

This is an interview with Harry Dent. The interview was conducted by Jack Bass in Columbia, South Carolina on February 22, 1974, and was transcribed by Susan Hathaway.

JACK BASS: We need to talk about the Republican party, I suppose, from South Carolina and the south. Where it is, where it is going, and how it got there.

HARRY DENT: I'll tell you where it is right now. These state Democrats are trembling their knees over this Westmoreland thing. Michael <sup>Mungo</sup> ~~Lungow~~ attacked the General this morning to give him a sample of the kind of whiplash he'd get if he dared do this ~~hastardly~~ thing. Really an interesting thing. I've never seen him so concerned.

JB: What was the impact of Strom Thurmond back in 1964?

HD: Well, I think it moved us ahead of some of these other states in moving toward a two party system. It was, I think, more responsible than anything else for 26 or 27 legislators or whatever it was that we elected that year. It went from one to twenty-six or twenty-seven - it might have been twenty-eight that we got up to when we got one or so elected maybe the next year in a special election. Anyway, his pull at the top of the ticket in '66 was very important in that regard and it had a lot to do with Marshall <sup>P</sup> ~~R~~arker coming so close in that Senate race. But, it has speeded the transition more here. It speeded it in the south, but it speeded it more in this state than a state like

Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, states like that.

JB: Would you think that South Carolina would be in the same category as those other states?

HD: Yeah, because you see we had no residual Republican base here like Tennessee and North Carolina back in the mountains. You see they had something to work with. There wasn't anything to work with here. The first thing that really gave it a handle to go with was, I think, Thurmond coming over. I think the Workman thing, you know, started the momentum. I think the Thurmond thing, you know, was step two in that drive. That important step two. Because once we got a Senator and a Congressman - that's what it amounted to - and then the Legislators, that started changing the reflection of things a little bit. And, the other side realized that they had a fight on their hands from now on and there's been a fight on their hands ever since then. They had a [candidate] that got 43% of the vote against the incumbent Governor that year. <sup>Parker almost</sup> ~~Hargrove~~ defeated Hollings for the Senate and Dr. <sup>Eddings</sup> ~~Eddings~~ got 45% to 46%, Superintendent of Education. That was a real . . . about '66 election, established the biggest beach head. It did more concretely to show people that it was here than anything. Previous to that it had been Presidential election.

JB: If Thurmond had not <sup>switched</sup>, do you think there would have been any chance to get Westmoreland to run?

HD: I think if Thurmond had not switched there would be a lot of things that wouldn't be here. Just like there would be no question about the role Thurmond played in the '68 convention, and the '68 election. In addition to that is the fact again,

when we won again in the Legislature, which was '72, I attribute that considerably to the pull at the top not only by Thurmond, who got the same vote that he got in '66. He got 63% to 64%, but Nixon got 71% or 72% and both of those - that was heavy pulling at the top. And like in (?) Kennedy, you know, we had some stuff going at the bottom. This is what turned

(?) upside down, when we never expected . . . it'd take a lot of pull at the top to turn (?) upside down. But they had the bottom thing going to, the dissatisfaction, as you know, here. So, I say it's been important, very important to have a vote getter like Thurmond as a senior Senator, even though, ordinarily having a Senate seat is not nearly so vital to bring the party along. Ordinarily speaking, it's the governorship that really does it. But there's no question that Thurmond speeded it ... the transition in this state; and, yeah, it makes a difference when a guy like Westmoreland is considering the governorship as a Republican at this time. But I looked at some of those states and say that South Carolina would have been in the Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi category. They don't have anything to speak of and in . . . they're still pretty helpless. They've got something, but not a whole lot.

JB: Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee had the mountain Republicans?

HD: Yeah, that's right. They were different.

JB: Florida had a base on which to build, in effect, because the migration of Republicans.

HD: Florida had a Republican gold mine sitting underneath it. All they had to do was just dig. . . it was right up towards the top - it's still there. They have made some mistakes in Florida. They broke the governor situation, then they had there problems and so forth. So they have really kind of stepped back to a certain degree, but the potential in Florida for the Republican party is greater than it is in any state in this area by far. They should've struck gold sooner. You know there was nothing going in Florida until all of a sudden Bill <sup>Murphy</sup> ~~Murphy~~ and those came along and they got an unusual situation with that governor's race and they hit it right. And, they struck gold, as I say, political gold, I guess you'd say. And they followed right through in the Legislature. And for a minute there they almost had the governorship and both U. S. Senate seats, you know, and almost half of the Congressional delegation. But things have gone backward - retrogressed down there, but the potential is absolutely there in Florida . . . absolutely there, as you well know.

JB: You have been credited in some quarters as the man who talked Judge Carswell into the Senate race. Is that true?

HD: Talked him into the Senate race? No, no, he was talked into the Senate race by Senator Gurney and Governor Kirk, and I mean after they had talked him into it, I knew what they were doing, but it was not my talking him into it as such.

I frankly thought that if they could've worked it out without a fight, it would've been a really good thing. But, I recognize the problem with bringing somebody in from outside to run against



somebody who is very much inside, who built that party, Bill Cramer. But they didn't work it out, and they got into a fight and that was lethal. Somebody somewhere should've backed off, but they couldn't work it out. But they, down there, had . . . they're only interested in winning but they were also interested . . . it was an intraparty fight going on. I thought they had the thing worked out so there wouldn't be a contest, because Bill <sup>Cramer</sup>~~Pringle~~, who is a good friend of mine today, we worked together on the (?) suit and so forth. Bill had indicated great reluctance to run for the United States Senate. In fact he had said . . . I remember we had him over to the White House to talk to him . . . he didn't give us an answer. But when that Carswell thing came, he moved, you know, we were a little bit unaware of what the exact situation was in regard to who was going to do what. But if either one of them had been . . . if they could've worked it out, without a fight, either way, then I think they could've won. But with a fight they lost.

JB: Where is the Republican party heading in the South?

HD: What do you mean, where I see it headed. It's continuing to go up.

JB: In all these things?

HD: Yeah, I think it is. I mean, it's gonna' be continued progress in all of them. It's inevitable, because, you know, the two party system is coming. It's just a matter of time, and how fast it moves in various states . . . depending on how the people do their thing in these states. Just like in South

Carolina, we'll make a quantum leap forward if we win the governorship, as I was saying. If we don't, we will continue at the level we're at right now for a little while.

