

Interview with Joel Fleishman
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Side I

Joel Fleishman is Director of the Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke University; former Legal Assistant to Terry Sanford when he was Governor.

J.B.: Changes in politics in the last 20 years?

JF: Yeah, I think there is some, and in no particular order of consequence. Because I really haven't had a chance to think about it and we will just have to sort it out as we go. I think that there is several things that has made a difference. In the first place, the increasing numbers of blacks were registered and they are increasing and the increasing proportion though it varies of their participation in politics is making the difference now. You couldn't very well have had the millions (I don't know what the exact figure is, somewhere between two and three million blacks registered in the 1960's without having any consequence on the elections). You have seen it in the election of ~~black~~ black officeholders as well as presumably though we are not sure that that change in actual policy outputs & of which tend to give ~~black~~ blacks a better share of the public policy expenditures. I think that is one difference. I think that that's going to be strengthened. I think that is a fragile kind of thing in some areas though in the large metropolitan areas it probably isn't unless it leads as it has tended to do in some places into some kind of polarization of the black and white community in which event the gains might very well be frustrating. But as you develop more black.. As greater wealth develops in black community either through business ownership or through land ownership, or just through a large middle class that is employed in a variety of other institutions I think you are going to get much more stable black politics, much more influential black politics throughout the South.

the party showing itself obviously there is no point in belaboring that. I think secondly, you are getting a lot more of local grass-roots kind of political activity which was mainly a phenomenon in the 60's. I think that has waned a little bit, but I think it is still an important factor to take into account especially when you consider it along with the increasing black political participation. That's a characteristic not only of the 60's but it's a characteristic in some degrees of the kind of politics which has occurred in other parts of the country and you think of it as the New York and California syndrome almost; but that is coming along with urbanization and a greater political consciousness because of television and other things to the South. That's making a difference, too. I am not sure how important that is in the long-run though I think it is important, I think it is a definite change over a political system that was basically a leap-run. At least in N. C. it was a leap-run. I am not sure that you could say that it was a leap-run in Ala., not at least in the same sense that it leaped. Or in some of the other states, it varies from state to state. You would know that better than I would. That's a factor. I think you can also separate out from that the fact of urbanization as the South has become more ~~ad~~ ^[advanced] and will continue to get more ~~ad~~ ^[advanced], I think that that factor is one ~~xx~~ in itself have an important shaping role on our politics. We never had large urban areas in the South and consequently we never had the kinds of divisions between the urban and rural areas that other states have. Then again, you think N. Y. and N. Y. City versus the rest of the rest--the upstate areas of Chicago versus the downstate areas--we have never had that kind of division in N. C. All we have had is a gentlemenly understanding that Senate seats would rotate and governorships

would rotate between east and west. But there has never really been a kind of urban rural division. I think we are going to have that. Louisiana is about the only place I know of in the ~~xxxx~~ South that has really has really had a marked division. New Orleans to some ~~xxxxxx~~ degree. Between New Orleans and the rest of the state. I don't think that it was anywhere as near as severe as it had been in some of ~~xxxxx~~ the other northern ~~x~~states. I think it is going to get to be when you couple with that kind of growth of urban areas--particularly dominate urban areas--the fragmentation in politics that ~~xxx~~ is occurring because of the increasing grass-roots participation, the proliferation of articulate interest groups, the increasing importance of the ~~xxx~~ black vote. You know, I think that we are going to have a much more .. I think we already have a much more diverse dynamic, unstable kind of politics in the South than we have ever had before. It is much more difficult for organization, even good organizations to continue to control the situation because there are too many elements in each organizational structuring at an election that are variable and they move or chip away at the slightest provocation. I think we are out of the time when you could have as we had in N. C. a Shelby machine that dominated the Deomcratic Party for 15 or 20 years. Or, a liberal Sanford organization either. I ~~xxxxx~~ see that phenomenon as being gone at this ~~x~~ point given the state of leadership that we have got and it is conceivable that a master politician like Roosevelt could come along and reunite and dominate a particular group of interests groups over a long period of time but we don't have political leadership of that~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ stature anymore.

W.D.: Could we examine that point for a moment?

J.F.: Sure.

W.D.: One of the people we interviewed described the Democratic Party as a bird (in N. C.)--as a bird with no head and a whole lot of wings

flapping all over the place-- the Sanford wing, the old branch, ~~They~~ the Taylor wing, the Bowles wing. How do you see that?

