B.: Was the Republican party in Alabama doing anything before the Goldwater movement?

Jenkins: To the best of my knowledge it was nothing in the world but a facade of patronage. It was operated pretty much that way as a closed shop as long as Claude Barterman had it. He was the keeper of that facade for a good long while. It was a closed club. They didn't even pretend to engage in political activity, in election activity, that is. It was out of this group, they mostly drew themselves from old-line Republicans, anti-secessionist Republicans and that type. A post office, federal judge

operation is what it was. It was out of that group that we got several of our very good judges including Frank Johnson. He came out of that particular Republican element. Well, Barnaman got himself into some trouble. Having influence in Washington, being the party chairman and so on, even though from a political standpoint it was utterly meaningless in Alabama, got himself in some trouble up there over some housing scandals. He got mixed up in something. I don't think he was ever brought to court, but it was very close. It was a scandal in which some bad was involved. About this time too, there was a surge in enthusiasm among Republicans. Eisenhower had done well in Alabama. Nixon had done well in '60 and what have you, and they saw that things were changing pretty drastically and that it was indeed time for them to start getting out and politicing like the Democrats did to do away with these country club executive committee meetings that constituted all of the Republican activity in Alabama, and this particular group, who was more or less represented by Grenyah and Martin, took away the party from this old crowd, the facade keepers. They tried to do, they made a conscientious, legitimate effort to organize a genuine political party with activities and election. It's just that they were

so inept at it that it didn't work, plus Wallace coming along which made it almost impossible for it to work. They had everything working against them.

J.B.: How much of a problem was ^{Guenier's} ~~Grenyah's~~ national role in that '64 election, if he had stayed in the state and worked at the state level?

Jenkins: It wouldn't have made any difference. It wouldn't have made a bit of difference. Of course, the state went overwhelmingly for Goldwater. In '68, of course, it went overwhelmingly for Wallace.

J.B.: I presume it went overwhelmingly for Goldwater because Goldwater voted against the civil rights. Would that be a fair presumption?

Jenkins: Oh, he went further than that. That wasn't the only reason at all. He was enormously popular. I am not sure about this, but I think Alabama may have given him his largest vote. It was almost a religious like movement. And the Civil Rights Act was certainly the crowning the icing on the cake, the crowning achievement of Goldwater's great career. There is not any question that there was an underlying sense that here is the man to stop all of that damn nonsense in Washington that they had been inflicting on us and all of that sort of thing. So race figured into it to a very very extensive degree. It wasn't just the Civil

Rights Act. That just kind of epitomized why they were for Goldwater. The vote wouldn't have been any different if he had voted for the Civil Rights Act. Because they weren't going to vote for Lyndon Johnson. He was hated in Alabama. You have to keep in mind that was during . . . he had come out for civil rights and the poverty program and all of that stuff.

J.B.: Do you think if Goldwater had voted for the Civil Rights Act it wouldn't have made any difference at all?

Jenkins: I don't think it would have made any difference. It conceivably could have diminished his vote somewhat but not a great deal.

J.B.: Let me discuss this with you. I can think of few southern states, with the exception of Texas, that have more of a tradition coming out of the thirties of producing really economic liberal New Deal Democrats than in Alabama.

Jenkins: Exemplified by Jim ^{Folsom,} ~~Folsom,~~ yeah.

J.B.: ^F ~~R~~olsom, Sparkman.

Jenkins: Sparkman, yeah, all of them, Bob Jones, ^{Ellie} ~~Carl~~ and all of them, yeah.

J.B.: Claude Pepper came out of Alabama.

Jenkins: Yeah, except . . .

J.B.: He got elected from Florida, but he grew up

there.

Jenkins: *[And of course]* Hugo Black.

J.B.: So is that, where is that background of economic populism? What is the status of it today?

Jenkins: The status of it is that it has been very sharply modified. Wallace, if you are using the old definitions of populism, Wallace could be called a justifiably a pseudo-populist. He wasn't like Gene ^{Talmadge} ~~Tallmage~~, one of these fake populists who gets up and mouths all of these things about what he is going to do for the people, and then makes his covert deals with the economic powers of the state. Gene was the most vivid example of the faker, of the man who spoke for the people, but represented everything against their interest. There was a little ditty, you might want to dredge it up and put it in your book. It goes, "The hook worms courted the big bugs and their clandestine embrace produced a Governor of Georgia who raised hell all over the place." That was pretty much what ^{Talmadge} ~~Tallmage~~ was. It was the epitome of the fake populist. Well, Wallace wasn't this at all. He came out of the Folsom tradition and his rhetoric was extremely populist, no doubt about it whatever. To a large extent he tried to carry it out. A good example of it is that junior college and trade school program which he built, he was without adequate

financing and things like that. He rammed this through the legislature and his idea was to create a junior college program where every kid could go with no money if he didn't have it, and if he couldn't get there, they'd send a school bus to pick him up and get him there. Well, in concept it was very good. But like so much of Wallace's stuff in concept, it didn't take the practical consideration of how you are going to pay for this thing, where you are going to get faculties to put this sort of thing up. What it amounted to was that they raided the high schools for their faculties and just added two years to the high schools, which wasn't too bad. Also, there was a lot of political wheeling and dealing about where they would be located and some of them were located in very bad places, but nonetheless the idea was still there and it was a good idea and it represents Wallace's populism. He did a lot for the people. He's done a lot for education, for instance, in the way of funding and things like that. But then when you get over to the other side of the populist issue, this is where you have a short departure from Jim Folsom. Folsom's ideas was to hitch up the big mules. That was his term, "We're going to hitch up the big mule." That may have been Bib Graves that used that term rather than ^{Folsom,} ~~Folgun,~~ but they were both meaning that we were

going to put it on the damn corporations for a while, like Huey Long did in Louisiana. But Wallace didn't do this. His taxing programs went straight to the consumer. One of the very first things he did was to impose an additional sales tax. He increased the beer tax, he increased the cigarette tax, he increased the beer tax twice, increased liquor taxes, doubled the prices of drivers licenses, he increased the price of tags from, now he'd say he didn't do this, the legislature did it, but the only reason the legislature did it is because he put through a bond issue and he said that he didn't give a damn whether it was paid for, and the legislature was forced to enact this increase in the price of automobile tags from \$3.75 to \$13.75. That is an extra \$10. Alright, then on the other side of the ledger, what did he do for the corporations? They had a very low income tax as it was. He increased that by the most modest amount from, I think, a maximum of 3% to a maximum of 5%, and in return for that he wrote the 5% ceiling into the state constitution which makes it very difficult to change now. It was statutory up to that point. So, in reviewing Wallace's tax record, you find that virtually all of his taxes was put on the consumers. Almost none were put on the corporations and industries.