JB: (Inaudible)

HD: That's right, and he'll help carry that ticket. That is one reason why his Legislators are so concerned, and they are terribly concerned, because they are going to face single member problem with, you know, some of the blacks, saying they are going to get some of those people in addition to everything else over that single member issue. And then they've got the possibility of a strong pull at the top that they hadn't figured on . . . on the Republican side. So, with single member and Westmoreland at the top, it could be more than the 25 or 26 that it is right now. Without Westmoreland at the top thanks to single member, if that comes, we won't go below a certain level. Now what that level is . . . you know, even if we have . . . we should have a downdraft this year, generally speaking, we should. Because aside from the Washington situation. I'm just talking about . . . this is the year when we would expect to have kind of a downdraft.

JB: Why?

HD: Because we don't . . . we would not ordinarily have a strong pull at the top with a big vote out. The bigger the vote, it comes . . . like a Presidential vote on top of a U. S. Senate vote, the better off we are . . . the more people get out, the better off we are. And, you know, one of the things that happened to Albert Watson, I am convinced, I've been thinking, there wasn't a tremendous turnout in '70

and the forces against Albert Watson did turn out . . . I think in greater proportion to there registered numbers than did forces that might have been pro Albert Watson, but nobody massed them or they didn't get out or what have you. And so I think this year, without a strong pull at the top, we would be in trouble save for single member. I don't know, you know, how many . . . I haven't sat down and looked at a map because you can't tell until you see them draw a map to where the single member districts will be. But there is just going to be no way we can go below some certain level.

JB: You mean above a certain level that you are right now?

HD: Yeah. For instance in '68 what happened to us was we had a Presidential race, but unfortunately the Presidential vote was 38% or 39% which wasn't a strong pull at the top, because Wallace blocked it off. And the Democrats, as you know, worked with Wallace, and against all of our people; so we suffered some losses that year, you know, from 26 or 27 on down to 9, I think it was, in the Legislature. Again, that points out how important it's been to us to have that pull at the top in these key election years. If it had just been a two way race, you know, Nixon would have pulled strong, and we wouldn't have gone down the way we did in the Legislature. Now, I think that as all this is going on, we are developing a little bit more and a little more at the local level. You know, we're getting more and more of the City Council in; but that's a gradual evolutionary process that is helped with a little quantum leap here and a little quantum leap there by the pull at the top, that comes with . . . that we had last year.

HD: And, as I say, Westmoreland will . . . would give us that extra pull at the top that could make the difference in some of these races.

JB: Where do you see the Republican party in the South getting its growth. There was a lot of talk in Atlanta about realignment pulling over dissident Democrats, Connally, Mills Godwin, as examples. Will you see the party going in that direction, or to some less articulated position as a way to broaden the base?

HD: Well, I think it is going to come, I think it'll come both ways. I think it is going in both directions. That is, and another thing Westmoreland will do for this party is when it gets to . . . when he gets to campaigning. He's going to, right now he doesn't have . . . you look at a poll and you don't see any black support particularly, because they don't know anything about Westmoreland particularly, you know, about . . . they're talking about blacks, particularly black leaders. But, yet, when you look at his record, there is not one taint of racism . . . in fact there is a plus in regard to what black leaders would want. And he will make an open appeal to them. I mean very sincerely, he feels very strongly about it. And, he wouldn't get . . . you couldn't get him near anything to do with a race question. So, that is something that is coming down here, you know, gradual thing as you get a candidate for a top job like that and so I would think in the general election, Westmoreland could take the biggest percentage of black voters . . . what ever that is . . . it might not be a whole lot . . .

but I mean, the biggest that any Republican running statewide had had in this state without any question . . . I mean he should - he should very definitely. The . . . now that will help broaden the base particularly as he gets in to the Governor's office and it is open to everybody, and appointments and he takes strides and makes moves . . . which he will. That's going to bring in more participation in that direction. And then, too, one of the problems that we have had with the Westmoreland thing within the Republican party is some of the people connected with the Birch society are against him, because remember the Council on Foreign Relations . . . they're not saying anything about this publicly, but they are on the telephone about that. So, I think base broadening, by the way, is something that has never been accepted in the Republican party. I mean, you can sit in a meeting of the State Executive Committee which is very . . . fairly conservative and today they . . . you won't get much dissent about broadening the base. At the same time, there is a (?) to get a (?) to run . . . to get a Westmoreland to run, so forth. That meets with a little bit of resistance, but it is a way to continue to make progress and go forward.

JB: When you're talking about broadening the base, what are they talking about to do that?

HD: Why are they talking about doing that? It's to be less philosophical, less ideological in orientation in state (?) so that people who want to come in feel welcome to come in and

participate. It's to be more pragmatic . . . is what it amounts to. The Democratic party leaders in South Carolina, as you know, are very pragmatic. They're old pros at the job. It's dollars and cents to them. It's being in office, patronage and everything that goes along with the old political system. They have been able to do things and to make alliances that the Republican party is not willing to make. And alot of things that the Republican party has not been willing to do because of its philosophical orientation and the fact that the Republican party has been composed of people who are new to politics who come who aren't pros. It isn't dollars and cents to them. It's ideology more than it is dollars and cents and jobs and so forth. They're not, therefore, as pragmatic about it. One of the problems that I have in the Republican party down here, is the fact that I'm far more pragmatic than most of the Republicans that come to the meetings. They want to win, but you have to paint a picture. If you gotta' go over here and . . . just like some of the resistance we have had to Westmoreland has been based on the Council on Foreign Relations thing, plus, it has been based on which some of the less consider much to liberal. But the other thing is, is he party pure? The Democrats have always been able to find a way to get around questions like that and not worry too much about it, if it meant victory . . . willing to make the alliances and compromises necessary to succeed. Yet, I think where they have muffed it this year, to the degree that they have, is that they had Westmoreland sitting there . . . I think they could've had him at a certain point. And yet there establishment leaders

didn't want him because they were afraid of him. They didn't know he was unknown. I mean, where would he go. They can predict with a certain degree of certainty whether a guy is going to come . . . who comes up through they're escalator system. (?) John West told Lee Bandy up in Washington one day that there was only one establishment in the Democratic party that wanted Westmoreland and yet, they don't want us to have him. That's what their poll said. Their poll said don't let the Republicans get him. Our polls said you better go get him. Its funny . . . that's what they said in effect. The . . . they aren't willing, you see, to . . . what they are worried about . . . the party leaders are worried about is if he should win and become Governor . . . too independent for them. In other words it's gotten to be, you know, straight down the party line. They had to make sure he was going to preserve everything just like it is . . . a lot in regard to policies but particularly in regard to . . . you know, don't let the Republicans and those independents in there at all. You know how much (?) we have in state government and any appointments or what have you. So they are willing to give up, or take a chance what an independent minded type guy. Let's face it, the Democratic nomination would be more valuable to him. I understand that. It always has been, but I think that it just so happens that this year