J.F.: I think that is absolutely true. You see the problem as I see it is that it was possible before when you had a small number of kinds of groups it was possible for group alignments to remain stable even under a lesser condition, ~~at~~ a lesser stature of political leadership because you had less groups to manipulate in a sense, & less groups to satisfy so that the alignments tended to be stable. There weren't very many groups, there were small numbers of networks ~~around which~~ as long as you control which it would be possible to build winning coalitions. But they were essentially small groups which formed the core. Now there are just many more and that a phenomenon it seems to me of the black vote of grass-root politics of urbanization which make it .. when you've got too many floating groups at this point to have any kind of dominate leader. ~~That's~~ The problem with the Democratic Party in N. C. today and I'm not sure that it is terribly different from the problems in other states except that we are probably more advanced in terms of this, whether it is better or worse, is not the question but whether we are more advanced in the process of this fragmentation of politics so that it is impossible with the stature of leadership that we've got ~~now~~ now to maintain any kind of effective continuity to continuing influence over those groups.

W.D.: Joel could you point to specific election or event which was kind of a watershed for this thing? Was the turning point? Where it was no longer possible to hold together these small numbers...

J.F.: Well I suppose the first sign when the blacks started running their own candidate for governor, I don't know what the first year was that Hawkins ran. Was it 68?

W.D.: It had to be 68.

J.F.: It was 68. I mean that is one of the first signs of it when you get .. when blacks identify their interest out.. separated their interest out from that of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, or at least whether for practical reasons or otherwise. That probably was the first stage in proceeding, because once that occurred then it permitted a large number of radical left_of-center to radical white groups including some of the organized labor, some of the peace groups, some of the civil liberties groups, some of the intellectual groups, to have another option in terms of their identification with any kind of political organization. Prior to that it didn't exist and prior to that ~~+~~ you identified with the Sanford wing or the Frank Graham wing of this Democratic Party. After that occurred there were other options and I suppose if I had... that's the most visible kind of watershed it seems to me and I think that that's a problem that is going to be with us for a long time. I think that because the black vote has always been the largest single vote ~~and~~ that could be counted on for the liberal wing of the Democratic Party in N. C. and probably throughout the South. Once that separated out and became it's own wing in a sense and had to be taken into account became very difficult at that point to mobilize the kind of winning coalition. I don't know what the percentage, ~~(you would know this)~~ what was the percentage of blacks who voted in the 1968 Gubernatorial Election as compared to the 1972 Gubernatorial Election. It would be interesting to take a look at it and obviously blacks constitute about 25 to 27 percent of the population in N. C. I don't think they vote in those proportions. I think they probably vote about 15 percent but still is a hell of a big chunk and it ~~is always~~ has always been. You know the ~~single~~ main single discrete element of the ~~the~~ winning liberal coalition in the South. So that..

J.B.: Is Scott perceived as the liberal candidate in ~~the~~ 68?

J.F.: Well, as things finally came down ..

J.B.: In the primary?

J.F.: Yeah, he was perceived as a liberal candidate. I know there is no question about it, yeah he was a liberal candidate. The problem was that he like so many of the liberal candidates prior to that point Terry is about the only exception that I know of. You know, I guess it was Rich Preyer was an exception too. The liberal candidates always felt they could count on the blacks and the liberals to come with them and therefore where they needed really to watch their flanks was on the right, so that they could afford to do a little bit of black beating in public in order to get more votes in the center and to the right. That is exactly what Bob Scott did. He felt he could take for granted the blacks and ~~the~~ other liberals because of the fact that they didn't have anybody else to vote for essentially. That proved to be correct in this election. I am not sure it proves to be correct anymore and I think ~~of~~ one of Skipper's mistakes was in a sense not really the kind of coolness and aloofness from the black political leadership and public association with blacks, I think that cost him some votes and it ~~was~~ is a very tricky thing now ~~is~~ given the high visibility and the active participation of black leadership it makes it just much more complicated to work out a winning liberal coalition. It has never been any problem working out of ~~win~~ working out a winning conservative vote.

J.B.: You say that Scott represented a winning liberal coalition.