J.B.: How about income tax?

Jenkins: There was no increase in income tax except for this slight corporation income tax.

J.B.: No increase in personal income tax?

Jenkins: No, not on the personal, no.

J.B.: What is the maximum rate now?

Jenkins: I believe it is 5%, but I am not absolutely sure. I think it is 5% for individuals. It is relatively low. We have no property tax in Alabama. It is almost non-existent. So that study by Eva Gambolas, have you seen it yet from the Southern Regional Council? Well, you will find that most revealing. You ought to get a copy of it. It is just out. It shows that among all of the southern states, Alabama has one of the most regressive programs. All of the southern states have regressive tax programs, but Alabama's is one of the worst. Now I don't have the up to date figures on this, but I think this is a very meaningful figure to me because Wallace is always going around talking about tax reform. When you adjust state and local taxes in Alabama for income levels, you are going to find that Alabamians are paying roughly \$66 per \$1,000 income in state and local taxes as opposed to \$55 per income in the nation. So that is a pretty substantially heavier tax load in Alabama than the nation has. He can't refute that. That is just statistical

information. So then, you see, he is a pseudo-populist. He has done all of these things, but he has gotten it out of the people, not out of the corporations like the old populists wanted to do.

J.B.: Didn't he make a little rhetoric against the corporations?

Jenkins: Damn little. If he does it will be against the foundations, that is one of his big You never hear any Wall Street type rhetoric from Wallace, not like you did back in the old days.

J.B.: I thought occasionally he got on the utilities.

Jenkins: Yeah, he jumps on them occasionally, but when he does, as a rule, it is not an attack on the utilities, it's an attack on the press. He says, "We've got to stop these utilities from advertising in the press because it is a form of bribery. They don't have to advertise, they are monopolies. The only reason they advertise is so that they can get the newspapers to support their rate increases when they go to the public service commission." That is the way he jumps on the utilities. It is really more of an oblique attack on the newspapers than it is on the utilities. He doesn't attack them. He did, I will say, come down on the side of ERA the other day in a dispute with the power company, but it was of little consequence. It didn't amount to

anything.

J.B.: How does he work, react and relate to organized labor?

Jenkins: Well, I was talking to this guy, what's his name, the labor man from Carolina?

J.B.: Wilbur Hobby.

Jenkins: Wilbur Hobby the other night, and I made the remark that labor has made its peace with Wallace in Alabama and he very quickly corrected me and he said "Wallace has made his peace with labor in Alabama." He put it the other way around, and he said that the reason this was is because labor really did a job on Wallace in '68, and that's true. The labor had a profound effect. I shouldn't be surprised if labor didn't, you might recall that going into the '68 race that Wallace was holding steady and that all of the public opinion polls were right at 20% of the vote. Well, when it came out, he didn't get but about 13% of the vote. I am convinced that that gap of 7% was that mammoth effort that labor put forward exposing Wallace as a phony populist and talking about these same taxing programs and mainly talking about his position on things like unemployment compensation, workman's compensation and minimum wage and things like that.

J.B.: What has his attitude been on those?

Jenkins: According to labor, now these are complex issues that I don't understand well, but labor was very dissatisfied with his attitude on it, and they campaigned heavily against him because of that, but I know that Barney Weeks told me, now he is the head labor man in Alabama. He told me just a few weeks ago, he said, "We're not picking any more fights with Wallace." He said, "We've got our unemployment compensation bills, and our workmen's compensation bills through the last session. He is working well with us now and we don't want to rock the boat. We don't want to get into any anti-Wallace fight because we got what we wanted out of it. As a matter of fact, I think this is fairly significant, when they had the big patriotic rally in Decatur when Kennedy came down as they put it "To make Wallace an honorary nigger."

J.B.: Is that how it is used in Alabama?

Jenkins: Yeah. That thing back fired like hell on Wallace, too, but that is another subject. But in any case, I've watched this and Barney Weeks, he is the labor man, was sitting over in one of the side stands for all of these ceremonies up there. Four years ago Barney Weeks wouldn't have been caught dead at a thing like that. But he was over there

anyway, and I saw someone come up to Barney and whisper something in his ear. Barney got up and went and sat down on the main stage with Wallace. Now there were about 40 or 50 people on the main stage, Kennedy and Wallace and all of the Wallace loyalists and what have you. So when they started introducing the guests, the Master of Ceremonies introduced all sorts of guests that were there, but he didn't mention Barney Weeks. When Wallace got up to make his little speech, he mentioned Barney Weeks, he said that he was glad to have Barney Weeks on the stage with him. So he has made his peace with labor, there is no doubt about it. Whoever made who's peace is beside the point. He is representing labor's interests right now.

J.B.: What was the effect of that Kennedy visit?

Jenkins: A very very surprising outpouring of almost hate mail to Wallace. "How could you do a thing like this," to such a great extent that Wallace was compelled to get up and make almost public apologies, they weren't quite apologies, but almost ridiculed the meeting. As soon as that thing was over he was saying, "Now look here, I didn't invite them to come down here. They were the ones that said that they wanted to come down and honor me. I didn't go and see them. They came to see me. If you will notice, I was on the right up there,"

and that kind of thing. He made it appear that what they had done was to come to Alabama to pay homage to him. He wasn't the one that changed, they are the ones that changed. But the net effect of it was a political minus for Wallace, one that he hadn't counted on and wouldn't have done it if he had known about it. When he said that he wasn't a party to the arrangements, of course, that is silly, we know damn well he was. It was worked out between the Wallace and Kennedy people.

J.B.: Nationally he got some plus out of it.