JB: (Inaudible)

HD: That's right. Yet, on the other hand he has enough



strength. and if the Republican party is pragmatic enough to give him the freedom and the leeway to run, the way it appears he would run, non-partisan or independent type Republican, then . . . this is a sign of maturity on the part of the Republican party, and immaturity on the part of the Democratic party. I'm saying in the past they have been immature - politically, wise, professional pragmatic group of people - their leaders. And I say, where they are tripping themselves up this year is they are not willing to compromise, for a guy who might not be a straight party liner in their Governor chair. We have indicated at this point a willingness to not apply the party line test to him. Some of our people have wanted it applied, but this is true, the polls show this as well as what I have gotten out of Executive Committee meetings . . . 'cause when I went down there to talk to him four or five weeks ago, after I had talked to him the first time, I said to him, now I want to know whether you want me to go back to see him or not, Jim Henderson and me. Jim Henderson wasn't there tonight. Jim was the one that initiated it . . . the meetings with him.

JB: How did the meeting get started?

HD: Jim . . . I don't know how . . . Jim Henderson just asked me to go with him. And, we went the first time, and we sat down and talked and really I was answering his questions, you know, more or less. And, telling him what the Republican party was like . . . 'cause I wasn't sure at that point, you know, what we wanted to do, if anything. So, I didn't want to go back without . . . 'cause when I got there I got the impression that he came with us as a Republican . . . at that first meeting . . . that he would run an independent type, non-partisan type campaign.

I wasn't sure in my own mind . . . I knew the elected officials, like the Legislators and all them. They'll tell you to go get him pretty fast. They are pretty pragmatic about things. They have to get elected. But I wasn't sure what the feeling would be of the party leaders, members of the Executive Committee, County Chairmen and so forth, so Ken <sup>Powell</sup>~~Power~~ called us . . . he had a meeting and he expanded it and said all you all come, this is a very important meeting. And I briefed him on the poll, but I told him, I said now if this man runs, on the Republican ticket, I don't know whether you're going to like it, the way he run. And, I want to know whether that's going to be acceptable to you if he comes in here. I'm not going back to see him unless, you know, you people tell me to go back, I mean its overwhelming that you want me to go back and talk to him further; because I'm not going to mislead him . . . I'm not going to say to him come into this Republican party, I think you can come in here and be an independent type Republican and it'll work out. The party would back you and so forth. I mean, I felt a responsibility to him. I'm not going to mislead him. I made that clear to them that night, and they said overwhelmingly to go get him any way you can. I was really surprised, because I really went there with the idea that I wasn't coming back if there was any real serious question about what they wanted. And, in fairness to him and fairness to the party, and I wanted them to know in advance what had been said in the first meeting. So, I really was surprised. It was a sign to me that the party had matured, they wanted to win and they were willing to be flexible.

JB: Well, what were his major concerns when he talked to you the first time?

HD: Well, I got the impression in the first conversation with him that, you know, he definitely had not made up his mind which way he wanted to go. He was looking at all three routes, you know, Republican, independent and Democratic. And, I don't think he was looking Republican as much at that point. The . . . but his . . . there were a couple things that motivated him . . . he did want to serve, because he did see things that he thought needed to be brought forward and updated in this state. He really very much impressed me with what he had to say about the need for change in South Carolina. I told him I said you know, that's right, when I came back down here in 1965 . . .

JB: What changes was he talking about?

HD: Well, he didn't get specific . . . he didn't get specific. He didn't say just this, this and another; but he was talking about per capita income being down, you know. The same thing . . . I told him, I said General what you're saying is the same thing that I started preaching when I came down here as State Chairman in late '65, which my little old theme was South Carolina is first ~~but it should be last~~ where it should be last, and last where it should be first. And, I got some NEA statistics, and we worked on that and did position papers, policy position papers, that South Carolina State (inaudible). Remember we had 22 policy position papers we started in that '66 campaign. Joe Rogers issued some of them, Dr. Ennings issued some of them, I issued some of them, Marshall May issued some of them, so forth.

I said really we have tried to . . . at the State and local level project the image as the party of change as against the party as status quo. And I said, really at the national level we are more conservative. So I said you'll have no trouble. I said you go in the Democratic primary and talk about things you have said to me, you'd be most unwelcome . . . most unwelcome. So, I think he came to realize a little bit more after that, that he could run easier and better. One, that we would give him the flexibility to run the kind of campaign he wanted to and, two, that this was the party of change at the state and local level, more than the other party. And, that that would suit him . . . that he would be more comfortable. And, he likes the idea of a two party system. He believes that there definitely should be a two party system. Yet, he likes, at the national level, our potential candidates for 1976 better than he does their potential candidates. I mean, I just came to the conclusion that night that this fella' suits us, just in what he has to say. Fits what I had in mind, and I felt he fits what Ken Powell has said as State Chairman, and so forth. So, I thought it could be a very convenient marriage.

JB: When you're talking about this reform and change, what are you talking about in specific?

HD: Well, again, I haven't gotten in my conversation with him specific as such. And, I think that is what worries the establishment type people in this state, the . . . when anybody talks about him.

JB: If the Republicans win the Governorship, do you think the top level of the business and financial community have been pretty much a part of the coalition of Democrats in this state

will switch over?

HD: I think we'll start breaking up the old coalition and, in fact, in the course of this election, you know, we didn't get any of that establishment . . . what you call establishment vote and money, to speak of, in '66 or '70 for the Governorship, as an example. We didn't get any . . . what you call real Democrat votes to speak of. We massed the Republican vote which is about 20% - 22%. We got most of the independent vote which is about 28% - 30% and . . . but we didn't cut any democratic votes to speak of. Fifty per cent of the people in this state (inaudible) polls say "I am a democrat," so when we get a candidate that can reach into that Democratic vote over there, as this man does, he reaches about 20% to 25% of 'em say I want that man to be Governor. Well that (telephone) (inaudible) is to be pragmatic enough and have a broad enough base and who has some popular appeal and exposure. You know, who is well known. He really fits into that ring.

JB: Then, that's the way to win?