J.F.: I don't think that Scott was a liberal, that is one of the problems. Scott was a popul~~ar~~ist. His father was a popul~~ar~~ist. Bob Scott ran as you all know simply because he was his father's son. He inherited branch head boys and he inherited a significant proportion of whatever the liberal vote was.

J.B.: Has there been a liberal governor in N. C. since then?

J.F.: No, there hasn't.

W.D.: Was Terry Sanford's election an accident?

J.F.: No, I don't it was an accident. The difference was that Terry decided that he was.. it is much harder for liberals to get elected anywhere, at least in the South and a basically conservative political culture which has a lot of demons in its mind, it is very hard for a liberal to run in the South. Terry started running for governor six years before he was elected. He put together a network of really good political leadership all over the state. That is the kind of organization that liberals have to have in order to win in the South. You have got to have dedication, persistence and you have got to go at it for a long time and you have got to have a solid organization and a brilliant campaign manager. Just the whole... it was a question of putting the thing together very carefully and when he went into the election he was very strong ~~and~~ because he had planned the thing. The problem with liberals is that they tend at least (that is new liberals) tend to want instant success, feel that people will vote simply on the basis of the right as they perceive it. On the basis of ideology and therefore they don't need to worry about all of the messy political details of putting together an organization of building it and of extending it. And as a consequence its just been very.. Terry is an exception to the extent that he is one of a few people who has both that kind of political dedication and instinct and also happens to have ideals and liberal ideals. That is just simply not the case and when Rich Preyer ran, Rich ran as our candidate but the problem is in N. C. you have never been able to transfer political loyalty from one candidate to another and we never did bring along the people. Rich didn't have his own campaign ~~organization~~ organization. It was clearly

the organization of Sanford and Bennett.

W.D.: You are explaining the regional success and also the feeling of loyalty and attitude of Sanford about people since that time to his organizational skills and the fact that he..

J.F.: I think that it is a combination of both. I that.. I don't think that that is what I amx saying. You can't factor the two out. He would ~~HYEYEX~~ never have gotten to be governor given the things that he believed in if he had not spent 4 to 6 years organizing the state.

W.D.: Yeah, but nobody talks about a Dan Moore wing or a Bob Scott wing, ..

J.F.: No, because that's .. they talk about the Frank Graham wing before Terry was elected. But they just hadn't won an election. And, no they don't talk about a Dan Moore wing. They won't never talk about a Bob Scott wing, ~~thxxxx~~ there may be still the ~~Kerr~~ Scott wing but that has been substantially ~~deemedxxxxxxforxxxxxx~~ subsumed except for the more racist elements of the group into the Sanford wing.

J.B.: So what did Sanford basically put to together? What was his coalition?

J.F.: He put together basically the coalition of people who were primarily loyal to him either through knowing him before hand or through having gotten to know him in the process of organizing for the governorship. In many ways it was an entirely different group. There were essentially two groups in the Sanford campaign. One of them were people who were primarily loyal to Terry and didn't care a thing about what he believed in necessarily. Many of them became converted x ideologically ~~xxx~~ later on when he became governor but they were essentially loyal to him. They trusted him, they didn't really care what he believed in particularly. They were responding to him as an individual and as they perceived him

a political leader. Many people in the campaign had never been active in politics before. Substantial business types, lawyers and others just hadn't taken a role in politics before, many of them were young at that particular point too and hadn't been active in politics. The other group were the people whom Terry ideologically associated with--The Frank Graham wing of the Democratic Party, the liberals, the blacks and their liberal patrons, some of the labor leaders, the general makings of the liberal wing of any Democratic Political Party and he attracted them very much too. You put together his personal loyalist with the ideological loyalist you had a winning coalition; but liberals can't win without that first component. And none of the other people that run had that. It takes hard work to build that up and it's something the liberals just don't prone just to forget. They somehow think that they are going to win because right is on their side, but they don't win because of that. It requires incredible organization.

W.D.: Is there an organization left?

J.F.: The Sanford organization ^{is} if left, it is not as strong as it could be. ~~Maybe the~~ Many of the people have died, many of the people have formed other loyalties. Basically it is still left. Terry could have won the Primary if he had organized the thing. It was the most poorly organized thing I have ever seen in politics, that is part of the Wallace Primary.

W.D.: ~~When you next take a look at its history, it's really cold~~ Then why did he get into it? You take a look at its history, it's really cold in terms of political decisions you know where it is going to come out.