Jenkins: Nationally he got a lot of minus out of it too. He got letters from all over the country against it. They let us read Wallace's mail up there. I don't know that Wallace knows that, but we have good contacts in the office and they let us read the mail. These old Wallace faithfuls, the people who used to send nickels and dimes and scribble notes on tablet paper, they didn't send any nickels or dimes with those scribbled notes, they raised hell about it. They didn't like it a bit. It is no major thing, but it did create a reaction against him. I am convinced that if he had known what was going to happen that he wouldn't have shown up in Decatur, wouldn't have gone.

J.B.: It was that much.

Jenkins: Yeah, it was enough that he wouldn't have done it.

J.B.: Was it not a plus for him from the other side?

Jenkins: Give him some respectability?

J.B.: Yeah.

Jenkins: Yeah, that is what the whole purpose of the thing was.

J.B.: Wasn't it basically a success in so far as that is concerned?

Jenkins: To a large extent it was. It was that to a large extent. I think the national press covered it in that way, that after all these years of being an pariah and an outcast they welcomed Wallace back into the family, and we need him and that sort of thing. See, they had big wigs in the Democratic party down there. They had Strauss and that sort of thing. Strauss is almost obsequious in his service to Wallace. He sounds like a Wallace supporter at times. I am not so sure he is not. [Interruption] I know this positively because I know a man that won't lie who heard the telephone call when they were, after Strauss took over the Democratic party and he called up Wallace and said, "Governor, we want you represented in the Democratic party. We've got vacancies to fill here, and we've got one specific vacancy and we want you to name the man who is going to get it." Wallace said, "I want Mickey Griffin to have it," and

Mickey Griffin got it.

J.B.: Who is Mickey Griffin?

Jenkins: He is Wallace's man on the National Democratic Committee. He is his personal choice as a member of the committee. In addition to that, Strauss also, now I can't prove this quite so easily as I can prove that other. I know that other is true. But I am under the very distinct impression that Strauss went to great lengths to get to Bob Vance, the state Democratic chairman who has been Wallace's most persistent enemy in Alabama over the past, well, for all of Wallace's political career. He has been the big thorn in his side, embarrassing him by having his own political party against him, his own Democratic party against him. Strauss made every effort to gut Vance. I believe, I am not sure about this, but I believe that Vance holds the position of chairman of the Democratic chairmen, you know, chairman of the whole nation-wide organization and Strauss tried to keep him from getting that as a favor to Wallace, but he wasn't able to do it because Vance has a lot of strength in his own right.

J.B.: What has Vance done with the party? What has happened to Cashen's party?

Jenkins: Cashen's party was demolished in the last election. It was wiped out as a political force. He

even showed that he no longer has the blacks. Cashen was running as a candidate for the Senate and John Sparkman, running as the regular Democrat, probably out polled in the black community alone, probably out polled Cashen's candidate by about six to one. So he was destroyed in that election. I haven't even heard of John Cashen since that election. It will surprise me very much if he even surfaces this year.

J.B.: So Vance has put together a coalition?

Jenkins: He has put together the coalition, but the most effective thing that Vance has done, has been to hold the state Democratic party together as an anti-Wallace organization. Now he was able to do this for the reason that I mentioned, because the Democratic party is largely an impotent institution. It doesn't have any effect power. Political power in Alabama is held by individuals not by party structures and things like that. The one thing that Vance does have and proof of this is the fact that Wallace has never really made any real effort to take over the party. He could have done so. If he had given it a moment's thought and a moment's effort, he could have taken that party from Vance at almost any time he wanted to. But he didn't do it. He now sees that he perhaps is going to have to do that because the sole power that Vance has got is to

embarrass him by having the Alabama Democratic party against George Wallace. Here is a man who is pretending to be a national Democrat, and a candidate for President, and he doesn't even have his own state party behind him. My guess is that he is going to take it this year, he is going to take control of the party.

J.B.:

Jenkins: I don't, I absolutely don't. I'll show you a letter that I wrote to Vance that is a joke, but anyway, pretty much outlines it that I think Wallace is going to do him in. They just held a meeting at which Vance announced that this is the most productive and harmonious meeting that we have ever had, supposedly meaning that all the blacks, all the Loyalists, all the women, all the Wallace votes, and everybody else came together and now we have one big happy party. Well, all in the world that they did at that meeting was get ready for an election at which Vance and Wallace are going to have a show down over control of the party. That is what happened. And with Wallace's sword in his throat and what they call the bitches of Birmingham at his rear, he is probably going to lose it. I wouldn't be surprised if he did.

J.B.: What are the bitches of Birmingham?

Jenkins: The women's liberation. They think that

Vance is a male chauvinist. It drives Vance crazy. He's been trying to do the right thing all these years and he has got these women against him.

J.B.: Are they going to get together with George Wallace?

Jenkins: Well, no, they are the most anti-Wallace people in the state. But they are big on principle. They'd fit well in the Republican party. Virginia Dare, who I think is the most knowledgeable person in Alabama on politics, also the least practical person. Do you know who Virginia is? She is kind of the elder states-woman of liberal politics. Virginia is very active in politics and she is looked upon in the women's liberation movement almost as the patron saint of liberated women and things like that. So she went up to Birmingham, and just threw the place into an uproar by promptly throwing in her lot with Vance. She told these women, she said, "Look, you are asking for them to give you all of these things. You can't give political power. That is like trying to turn lead into gold. Political power comes from one thing, from getting out and asking the people for it and getting elected. What I am telling you to do is to get out there and fight like men." That was beautiful. Virginia just left them in complete disarray. They didn't know what to do after she did that. "Fight like men". . . (Laughter)

J.B.: Well, Wallace would not be shrewd enough to see how leaving Vance as chairman could accrue to his benefit?

Jenkins: No. It would not accrue to his benefit at all because he can not trust Vance. The enmity between those two men is too great for him to take any chances like that. Since he has now sort of irrevocably cast, I say irrevocably, I am not real sure about that, I can conceive of Wallace running as a third party candidate again in '76. But since at the moment, he is irrevocably committed to the national Democratic party, it is in his interest to regain control of the party, so that there won't be any doubt about it when the time comes that the state party is going to be embarrassing him in the nation, that is the only power it's got.

J.B.: What would be the significance of the chairman's demise?

Jenkins: Well, they'd install a Wallace chairman, presumably Mickey Griffin. He is carrying Wallace's, all of his Democratic party affairs. He is the chief-of-staff of the party.

J.B.: Well, will that affect the coalition that Vance has put together?