HD: That's the way to win as a Republican, unless you can ever catch the Democrats . . . and that is the same thing true in regard to the national picture for the Republican party . . . unless you catch the Democrats in a terrible fix, which we did in '68, so forth, unless we come along with an Eisenhower . . . I don't mean just a military term . . . a guy with a big and broad following . . .

JB: Do you see Westmoreland's position in South Carolina as that of an ~~allegist~~ <sup>analogy</sup> to that of Eisenhower in the '52 Presidential election.

HD: Not totally, but, a good bid. When you bring it down from the Presidential to the Governor level, maybe, much more so. I mean he'd tell you that it's not absolutely the same.

JB: Pretty strongly an <sup>analogy</sup> ~~allegist~~?

HD: Yeah it is. When you ask me where does the party go? I think the party has become more mature, become more pragmatic, it does desire to win and it needs some pragmatic, mature type leadership to get it to go that way. Because those people will follow . . .

JB: Are you saying that it is also becoming less ideological?

HD: Its still there . . . still there now, but . . .

JB: Not to the extent of, say, Louisiana? Or, Alabama?

HD: What you mean there?

JB: As ideological as the Republican party?

HD: Well, yeah, this one is less so today, then there . . . yeah. Its . . . I think what these people want to win. They don't want to give up their ideological persuasions and views; but they are willing to give them up to a certain degree, but that depends on the leadership they get. The leader says follow me, we're going this way. We're still going to win and still keep most of what we believe. They'll go, they'll go very fast. That is the difference than some of these other states. A lot of it depends on that leadership. It is important to have some office holders. You know, in some of these states, they just don't have any office holders, to speak of. Now, thank goodness you do . . . every Southern State has an office holder. A major office holder, like a Congressman, Senator, Governor or something. You know, you asked what difference Strom Thurmond makes . . . it makes a lot of difference, because

your office holder is . . . gives leadership, and the office holder himself is pragmatic about winning and that helps get the party around more. Just like recently we went around here to (inaudible) for an overflowing crowd. They had two hundred some people more than they planned for at \$50 a head. I was remarking to people, you know, it shows you the difference between winning and losing. If you tried to put on a Republican fund raising dinner, in Florence for anything previously, you couldn't do it, like they did over there. But, Ed Young, a Congressman, a winner, . . .

JB: Is that likely to be followed by Republican Legislators from that area?

HD: Yeah, it'll all help.

JB: Do you anticipate that that will flow out of winning that Congressional seat?

HD: It'll certainly help. It sets the tone and the climate and they see a Republican Congressman . . . not only is he not so bad, in the view of the people in this District. But they turn around with a guy like Ed Young, his rating the other day in a poll was seventy odd percent approval. But they see what it takes for an Ed Young to win. Now some of the Republicans resent Ed Young, you know, not being a pure 100% Republican, and they resent Strom Thurmond and they resent Floyd Smith . . . we have a certain amount of this that goes on. But the vast majority of Republicans do not, and, you know, they go along with it . . . things have become much more mature, and people have become much more pragmatic and there was an element of the John Birch Society had some positions in these parties. It



is less today than it was . . . you know, they go to the meetings and they sit there and they get elected, you know, but nobody knows who a John Birch Society member is, generally speaking. They don't identify themselves. But the ones who will give you the most difficulty about not going with a Westmoreland or not taking a pragmatic course or being a little bit more mature about the issues or candidates. Most of the time, its somebody who, who is . . . you don't know if they are a member or not, but they probably are. They cause quite a bit of . . . they're a lot noisier then anybody else. They go on that very conservative theme, and play it very hard; and, of course, you know, it gets to some people because they are more in tune that way. I found that the same thing . . . I found that Republicans across the country in the time I was at the White House and I was speaking in most every state to Republican audiences; and the thing that interested me was the fact that I could go there and give just as conservative a speech in Connecticut to a statewide meeting of Republican (telephone - break in conversation).

JB: (inaudible)

HD: Yeah, in fact, the funny thing about it was that I found that after I got out on the trail, speaking in these various places that I got more hoorahs and hosannas when I gave a staunchly conservative speech, and turned up a southern accent then I did . . . I'm talking about Connecticut . . . it really amazed me, up in New England in particular . . . well, what convinced me was that the Republican party workers across the country . . . people that come to the meetings, dinners and so forth, and do the nitty griddy work are conservatives. And, the same thing is true in regard to the Democratic party . . . they are liberal

. . . I mean, I am saying the opposite is true. Except down here, in this area, in the South which is a kind of a mixture of Government situation. But, the thing that the Republican party has to do, though, is the same thing the Democratic party can never afford to get itself in a position of letting the emotional appeal overcome what's in the head, not the heard get over the head. That's the thing we kept telling those people down there at the '68 convention . . . I'll never forget we said, you know, head over heart when we were trying to stop Reagan for Nixon. So, I think that to answer your questions the way the Republican party in the south is going to go, I think it's going to continue to pick up and this victory will help to get that victory and that victory; and, most of the people in the south, a lot of people in the south are inclined to be Republican anyway, and they finally come home where they ought to be. Then with regard to black votes, I don't know . . . it'll be a long time before the Republican party, except in a place like Arkansas with Winthrop Rockefeller can get a tremendous chunk. They might in this particular case, and might in that particular place. But, I think that the inroads are being made and it's going to be a steady making of inroads as the party grows and matures, and the blacks become more independent, which I think they are, a little bit more. This is a problem for the Democratic party down here . . . whether they . . . what they do about it. They'd manage fairly well to survive through that period of transition.

JB: Do you perceive labor in the South growing in strength, and if so what does that mean politically in the future?

HD: Yeah. I think its inevitable that it will come on more, not tremendously so. I think that's going to be a gradual type thing. As it comes on, of course, that could be an assist to the Republican party. But, not necessarily so because I think even Unions in this State, you know, are far more conservative in their leadership, and so forth, then they would be elsewhere. I think that will continue, because of the overall conservative atmosphere that exists among Southern people as such.

JB: Do you see any place in the Republican party in the South for liberals? Or, non-conservatives?

HD: Yeah. I think there clearly ought to be. For instance this party . . . I guess you'd say . . . I don't know that I could (inaudible) and tell you there's a liberal who is a member of this party and comes to meetings as such. But I can point to other people that are moderates. Who would not classify themselves as conservative. So, they are normally conservative but are not liberal, they are in the moderate category. Yeah. Like take a guy like Jim Henderson is in that kind of a category. He's accepted.

JB: Is he going to run Westmoreland's media campaign?

HD: No, I don't think so. He doesn't like to do that. He won't do that kind of thing.

JB: He handled his own though, didn't he? In his firm, agency?

HD: To tell you the truth, I don't know exactly how he did it. I am not sure. But I have talked to him before about running campaigns . . . but he won't do it. So I am pretty sure that he has no intention in this.

JB: Its not because of his personal involvement in this?

HD: I don't think so. In fact, Westmoreland hasn't even been to that point of knowing what he is going to do. Who is going to be a campaign manager, who is going to be campaign chairman. Cause, he hasn't finally resolved that thing. As soon as he does, he's going to have to start getting busy, in that regard. (Pause) One thing that is important in the South . . . the Southern Republican operation is respected all around the country in the Republican party. Because the Republican party recognizes that it has its problems as a shrinking party nationally to a certain degree. The Democratic party is shrinking a little bit too. They recognize that they are in a minority status around the country; and they have really welcomed, except in a few cases, the rise and the development of the two party system in the South. I found this to be the case all over the place, except in a few cases where you find a fairly liberal Republican who says that . . . who was it that made a comment not long ago . . . oh, Senator . . . from Maryland, Mac Mathias made a comment . . . that what he called the so called Southern tragedy about an albatrose around the Republican parties neck. Well, remember that isn't true. There might have been an albatrose around his neck, yet he seemed to do very well in Maryland, despite that if he considers that a problem. But, it has aided in the . . . it has taken up some of the slack in the Republican party and we have put people in the Congress and, as you know, what the statistics are in regard to that. . . to make up for some of the losses on the national level. And, we have provided the votes that made up for the Presidential

election. And we set the pace for them in 1972, that 70% average vote of all the Southern states. So, I know you look at it both ways, if you want to, but the great majority that I've found all around the country was where I went with a Southern accent . . . they said welcome brother . . . I mean you guys keep it going. And the South . . . and I really believe this, the south has more influence, and has had, and will have in the conventions than any other one section, because of the fact that the South will, generally speaking, stick together. And also because of the fact that the South has (?) brethren out West and the Mid-West, who will hang together with the South in an alliance type situation. That's why today you see people coming South, I mean, like Nelson Rockefeller, his first trip was to Atlanta, Elliott Richardson headed to Mississippi. I think he'd fall behind Rockefeller . . . Rockefeller would do better in the South today than he did previously. You know, it'd be Ford and Reagan and Connelly could all do well down this way naturally. But if they all fell by the wayside . . . if something happened and Rockefeller should emerge, he'd get a lot more support down this way . . . if they had to vote between Rockefeller and Reagan, you know which way the South, generally speaking would go at a convention. But if they were convinced that Reagan couldn't win but Rockefeller could, you'd see some split up in the South. I think, certainly, in the General Election that Rockefeller would be nominated by the Republican convention. He would do better than a lot of people might think.

But, Percy . . . there is a feeling there about Percy; and Richardson somewhere in between there. Now I may be wrong. He was not previously, that is, he . . . did as Secretary of HEW . . . did a very comendable job of handling the Southern situation . . . as Secretary of HEW; and he did not rub the people the wrong way. He had a Southern strategist Dr. Richard <sup>Blaahan</sup>~~Brown~~ on his staff. So, the Southern boys did not get the feel about him the way they did about Finch . . . by the Republican leaders - let me put it that way. Now, what has occurred since then with regard to his services as Attorney General . . . I think might have exasperated the situation a little bit more

JB: (Inaudible) revolution of Watergate didn't it?

HD: Yeah, that's right. It may well. But he is not previously . . . prior to his service as Attorney General been considered a by any means.

JB: What is the Southern strategy. Democrats usually refer to it as Republican use of race for political purposes.

HD: Yeah. Well that's . . . that's the way they had sought to tab it and put it. But it really was the idea of sticking together and voting together for . . . in a conservative vein, but being pragmatic enough to . . . not to get like . . . not to go for Reagan in '68 . . . to go for Nixon instead of Reagan; and because that was victory as against what was considered not to be victory or maybe a question about victory. But it has not been to . . . for instance, the Supreme Court, I'd say what the President do with regard to the Supreme Court

was more important in the South in getting him a good constituency, you know, and a lot of friendships down this way then anything else he did. But he did not put a single member in that Court who would vote against desegregation, do you see what I mean. There was not a racist or appointment that was made.

JB: Would you say he put a number who voted against extending desegregation beyond where it was in voting by turning the clock back. But he put people on there who would (?) status where it was at that time.

HD: But when you look at his overall appointees to the Supreme Court, though, they had more to do with the subject of law and order and basically strict construction of the Constitution in regard to plain conservative type government. More then . . . as you say turning the clock back on the race question. And another thing is when Nixon picked up a lot of points in the South was his basic appeal toward what they considered patriotism, and the way he did his thing in regard to Viet Nam and so forth. I'd say that and the Supreme Court appointments together . . . you can think of a lot of things, but those two things . . .

JB: Well, how about what has been referred to as his retrenchment on Civil Rights?

HD: Well, there wasn't any real retrenchment. You know, he achieved more desegregation under his administration . . . he didn't go forward and blow the bugels and the triumphets and push people around and so forth; but he took the velvet, soft glove approach, and through leadership and you know the establishment of these committees down here in the South and



so forth, his whole approach to it was one of the previous administrations had gotten out sand paper and rubbed up against people with it. He got with a smooth, the other side of the sand paper and used it without creating friction and discord and led them into accepting what they had to accept. And, they were willing to take it from a guy who made what they considered law and order from the Supreme Court and basically was what they considered a patriot with regard to U. S. situation in Viet Nam, and standing up on national security matters, and so forth . . . and see, they followed him right on through, except for a relatively few people on the detente, and the trip to Russia and the trip to China and so forth. The thing today that will get you the biggest applause, particularly in the South . . . did the other night over in Florence . . . when you talk about putting on lines and (? with that decision. In other words, basic appeal . . . I don't know if you call it appeal to nationalism or patriotism or whatever you want to call it, but that was mighty strong . . . they felt like . . . that they got the feeling about Nixon that, you know, he wasn't an agitator. But, he was going to do what he had to do. And you look at the tremendous amount of desegregation that occurred on the end as compared to what happened to (?). I mean, (?) I mean . . .

JB: In fact, wasn't most of that stuff that the momentum was built up (inaudible) in HEW, they got all the plans being submitted during '68, '69 during the transition period.

HD: You mean (?). Yeah, but we got the credit for them.

JB: I agree that you got your credit for them, but, at least you took the credit when you wanted it, but at the same time you had the Justice Department going in Mississippi for the first time arguing against the positions of NAACP legal defense, school of desegregations?