Jenkins: It would certainly weaken it drastically. It would be in the eyes of the blacks and in the eyes of

women and the liberals and the loyalists and what have you. It would be a gross act of bad faith, of breaching this illusion of harmony that we have achieved, and it would have the effect of destroying whatever has been achieved.

J.B.: It was in that context that I was thinking that Wallace would perceive it to be to his advantage to leave Vance alone.

Jenkins: That conceivably could happen, but it would surprise me very much if that happens, it really would. If I were Wallace, I wouldn't take a chance, I'd put my own man in there because he doesn't need that kind of unity.

J.B.: Well, wouldn't it be useful to him, say, going into a national convention?

Jenkins: It would be useful there, yeah. But I just don't think that you will get Bob Vance to go to a national convention and support George Wallace. In the '72 convention, the political sentiment in favor of Wallace for President at that time in that state among Democrats was probably running 80% or better, and Bob Vance went down there and was in a very small minority to cast his vote against Wallace. He voted for Terry Sanford for the nomination on the first ballot. Now Wallace can't tolerate that kind of thing, or even a chance of that happening with a man like that running

the party. The enmity is just too deep for him to be taking chances on leaving Vance in. I think if he could get some kind of positive commitments out of Vance that he'd be a Wallace man, but for God sakes, Vance has got too much self-respect for that sort of thing, plus the fact that he is campaigning for a federal judgeship, I think. That is the utmost speculation on my part. I never heard Bob Vance say one word about that. It just stands to reason that he sees that as what he has earned for his participation in politics and about the only thing within his grasp because he doesn't have any political office that he can reach for. He is not going to switch to be a Wallace man, and that is what he would have to do. It would be like asking me to switch to be a Wallace man. Our politics are very much alike and I don't think he's likely to switch any more than I am.

Begin Side Two, Tape One

Jenkins: As I say, I think that is the only time he ever supported him.

J.B.: But there is a difference between you and him, not in philosophy, but in roles, and that is his being a political role. Now I am really trying to understand,

I'll talk to him later, but could he not perceive it as being in the interest of the Democratic party for him to support Wallace because of what Wallace can contribute to the party's success in the South?

Jenkins: I think Vance does perceive his as a political role, but he is not willing to pay the price of supporting Wallace to continue that political role. I don't think that his personal integrity and background would allow him to do that. I just don't think it is possible. Now I may be wrong. We'll know this fairly soon. We'll know this within a year. We'll know it specifically after May. We won't know it for certain until next January, but we will probably know it after May.

J.B.: Next January is what?

Jenkins: That is when they reorganize the Democratic committee.

J.B.: We can discuss that when I get to Alabama.

Jenkins: Yeah. They reorganize the committee. The organization of the Democratic party in Alabama is a very complex thing.

J.B.: What is your reaction to Neil ^{Pearce's} ~~Pearson's~~ thesis that Frank Johnson has had more impact on politics in Alabama in a broad sense than George Wallace has?

Jenkins: I'd say that Frank Johnson has had more impact on social change in Alabama than George Wallace has. I don't know, you get blurred definitions when you talk about sociology as opposed to politics. But I can check off the things that Frank Johnson has done. His achievements have been a thorough desegregation of the school system. He is not alone in this. There is another federal judge, too, ^{Rives}~~Reed~~, he being on the court of appeals, not on the front line like Wallace, I mean like Johnson, but is a very strong man in the background and in many way influences Johnson very heavily and his decisions.

J.B.: Both of them Eisenhower appointments?

Jenkins: No, no. ^{Rives}~~Reed~~ goes back to Truman. ^{Rives}~~Reed~~ goes back to Truman. ^{Rives}~~Reed~~ is the great man of the judiciary in the whole South in my thinking. I am not trying to diminish Johnson for that because Johnson himself admits that he owes enormous debts to Richard ^{Rives}~~Reed~~. But together they have desegregated the school systems in Alabama. They are on three judge panels which have done all of these things. They have desegregated the state bureaucracy in Alabama in employment and what have you. Johnson alone has totally remade the treatment of the mentally ill in Alabama, totally restructured that. He and Reed together have

reapportioned that legislature as no other two judges have done. It is not generally known, but the critical reapportionment case came up out of Alabama. It was a Reed - Johnson decision. The Baker versus Carr decision in Tennessee, which is regarded as the reapportionment decision, you know, that wasn't really it. All the court said in the Baker versus Carr was that this is an area in which the courts, there is a justifiable issue. But it was an Alabama case, Reynolds versus Simms, which was the one man, one vote case and that was Reed and Johnson that wrote that. They have even extended it beyond one man, one vote now with this new reapportionment. So they have been . . .

J.B.:

Jenkins: Well, it gets complicated because the new legislature that they've structured now tends to obliterate county lines and things like that. It comes up with . . . it says that the apportionment must be so precise, that county lines have to be ignored if necessary to get proper balances. It is the first step towards the destruction of counties as political entities in Alabama.

J.B.: That has been upheld by the Supreme Court.

Jenkins: It's been upheld, right. It goes into effect as of this year's elections.

J.B.: And it could well set a precedent for the entire South?

Jenkins: Could set a precedent for the country. They've sort of picked at this issue in other states. I think Indiana has and what have you, but the most massive and drastic changes occurred in Alabama.

J.B.: Who actually drew up the plan, I mean mechanically?

Jenkins: A statistician for New York using the census districts. He constructed legislative districts by building them out of census blocks and he ignored county lines. Now he tried to maintain county lines wherever possible just for the politics, you know, in the interest of politics, but he . . . it was drawn up by computer is how it was done. It has created chaos, and we are going to have a bad session of the legislature next time around as they feel their way around. But as they become adjusted, we are going to have one of the best legislatures in the country.

J.B.: What do you think it will eventually mean in so far as counties are concerned as units of government?

Jenkins: It changes so totally the relationship between the legislature and the county. Because you see in times past under the legislative courtesy rule, the county legislator, nothing he submitted was challenged. He got through local bills without any challenge at all up

there. So there was a hand in glove working relationship between the county bureaucracy and your state legislators. If the County Commissioner or the Probate Judge wanted a raise, he had to go to the state legislator who took it to the legislature and got it very easily. So they had to work together very closely that way. Well, with this obliteration of the county lines, you don't know who to go to to get this change made. What it is going to mean is that ultimately the legislature is going to adopt a larger measure of home rule. But you've got Barbour County, for instance, is divided among four different legislative districts. Now who are they going to go to when they need a raise. They don't have a legislator any longer. So it is having a profound impact. It will elect a lot of blacks, it'll elect a lot of people representing poor districts, and it will elect a lot of Republicans, all of which we have never had in the legislature.

J.B.: What are any other major changes that are the effect of Frank Johnson?

Jenkins: His effect has been so profound that is . . . of course reapportionment and race are the big ones, the mental health changes are tremendously significant, and through a whole wide range of areas, Johnson has extended procedural due process of law in

little ways that you wouldn't notice. If a school principal kicks somebody out because they wear, boys wear long hair, they have had cases in Frank Johnson's court and he says, "Did you give him due process of law? Did you have a written rule that he couldn't wear his hair this way and that sort of thing?" You've had it come up in the prison system where an inmate would be put into isolation for some in-prison infraction, and they will come into court and Johnson will look into the case, "Did you give him due process of law, did you allow him a hearing on this, did you have the rules clearly posted that he was violating and this sort of thing?" So his very tenacious insistence on the application of the procedure of due process has been very significant. It's cleaned up the justice of the bureaucratic system to a large degree. Now in employment he has had a tremendous effect too. As far as I know, he is the only judge in the country that has ordered specific quotas for hiring. In the state trooper case, he held first that there was discrimination, a clear pattern of discrimination against blacks. Out of 800 troopers, we had no blacks, so that wasn't too hard to prove. Then he ordered the state to hire, as they hired new troopers, to hire one black for every white until the state trooper force reached 25% black, which is the state's population of black. Now that is the only

ruling in the country that has come like that. He hasn't applied that so rigidly in other areas, but the implication is that it would apply to every other agency of government as well. There is no reason why it shouldn't.

J.B.: How did Wallace react to him?

Jenkins: He reacted violently to it.

J.B.: Not only to that personally, to Johnson?

Jenkins: Well, . . .

J.B.: Well, go ahead and finish what you were saying.

Jenkins: Well, that does finish what I was saying.

Wallace reacts violently to it and as a matter of fact, he is right now under the shadow of a contempt of court citation for refusing to carry out the state trooper decision. It is not going to come to contempt. For God sakes, don't say this because Johnson told me this personally at some Christmas party where I ran into him. He said he is not interested in citing Wallace for contempt, all he is interested in is seeing his order carried out. Johnson is acutely aware of never entering an order that he is not certain can be carried out. He is very aware of that. But to get back to the personal relationships, it goes back to college, the legend has overstated their friendship. They were on friendly terms but they were not close friends. They were college classmates and that sort of thing. As they got out they went their separate ways. Johnson was a

Republican, Wallace was a populist Democrat so their paths didn't cross until 1958 when Johnson was a federal judge and Wallace was a state judge. Wallace, getting ready to run for Governor, made this gesture of defiance towards the Civil Rights Commission, refused to give them the voting records. Well, the upshot of it was that he created so much chaos and so much publicity and what have you that Johnson ordered him in court on a contempt proceeding. Contempt is a legally memble-jumble type area where your initial order is an order to appear before this court to show cause why you should not be cited for contempt. You know, piling negatives on top of negatives and so on. So, in any case Wallace got a hell of a lot of mileage out of it from a political standpoint. And the election was over. He lost the election. That was in '58. The election was over when they finally got around to resolving the contempt business against him. So Johnson called him into court. Wallace appeared in Johnson's court, the only time he has ever been in Frank Johnson's court room, although he has been sued in Johnson's court room a million times. Wallace appeared, and as far as I know, he didn't say anything. This was in January of '59, if I am not mistaken, he appeared in court and didn't say anything. Johnson read an order from the bench in which he said that the court has found that essentially this has

been an attempt to use this court for political purposes, but this court will not be vowed to political whirlwinds. He made a mistake, really, in going that far. I think he recognized this. Incidentally, and I have got this fairly well documented in New South, Wallace privately tried to negotiate with Johnson on the basis of their old friendship. This was before their enmity had solidified and what have you, and quite specifically has asked Johnson. He said, "I want you to help me get elected Governor. Will you give me a 20 day sentence in jail or a heavy fine or something like that?" and Johnson wouldn't make any commitments on it. He said, "You'll just have to take your chances," and Wallace certainly wasn't going to take any chance on going to jail for a year, maybe 20 days, but not a year. Well, this came to nothing. This was a midnight visit. Like I say, I've got it written up pretty well. But in any case, in reading this order, Johnson came to the conclusion that in spite of his gesture of defiance, Wallace in covert ways and through subterfuge had cooperated with the agencies, with the agents, and had turned over the records to them. So there was no contempt and he dismissed the contempt proceeding on that basis. So he was calling Wallace a hypocrite in public. Well, four years later when Wallace ran for Governor again, one of the lesser running candidates,

who was trying to, Wallace was certainly one of the forefront candidates, but one of these backfield candidates and what have you way down at the end of the track, thought he could get a little mileage out of this by pointing out the fact that Frank Johnson had said that Wallace was a hypocrite, that he really wasn't a fighter at all, that he knuckled under when the chips were down. Well, this infuriated Wallace and in every speech that he made from there on out, he said, "Anybody that says that I cooperated with the federal agents is a scallowaging, carpetbagging, integrating liar." And that is what he was calling Frank Johnson throughout his campaign. It was very effective, and he won the campaign. He'd get great cheers when he'd call Johnson this scallowaging, carpetbagging, integrating liar. He never was quite so abusive after that, although he could pour scorn on the federal courts. And he'd call special sessions of the legislature for no purpose other than just issuing, I mean, passing resolutions denouncing the federal court. He has said on many occasions in a very temperate sort of way, in conversations, not in an acrimonious sort way at all, but almost an off-handed way, "The Governor in this state has no power, the federal judge is the only one who has any power in this state." I think he believes that. There is a very fundamental, legitimate, ideological difference between the men.

J.B.: Does it spill over into personal enmity?