HD: Right, right.

JB: Booked by Atlanta editors refer to you several times interceding in behalf of local schools desegregation matters, was this all considered part of the Southern strategy?

HD: I mean, they might have considered it a part of it, but the way we approached it, we were able to accomplish, with regard to the whole desegregation thing . . . we were able to accomplish as much as would have been accomplished under another administration with peace and tranquility without bitterness. I don't know whether they could have accomplished some of the stuff if they hadn't . . . I mean, if this approach hadn't been followed. So, no, it was a case of . . . and most of these little things you're talking about the individual matter . . . it was a case of somebody doing something that just went strictly against the grain. It was absolutely stupid to . . . they were going to tear up a community, and be counter productive. There was no way you could fix anything with regard to desegregation in this administration. You know, you go in and say hey for this political purpose, how about doing this, that and the other and so forth. There was no way you could say don't desegregate that community. You know, that didn't happen. There were a few cases where they were trying to

work out a plan and they . . . and then the school board was up against the wall. I mean, there . . . they just said we're going to close the school and this, that and the other, and they made some concession that didn't amount to that much; but enabled them to go forward and work it out. It was a matter of willingness, you know, gee, if we had left the Ruby Martins there and the Leon Pennettels, who was ours . . . in there to do this kind of thing, I think from the stand point of the Civil Rights signed they were better off the way Nixon approached it and handled it. I don't know whether or not to admit it, really, they should admit it . . . that they came out better the way Nixon approached it. I say, I think black people, and I have spoken to various black audiences about this subject, I think black people didn't want, by in large now, I think the average black man and woman did not want the hostility and trouble to go with it. I think they wanted it worked out, but I believe they . . . you know, can see the two different approaches and . . .

JB: How are you characterizing two different approaches?

HD: Well one was just (inaudible). And the other was persuade and lead and not use the coarse sand paper to get to John Doe. But still the desegregation took place. Now, one other difference was that on the busing question . . . you know, a certain amount of busing did take place from this administration. The President was opposed, and he did say he was opposed to it. But, nevertheless, HEW and our justice did bring about a certain amount of it. And, the country didn't want that. I mean that public opinion poll after

public opinion poll showed that, black and white. The majority of blacks . . . I never saw a public opinion poll that didn't show a majority of blacks opposed to busing . . . forced busing.

JB: Well, what is forced busing . . . does it have any practical meaning?

HD: Yeah, yeah. It means whether you are going to haul people from one end of, yeah, well like that Judges decision ~~Merritt~~ <sup>Mehrige</sup> decision up in Virginia where you are going to haul people from an adjoining County all the way into town . . . into the City of Richmond.

JB: The facts of that case, you ended up with less busing then it is now.

HD: Well, the people . . . blacks or whites don't want that, I know they don't want that, to that extent. And, that was stopped and I think any administration that would have tried to implement that . . . put that into effect, you know, as to put it through Congress - well, it couldn't have gotten through Congress. So I think Nixon's approach was the most sensible sound approach and the South accepted it. I mean, you know that. The South didn't particularly like it, but they accepted it... black and white, and so I think that Richard Nixon deserves a tremendous amount of credit that he has never gotten because of what you call the liberals or what are you going to call it, have never been able to really credit him with having had the right approach to this de-segregation crisis. But I think that another administration would have.

JB: But you have a busing plan in Greenville, South Carolina

that works.

HD: That's right, but, but, but, they put it in . . . the local people put that in by . . .

JB: By the Federal Court order.

HD: Yeah. But I mean they drew it up for the Court. I remember that one in particular. It was more practical. He had a practical application to it.

JB: How is it any more practical then accept in the sense that the percentage of black population is only 20% of enrollment . . . roughly 20% - 25%.

HD: I mean, they worked it out so that evidently the blacks and whites like the . . . like what was done. It didn't disrupt the operations of the school system. I think the operation in Greenville is in great shape today. Where as in other places there not. I mean where I come from in ~~Calvin~~ <sup>Calhoun</sup> County is 96% black in the public schools.

JB: I was told by somebody in Greenville who was in the forefront of that whole effort, that implementation that if Richard Nixon had come out before that plan was implemented, rather than a month later, against busing, that they would . . . there would have been no way that they could have achieved it successfully.

HD: Well, just like down there in Atlanta recently when they had that accumulation of blacks and they all got together and they scrubbed a busing plan or whatever it was . . . that was a practical approach to something. Just like I said, right down here in Calhoun County and a lot of other communities in

the lower part of the state, what has been achieved when you got 96% blacks in the public schools. What has been really . . . I mean what have you . . . if they want to . . . they aren't getting together that way. Some of that stuff is impractical. I wish the whole thing could have been worked out on the basis that they could have achieved people living together without people running . . . having people running away . . . or feeling they had to run away or something else. People could have really lived together and . . . its no different in Calhoun County today then it was when I went to school down here.

JB: The critics say that President decided the moral leadership that the Supreme Court upheld busing and Constitutionally mandated, with limits, in the *Swann* case - the Charlotte - Mecklenberg case. That the President failed to exercise responsible moral leadership in saying this is the law of the land if you like it or not . . . in effect. And in effect he more or less echoed the position of George Wallace taken previously, but, I want to get your response to that charge which has been made.

HD: Yeah. Well, my response to that is that I think that the President of the United States has some discretion as to what he thinks the position should be, as well as the United States Supreme Court may have. I'd have to go back to recall that particular case because it is a little hazy in my mind today . . . and I'd have to go back to recall that particular case . . . but that was a case based on a certain set of facts, you see, as a question if it becomes the law of the land, as such, because, I think, the Supreme Court came back and turned itself around again on that subject.

JB: Only to the extent (inaudible)

HD: I don't think that a President has to go out here . . . is mandated to go out here and exercise whatever kind of leadership you call it to do something that he himself also determines as a co-equal partner in this thing. He is impractical, foolish against the best interest of the country. and I think that's where he has some judgement and discretion. I mean, he's got some discretion to act or not act or to interpret as he may see it. I think if he had gone forward with that . . . you know if he had said I'm going to take the Mecklenberg thing and I'm going to ram it down the throats of all these communities around the country . . . this is the way its going to be because the Supreme Court said in this particular situation. That judge, I mean I am absolutely convinced that that judge was wrong. He tore up Charlotte and Mecklenberg which had been a model in the South for a moderate type community. And I don't think he accomplished a doggone thing, and I think the President was wise, maybe just because I feel like he felt that way. But again, that was his practical approach, which I think was in the interest of the country, his velvet glove approach because there was no way anybody could do . . . could implement desegregation the way that some of the Civil Rights leaders wanted to do it and come out with anything that would be particularly worthwhile, or anything less than a heck of a lot of trouble. And, I think somebody has to sit back . . . and I think that is the position of the President of the United States . . . I mean he could . . . in my judgement he was exercising moral leadership in not jumping off the bridge, whether the Supreme



chose to do so or not. But as I recall that particular case, that was a judgement based upon a particular set and that's what all these cases are . . . the circumstances in a particular case. I don't know that they gave a rule of law as such that applied universally . . . I wish I could remember that.