Jenkins: I just can not conceive of those two men sitting down in the same room together. Their hostility toward one another . . . Johnson is very guarded about his, but my guess is that you have got something as close to hatred between two people as you could possibly have between those two men, probably the hatred is greater on Johnson's part than it is on Wallace's for the simple reason that Johnson is in a position where he can't respond, he has to take all of that abuse. I'd certainly feel damn ^{aggrieved} ~~de~~grieved myself if someone called me a scallowaging liar and I couldn't say a thing about it. At the time, there is a great measure of truth in what Wallace says about the federal judges got all the power. There is one order pending right now, and I think Johnson made a mistake in doing this. I really wouldn't want to be quoted on saying this but I think he made a mistake on it anyway. In one of his mental health cases, in which he has laid down very specific ratios of how many psychiatrists the state has got to employ, how many nurses and teachers and what have you in the mental institutions and in there he makes a somewhat circumspect threat saying that if it comes to this, or this court is reserving judgement on the question of whether or not it can judicially divert funds, say from the Highway Department to the Mental Health Department

in order to carry out this order. Well, if that decision is carried out, that will be as fundamental a decision as Mulberry versus Madison.

J.B.: What is his Constitutional basis?

Jenkins: I don't think he has any.

J.B.: What is his Constitutional basis for even mandating the number of psychiatrists?

Jenkins: He is on very sound ground on that. He first says this, "If you take away a man's liberty by committing him," . . .

J.B.: Is it due process?

Jenkins: Due process, that is exactly what it is. There is just not another federal judge in the country that has come anywhere close to being as active as he has. He's been pretty active in Civil Liberties. For instance, when, this is one point in which I have disagreed with him really, when they had a little student fund over at Auburn, and I don't remember the exact circumstances of it, but somehow or other the students wanted to invite William Sloan Coffin. You know who he is, the Yale Chaplain and a very controversial guy. The University authorities turned it down, and this was some sort of student speakers' fund that had a very specific amount of money, something like \$35,000 - \$50,000 in it to get speakers down there, six, eight or ten speakers a year. They took the case to federal court and Johnson ordered the

University to let Coffin speak, which is fine up to that point, but he also ordered them to pay him the fees, pay his expenses and pay his honorarium down there and so on. Well, you see, what the judge did at that point was get into the business of choosing specific speakers when you've got a limited number of speakers. Let's say you have got six speakers that you can get for that amount of money, well, to me it stands to reason that the University has got to have some sort of say so over that. If it were a matter of simply having him come on campus and speak if some students invited him down there at their own cost and what have you, that is one thing, but to require the University to pay him struck me as being a little bit far out. But anyway, he has been in a lot of rulings like that as well. Let's see, he's been pretty much in the forefront on women's rights. There was one woman, this was one case when he and Judge ^{Rives} ~~Reed~~ disagreed. There was a very few. This woman Air Force Officer that sued the Air Force for the same type of benefits that male officers get for their wives, housing benefits, medical benefits and things like this which had been denied to female officers. It seemed to me to be a pretty open and shut case of discrimination and Johnson held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade this sort of thing. The Air

Force had to give her exactly what they gave male officers, which stood to reason with me. ^{Rives} ~~Reed~~ came to some sort of tortured reasoning in the thing. He and the other judge in the case held that no, the Air Force didn't have to pay her the same fringe benefits and so on. What do they call it? It's not that, but anyway, fringe benefits is what it amounts to. That went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court upheld Johnson in that case. [Interruption] But when Haynesworth was first appointed, wasn't Haynesworth Nixon's first appointment to the court? Well, there was all of Johnson's friends . . . lobbied very strongly to get him on the court. Well, John Mitchell, of course, was the man who checked out all of the Supreme Court appointments. He is the one that submitted names to Nixon and made recommendations and what have you. Well, Johnson has got a strong sort of law and order record, he is that. He's a no nonsense man on that sort of thing. Mitchell apparently pulled out Johnson's file up there and looked through his record of cases and everything and said "This is exactly the man we want for the Supreme Court." So they sent, I don't know whether it ever got to the White House or not, but anyway they started the motions of getting Johnson appointed to the Supreme Court. So they said that they had better check with the Republicans in Congress before it was done. And

they went to the Alabama Republicans and they said, "Absolutely not." Johnson's own Republicans now put it down. So they said, "Okay," and apparently considered it for a little while longer and then he went back to the Congressmen and said, "Look, he's the man we want. We are not asking you to support him, if you just won't fight it, we'll get the nomination through," or something to that effect. The Republicans turned that down too. They said, "No sir," that they would resist the appointment. They said that "Well do this, we'll let you put him on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals," which was just a way of getting him out of Alabama. They wanted to get him out of Alabama but denied the honor of the Supreme Court, you see. So after that Johnson's file went back into the file and that is when they came up with Haynesworth. He was always mentioned in all of the big publications as one of the front runners, or not front runners, but one of the runners for that first vacancy. Then when the others came up, I don't think his name even came up for consideration again after that.

J.B.: When was Folsom Governor?

Jenkins: Folsom? '47 through '51, and '55 through '59.

J.B.: How would you characterize his administration?

Jenkins: There is a book coming out on Folsom which will answer all the questions you need about him, and it will

be out early enough for yours. You can get a copy of that. Basically Jim was as solid a populist as ever came down the road. I mean he really was. He was good, he really fully appreciated the needs of the poor people of Alabama. He fully appreciated the control of the state, not control, but powerful influence exerted by agencies like the Farm Bureau, and he was determined to break it. He went in and he had as fine a program as any Governor ever could hope to have. But now he had a malapportioned legislature that made it impossible for him to achieve anything that he could ever hope to do. Plus the fact that he was such a wretched administrator. He was a heavy drinker always. In his last administration he was an out and out alcoholic. You would go for six weeks without the Governor doing anything and that sort of thing. The two things combined plus Jim's gentle personality and gentle nature and unwillingness to hurt anybody. He simply lacked the ruthlessness that you have to have in politics to accomplish things. Those things pretty much made him a failure. Virginia ^{Durr} ~~Dare~~ summed him up, she said, "Jim Folsom was a flawed masterpiece." That is pretty well what he was. But he never really accomplished anything to speak of. But on the race question, he was way way ahead on that. His Christmas message in 1949 is really one of the nicest, just simple statements about justice towards the black man that anybody could possibly ever write.