JB: Didn't they basically rule that busing could be used as a tool?

HD: Could be used as a tool and you could interpret that . . . that's the key to the whole thing. You could interpret it . . . the courts could use busing if they chose to do so, but it was up to the court to apply the facts to the situation.

JB: You said that they had a previous decision to the connotation that mandated the greatest amount of desegregation in achieving the unitary system?

HD: Yeah, but I . . . anyway, I just think we were going against the laws of the nature with some of that that the people were trying to push. I think the fact that the South has been desegregated, the way that it has, aside from whether or not it is better off or worse off, you know, but the fact that desegregation has occurred and is a fact of life today in the South . . . that it has been accepted to the degree that it has by both blacks and whites is a tribute to Richard Nixon's leadership. That's where I think he deserves a plus rather than a minus.

JB: How do you respond to criticism that we hear voiced some times by some Republicans in the South and its a minority . . . my impression is that it is a definite minority view among the

Republicans . . . but the criticism of the Southern strategy that it really was a strategy aimed at re-electing Richard Nixon is not a strategy aimed at building the Republican party in the South. Part of that argument, as I have heard it articulated is that they cite the attempt to get to Virginia Republicans not to put up opposition to Harry Byrd, Jr. when he ran as an independent; the support given Senator Eastland from Mississippi when he had Republican opposition rather than supporting the Republican or staying neutral.

HD: Well, of course, the fact that the President ran so well in '72 helped us here in this state and all across the boarder in the south. You know we made gains all over the place, so it was a help, as Nixon was helped so was . . . so was . . . in running so strong in the south with an average of 70% of the vote, so was . . . yeah, the whole Republican party was helped in the south. At the same time . . . take an example of the Harry Byrd, Jr. thing, we could have had him as a Republican United States Senator, and what has happened now in Virginia which they finally . . . you see the Virginia party finally came to accept that position when they went over to Mills Godwin. And so now Virginia is now a Republican state today. And, you know, the Legislature has not entirely gone yet but we were at the point when we could have moved the Legislature and the next Governor and had Harry Byrd in the Republican party today, and not just an independent Senator. So, I applaud and go all the way . . .

JB: Are you convinced that Byrd would have become a Republican?

HD: Yes sir, absolutely.

JB: Some Republicans in Virginia say that if they had not opposed Harry Byrd that Godwin would have been running as an independent rather than as a Republican.

HD: But Byrd . . . you'd of made the transition . . . you'd be further along today then . . . and today they are a good piece along the way because they finally accepted the Governor. With regard to the Eastland thing, I did not favor that . . . I was the only one that helped that fellow . . . I saw him the other night over here at the Wade Hampton Hotel . . . can't think of his name right this minute, and he thanked me again, but I didn't favor leaving those people alone. All that was done, as you know, for the purpose of a minority President dealing with a majority Democrat Congress. But the overall picture, I mean the south stands today in the strongest position that its been in the Republican party. And the south and the nation today is the strongest political position that its been in in a long time. A lot of that is due to what the people call the so called southern strategy. As I say, Republicans across the country are appreciated except in a minority . . . except some minority voices, you know, along the way.

JB: What is the picture of George Wallace moving back into the Democratic party?

HD: I'm glad to see him do it. It's like (inaudible) moving back into the Republican party in this state. I don't think it's going to have any particular effect. I don't think the Wallace thing . . . well, it will help them some, it will help

their southern strategy to some degree. As you say their strategy was when Teddy kissed George wherever it was last summer, July 4, down in Alabama. The thing that gets me, you see, the Democrats are coming along and do something like that (telephone rings) strategy.

JB: Do you get calls frequently from Republicans now throughout the south for advice or assistance? How do you perceive your role in the future of Republican politics in the south and nation? Do you find anything of special interest in southern politics or national politics or South Carolina politics.

HD: I've really drawn back on this thing in regard to Westmoreland and I'm very interested in it and so forth. I didn't intend to come here and get involved in politics within the state party. I don't have that much time and secondly I don't want to become involved in, you know, people fighting and fussing and so forth. I'd just rather not. They asked me to help (inaudible) and do some recruiting, which I have done; and I ran across this Westmoreland situation and I got very enthusiastic about it because I like to win. I made a few people mad with it so I am really trying to fall back from that and let nature take its course with regard to that now. So I don't intend to play any leadership role in the state party situation. I'm not going to touch the State Chairman race that's coming off right now. I can live with either one of them. But so far as the southern race is concerned, I mean I have no plans for any particular role of leadership. (inaudible) I go to their meetings and they put

me on the program there briefly in Atlanta. I went to a southern chairman meeting in Washington yesterday, they meet every two months in Washington it seems like. . . I go to most of their meetings and I also go to all the national meetings because I am the general councillor for the Republican National Committee. So, I stay in communication and contact with them. (inaudible) Most of them call me or we have a conference call or something about what to do. I mean, there were a few of them that said that they wanted to come up with a recommendation of Barry Goldwater, well, I said that's not realistic, you know. They don't need to go wasting it on something like that and we finally got together on something like that and we finally got together on some names that we sent up there. But I don't really have any . . .

JB: I presume that Ford was on that list?

HD: Yeah. Right. We don't have any . . . I don't have any particular leadership to play. I am of the firm belief that the south can play again the key role in the '76 convention. And the south can play the key role in the election of '76, again through unity. We gotta' hang loose on this nomination thing until we get down the road much further.

JB: Do you see the south coalescing at the moment behind any candidate?