It read, this is more or less verbatim, he said, oh, he talked about the low educational quality, the low health care that the Negro citizens and so on, and then he said, how was it, how did he put that, he said, "As long as the black man is held down all the other poor people will be held down along with him. It's time to stop just preaching brotherhood and start practicing it," or something along that line. I can't remember the whole statement, but it really was a very beautiful statement. That was in '49, that was five years before the Supreme Court ruling. Of course, in '54 when he ran for re-election, he said, "Yeah, I'm a segregationist, but I believe in segregation, but everybody believes in it. It's not an issue." So that is the way he dismissed it. That is all he ever really said about it in the campaign. He got elected then, and when the legislature started passing all these anti-position resolutions and things like that, he'd veto them, and one of them he called just pure hogwash. He said, "It reminds me of an old hound dog baying at the moon." That is the kind of fellow that he was. He was really just a fine man. His first administration was really much better than his second, because by that time the crooks and termites and what have you, and all sorts of devious characters had pretty much taken over. They ruined his reputation, blackened it so

thoroughly that even though he damned near got elected in '62 again. He was regarded as the man to beat. But after that it was down hill all the way, down to nothing.

J.B.: Who are the other Governors that you had, Patterson?

Jenkins: Yeah, let's see.

J.B.:

Jenkins: A guy named Gordon Persons who was sort of a moderate progressive, a pretty good Governor. He was Governor during the Phoenix City period. That was one of his big accomplishments, was cleaning up Phoenix City. But an ordinary run of the mill progressive Governor, established a good state-wide educational television network. He was in broadcasting and had a lot of interest in that. Generally, ran a good shop. He would compare, I suppose, with John West in South Carolina. I don't know. That strikes me as being the kind of Governor that he was. He certainly didn't do any race baiting or anything like that.

J.B.: So race really became an issue in which race?

Jenkins: '58. '58 was the first year it really became a big issue.

J.B.: That was Patterson?

Jenkins: Folsom, none of them had any success whatever. I believe Bull Connor ran for Governor in '54 when Folsom was

elected. He was the big racist in the campaign. There were two or three racists in that '54 campaign, but Folsom won it without a run-off, beat 14 people with a majority, a clear majority. So he really had the people with him. Every newspaper in the state was against him. You know this is one thing that may be worth trying to get, about the hostility that has always prevailed between southern Governors and press. The real reason for it is that the press has been very conservative and the Governors have been very liberal. That is exactly why it was. That is why the press was against Huey Long, against Jim Folsom, and you can name a lot of other southern Governors in that same category. Of course, the press wasn't against some of them but just overt race baiting like Gene Tallmage, and so on. Basically, it was a conservative press against populist oriented Governors, New Dealish Governors, you know. But race became a big issue . . . I hold Jim responsible for this. It got completely out of hand in '56 when, now Little Rock had occurred before this. I don't remember when Little Rock occurred, but then sometime after Little Rock, very shortly after, Arthering Lucy registered at the University of Alabama and was ordered admitted. She was indeed admitted. After, well things got out of hand then. They started having bad riots on the campus and things like that, and she was in danger,

there is no doubt about that. There were Klan elements getting on the campus and that sort of thing. It wasn't really the students as much as the outsiders. The upshot of it was that ^{Arthurine}~~Arthering~~ Lucy issued public statements accusing the University officials of cooperating with the Klan, with the mob, that was trying to drive her off the campus, and they expelled her for that. There was no truth in what she said. There was no way to prove it because it wasn't true. They expelled her on that ground and that ended it there. But now if Jim had been on his toes, he could have kept order at the University. He could have kept those people off the campus and all he would have had to do was to say, "There ain't going to be no riots on that campus, and I am going to have a sufficient number of state police up there to prevent it. I don't like this any more than anybody else, but we are not going to have that University destroyed." Well, if they had integrated the University at that time, you see it would have been open then. It would have been the break, and all of the other would have come slowly and gradually after that. You see, the whites won that victory and when they did, it just solidified their resolve to keep the state's schools segregated. John Patterson ran primarily on a racist ticket, "I'm going to keep the niggers out of the schools," and that sort of thing, and he did. He kept them out. That

really introduced the era of inflammed racial politics to Alabama. He was the one who started exploiting it. Even Wallace didn't run, you know, although he certainly made a lot of racist noises then. He got the Negro vote in '58, in a big way, he got it over Patterson. Then four years later was the, "I'll never be out niggered again," and he hasn't been.

J.B.: You are convinced though that he made the remark?

Jenkins: Yeah, I am pretty sure he made it. If he didn't make it, it was something similar to that. I never heard anybody who said they heard him say it, but I am pretty sure that he did. I think he denies making it, I don't know.

J.B.: How would you characterize Wallace as Governor?

Jenkins: As Governor? He is bored by Governor. A state senator told me a pretty good story about him one time that pretty well wraps Wallace up. He said that he had gone down there . . . this was before Wallace was shot, and he was a Wallace supporter. Wallace supporters are kind of interesting in the state legislature. Nobody is particularly close to Wallace and a lot of them make fun of him. They just deal with him and support him and what have you because he is Governor and you've got to work with him after all. But this particular man, pretty

sophisticated state senator and I asked him, I said, "What do you all talk about when you go down there," and he said, "Oh, we eat Baby Ruth's and cuss niggers." I said, "No, no be serious. Tell me what you do when". . . he is hung up on this Baby Ruth business . . . "tell me what you do when you go down and talk to the Governor." He said, "All right, we went down a few days ago. We had \$110,000,000 bond issue that we were trying to get through the legislature and we had everybody, all of Wallace's people down there, all the legislative leaders and what have you, and we were holding a strategy session on how to get this \$110,000,000 bond issue passed. We were talking about spending \$110,000,000 of the tax payers' money, and I looked around and the Governor of this state was gone. I looked all around and there he was standing over by the window looking out the window eating a Baby Ruth." So he doesn't care about things like this. He is bored by that sort of thing. But at the same time, he's so smart, Wallace is about ten notches above most Governors that I have ever known in intelligence. He has got a keen memory, one which works very quickly, a mind that has an instinct for making the right decisions quickly, and just by half doing it, he could make things run pretty well, but he is not what you would call a good administrator at all, not by a long shot. He is so totally

preoccupied with politics, with running, that was all he was interested in doing. Once he got elected Governor, hell, that was just a job for him to do then. The next thing that he wanted was a race. Look back over his record now. I've gone through this in some stuff that I have written. [Interruption] He got into politics before that. He was elected to the state legislature around '52, he was elected circuit judge in '56, no, '48 in the legislature, circuit judge in '54, ran for Governor in '58. Let's see, two, four, six. In '60, he didn't run for anything and that is supposed to be the low point in his life. He just walked around the streets of Montgomery buttonholing anybody who would talk to him. Then he had that really hard campaign in '62 for Governor. '62 for Governor, '64 for President, '66 for Governor, '68 for President, '70 for Governor, '72 for Preisent, '74 for Governor, and '76 for President, every other year. He runs all the time.