HD: Well, it shouldn't. You know, Reagan is the favorite today and I like Ronald Reagan too. But it should not close ranks behind any one man at this stage of the game . . . by any means. I think that if Gerald Ford wants the nomination,

then as of today it is his . . . that could change . . . and he'd certainly be acceptable down this way without any problem, and most other ways in the Republican party across the country. I like Reagan, I like Connelly and I like Nelson Rockefeller, I really do. I've said that publically about Rockefeller, I mean, I could live with Rockefeller as the nominee of this party. I wouldn't necessarily go out and carry his banner and lead the fight for him unless I were convinced that the other prospects didn't, you know, have a realistic opportunity to win, I could carry his banner. Because I think it's important to win and what I say to these people is let's win with the best we can get from a philosophical standpoint, but for goodness sakes, let's win. So, my advice to him has been let's continue to hang together and meet together, but let's hang loose; and don't get tied down, and let them keep coming and visiting, you know. And, be nice to every one of them including Percy when he comes down here. I called ~~Claude~~ <sup>Clarke</sup> Reed a little while ago to make sure he was going to be real nice to Richardson and he said he would. Anyway, so I think the south is sitting in a position (inaudible) and it ought to play that role properly, and don't get overly emotional and jump on somebody's band wagon before it's ready.

JB: Do you think the south will coalesce behind a candidate at the convention?

HD: I think that's pretty likely . . . pretty likely.

JB: Would you say as much as 90% of the delegates from the south.

HD: Yeah, I think so. It's still hard to tell yet. You know, if you remove Ford from the picture, then you've got say it

continues as it is right now . . . Reagan and Connelly and Rockfeller, well, you know you would rank Reagan then Connelly then Rockfeller in that order in the south among the southern delegates that I can see going to the '76 convention. Connelly has been making some inroads with his speeches. I've seen some people who are conservative, but you know, on the pragmatic side to listen and they've said that guy . . . I could go with that guy . . . who would be ordinarily be Reagan people. Yet Reagan has the emotional appeal. He has the majority of the appeal today down this way today. And yet Rockfeller is more all right with a lot of people then he was previously. So, that's how I size it up at this time with the way . . . you know if Ford wants it it's his and I think Reagan realizes that. Jim Edwards here, Reagans man, realizes that - hell tell you than in a minute as of today. But again, I mean if I were in a leadership position at the '76 convention . . . which I don't know whether I will by any means, but if I were in a leadership position I would make some enemies, and I would make some people mad because I would insist on knowing that that man, that we are going to support has a realistic chance to win. If he hasn't got that, then I'm going to be in the minority carrying somebody elses banner. I feel very strongly about it . . . I mean today, Jim Edwards is . . . God bless him, he and I have been friends . . . he's as mad at me as he can be, and, so are a lot of his friends . . . just as mad at me as they can be.

JB: If you went to the convention in '76 and it looked to you that your perception was that Rockfeller; one, is going to end up getting the nomination, and two, could win, that Reagan had

a lot of support in the south, tremendous popular support, but is going to end up not getting the nomination and if he gets it is not going to win, would you end up supporting Rockefeller?

HD: Let me put it this way. I'd give it an awful lot of consideration. I think the first thing is we got to win. that's where I differ from some of my friends. The second thing is I think we got to get the person that we believe would most and best serve the philosophical bent, you know, of the country and of this section. And when he comes in my office . . . now a lot of my friends would put it in a different light . . . alot of them might believe that a fellow could win. I mean, I look at it cold and hard and what the polls show.

JB: You mean . . . are you in effect saying no more Goldwater.

HD: Well, and I like Barry Goldwater very very much, but I don't want us to lose, I want us to win and I think we can win with a person that would be good for the country and good for this section of the country. What I am saying is . . . and this is where I make my enemies in the Republican party. I go right now with the polls showing exactly where Westmoreland stands and where others stand who would like to also run. And, some people look at that and say that doesn't make any difference . . . I don't believe it, you see, but I believe it and that makes a difference to me. It just makes an awful lot of difference to me. And then I am more



pragmatic than some of my friends. And when I get that way then I go out and take the flag and I run with it. That causes me some pain and suffering. You know, I can sit back like some of the people in this party are sitting back right now doing nothing because then I am going to make somebody mad for this reason or that reason. I have always gone in the way . . . a certain way at one time. I mean, my thinking has become, as you will recognize more pragmatic then it was in 1965. I had a guy tell me one day in a Republican meeting down here, he said you've changed, you've changed. And I said your doggone right I've changed, and I'll continue to change as to what I really think is the order of the possible. (inaudible) And, I'll tell you something else I do, I mean, I have some good friends . . . I don't go on the basis of politics on friendship. I heard a guy say the other night. He said . . . he made a statement to tell me (inaudible) he said, he gave the information I'd given about Westmoreland about where he stood in the polls, and that this looked like a realistic chance to win and so forth, and people ought to sign the petition. He said well I'll tell you right now if so and so runs I'm going to support him because he is my friend - that ain't me. I've never been a friend of General William C. Westmoreland in my life. I mean I've known him casually and he knows who I am. But I ain't got no friendship with him . . . William C. Westmoreland. I have a real friendship with my friend Jim Edwards and other people like Warren ~~Gazzio~~ <sup>Giese</sup>, my next door neighbor. My wife, she says you know you're going to lose

some friends, and I said yeah, I know it. But in politics you can't let those things . . . you gotta keep your friends and work with them, but you have got to be pragmatic enough to figure out what is possible. But we'll win and we'll still be, you know, okay. And, I think the South is coming to that view more and more. <sup>Clarke</sup>~~Claude~~ Reed is a lot more pragmatic than people think he is. You know he'll got off and give me a harrang about this and that and the other, but when it comes down to the nitty griddy, and you get in that convention like the one in '68 you can count on Claude, you know that. If you explain it to him and he . . . sat down and talked it over with him and said baby this is the way to win, that's the way to lose,

JB: But he's changed hasn't he? Yeah, yeah. But, he's still very conservative. He was pragmatic at that '68 convention and he took a lot of whipping, in his own state and his own delegation to do what he did. But without a <sup>Clarke</sup>~~Claude~~ Reed and a Bill <sup>Murphy</sup>~~Murphy~~, you know, we wouldn't have been able to hold that solid, fairly solid front. But what I am pleased about, this is my point about the southern Republican party, it is . . . it is becoming more mature, more pragmatic about the game of politics, it is, I know. And that is why I was so pleased a few weeks ago in the State Executive Committee meeting when I was amazed to find they just said well, go get him. I mean it was just overwhelming. The only two people who spoke up against him were Arthur <sup>Pavenel</sup>~~Rammel~~ and Jim Edwards - long time political enemies; both of them were interested in the governorship themselves. Everybody else

in the room either said nothing or said go get him. So they said go get him and try to convince him, which we have tried to do.