J.B.: What compulsion does he have about running? What is it?

Jenkins: Well, the way I put it is that the thing that makes George Wallace run for office is the same thing that makes a drunk drink whiskey. He has just got this compulsion to do it. Now it has got to be deeper than that. I think that he wants, as much as

any man that I have ever known, I think he wants to be loved by everybody. I really believe that he wants that. His way of being loved is to win public office and to represent the people. He has this sort of mystical union with the people. He says "It's not George Wallace, I am just the embodiment of what you ask me to do," and this sort of thing. He talks like that quite a lot.

J.B.: Does he really perceive himself as being a President?

Jenkins: I think he does, yeah. I don't think that he ever seriously considered the awesome demands on being President, for being President and so on. But I think he seriously does, yeah. [Interruption] He is wounded when people suggest "pooh, pooh," the idea of his being President. He thinks he is as good as anybody else to be President.

J.B.: What has been the effect on Wallace of the shooting?

Jenkins: It is so difficult to put into words. It is something that you just have to have known the man before and after to see the effect on him. He genuinely thought that he was dying when he was shot. He was prepared to die. He even has told me his thoughts about what he thought about while he was dying. You know, in his mind he was dying, "What's going to happen to my

family, and my children," and that sort of thing. He had made his peace with God, right there in the ambulance to the hospital and he lost consciousness after he got to the hospital and for all intents and purposes, he went through the experience of dying. Then when he came back it was such touch and go for so long and he laid there and pondered death and that sort of thing, not knowing whether he'd make it or not and struggling to try to do it and he has said many many times, that he thinks that God intended for him to live and he thanks God for it, and he really means it. He came out of it with a personal religious conviction that he never had before. I don't know, maybe those nuns up at the hospital had something to do with it. He got awfully close to them, I know that. He was in a vulnerable position during that time. Then the sickness was, how many operations did he have, five? A large number of operations and just going into each one of them not knowing whether he was going to live or not, and trying to come back, and what have you and trying to do the exercises, these demanding exercises that he is having to do to build up his upper body and so on. At one point there he seemed to be going along very well. He was carrying home this physical therapy routine, working four and five hours a day on doing nothing but lifting weights and walking on the cross bars and things like that,

and then all of a sudden this prostrate infection hit him. He had to go back into the hospital, and they said that it wasn't anything serious, that he wouldn't be in the hospital more than 10 days. Well, he was in the hospital over a month. He got really really down in the dumps. All the while he'd be beset by these terrible periods of depression, and people would tell how he would just be reduced to sobbing for hours and that sort of thing. He was seen in public crying, weeping, and there was one story that we heard, it came to us from what we considered as pretty reliable sources that on that last illness in Birmingham, the prostrate thing, when he stayed in the hospital over a month, you know, that his mental condition became so serious, there is one story that he tried to jump out of the window. Now I don't have the faintest idea of whether or not that is true. But it apparently became so serious that they kept 24 hour guards around him just to protect him from himself. When I say jumped out of the window, he crawled to the window and he'd get up, and he could do that, I guess. But that is how bad it was. Then about that time, a little after that, when he seemed to be at just the very lowest point in his sickness, Harold Martin, do you know who he is? He is our publisher, he and Wallace are about like Wallace and Frank Johnson. In fact, Wallace is even more frightened of Harold Martin because Martin has really done him in, I'm

telling you. Of course, Martin has done good work. Everything Martin has been damn well documented and well based and so on. Martin made a speech to a civic club in Montgomery in which he called on Wallace to resign. He said he was physically incapable of running the government and to make other arrangements, either to turn the government over to the Attorney General, or if he didn't resign, in fact, to make a public statement that he was leaving public life altogether and designate some sort of committee of business men or something like that to run the government until his term expired. Well, this thing had, they tried every conceivable treatment that they could on Wallace to make him respond. This made him respond like none of the others did. He almost got up and ran out of the bed, and he's been improving ever since. He's been damn good. When he made that speech to the legislature when he opened the session of the legislature and they wheeled him in, everybody knew something was going to happen and they had constructed this box, and they wheeled him up to the box and he grasped these things and he stood up. This was on state-wide television, pulled himself up, this doesn't mean he had any use of his legs. He has no feeling below his belt. He once described to me that one of the most troubling things about the whole thing is that he has a sensation of

floating, because he doesn't have any feeling where he is sitting, you see. It is as if he were suspended in air. He also has no balance. It means that he falls around a lot. He has no feeling below the belt at all. Meaning, he has no control over his bowels, his sexual power is completely gone, and that must be one hell of a damaging thing to Wallace. You remember Folsom's great remark about him, did you ever hear it? "George don't drink but he always was bad to fuck." It must be a hell of a damaging thing to him and I suspect, and this is just speculation, but I suspect the day is going to come when he is going to think that his wife is running around with other men. He may already think that. That's the kind of paranoia that goes along with this kind of injury. There certainly has been no indication that she has been doing it yet, but that's the thing. Now, besides that, the other ways that it has changed him, I think it has made him a genuinely more compassionate person in a very personal sense. Prior to the shooting, he was compassionate in sort of an abstract sense. He could see a large number of people out there that had needs, you know, but for a specific individual with needs, it didn't seem to sink in so much, you know. But after this it did. We ran a story, for instance, about a woman who way dying of cancer, and Wallace called her up on the telephone just to cheer her up, and that was the kind of

thing he did, and very quietly without any publicity or anything he slipped into the general appropriations bill, this last session of the legislature, an appropriation which would . . .

End interview with Mr. Jenkins.