J.F.: He got into partly because its presidential ambition, its a classic situation of conflict of goals. He did not want to leave Duke, he did not want to... He both did not want to ^{leave} Duke and he wanted to win the election.

He compromised the solution in such a way as to announce late, which he should have never done if he were going to do it, but the reason he announced late was because of the fact that he wanted to be sure that he ~~xxxxxx~~ consulted extensively with trustees and faculty and students and alumni and in the process took about 6 weeks or more. Once I knew that he was going to run, once I heard he was thinking about it I counseled him very strongly against it because I knew that it couldn't be run right. And the group that he put together was just terrible, the election....

W.D.: All of his old political advisers tell us the same thing.

J.F.: Well, we did. You know it is a measure of the fact that he felt that it ~~was~~ important to oppose Wallace down here and nobody else would do it. He also felt that he could win the election without really having the thing well organized. And that in a sense was the lesson that you can't no matter how prominent a person is here, no matter how much following he may have ~~h~~ you can't do it. It requires work, and ~~xxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ every election requires substantial organization. They didn't even have 60% of the county.

W.D.: When you push the button on the old organization nothing happens.

J.F.: Well, that's right. Because it requires continuous activation. It requires repeated activation. Do you ~~xxxxxxx~~ remember what I said earlier that it ~~wa~~ is always a question, at least it is with him, a question of having a personal group which then went to work. The personal group isn't going to vote. If you counted all the votes of people who are in the Sanford organization you might not have more than 2 or 3 thousand votes in N. C. Maybe more than that but not more than 10,000. But what the difference is they have to have time to activate their friends and organize in different counties and cities of the state. It never happened, it was 5 weeks from the time he first decided to run until time the primary

took place or to the time he announce he was going to run to the time the primary took place. They hadn't even got.. there were not more than 30% of the county managers that had been announced at that point.

W.D.: You don't think that decision has hurt him at all?

J.F.: I don't think there is any question about the fact that it hurt him.

If he had won the primary he would have gone into the convention in Miami much stronger and probably come out with twice as many votes. Once he lost that primary I think he hampered his chances considerably (not that he ever had a chance of getting the nomination last time) but he would have come in with a much better showing. He would have had I would guess ~~xxxxxx~~ somewhere between 200 and 225 votes if he had won that primary.

But he lost it. I think that having his decision to go ahead and stay on in even after the primary enabled him to become a more credible candidate this time, I think. I ~~xxxxx~~ think that in the sense .. I think the primary will still hang over him because anybody who couldn't carry N. C. at that point given the position that Terry was in obviously ~~was~~ is damaged in other...

W.D.: Do you think in organizational terms that the Sanford wing if you want to call it that is still deep and most powerful organization~~xx~~ in the Democratic Party?

J.F.: Yes, I think in the abstract it probably is. But it is no more powerful than any other group unless it is activated and the problem is that you have to activate it each time.

W.D.: On his behalf?

J.F.: No, I'm not sure that it has to be necessarily activated on his behalf. I think that's a question that varies, it depends on who behalf it is being activated for and it depends on the context while we thought as close to the election.. we thought we could activate in behalf of

Rich Preyer, it turned out in fact that there was too much going against Terry at ~~that~~ that point as well as too little going for Rich at that point for the thing to work and I think both of them were very important. At this point I think it is conceivable that it could be activated by somebody else, but as I say we don't have a tradition in N. C. of being able to.. of governors or other political leaders being able to transfer this loyalty. In that sense it is unlike the classic concept of a ~~the~~ political organization that you have in other places where the organization can deliver for anybody. We have never had that kind of organization here, to a certain extent I think it did with the Shelby machine from the 30's down to when ~~Kerr~~ Scott beat it, and even then it lingered over some into the 50's. But ~~w~~ other than that they could apparently ~~it~~ deliver for anybody. Since that time we have not had kind of organization.

J.B.: Is the traditional source of Democratic financing in N. C. shifting over to the Republican Party?

J.F.: I don't think so. What has happened.. let me modify that, I think that some of the traditional source of Democratic support (the very conservative right wing of the Democratic Party) some of that is going over to the Republican Party. But I don't think an awful lot. I don't think we ever tapped a lot of the Republican money in the Democratic Primary. ~~M~~ If one looks at the fundraising for the 1972 gubernatorial race, I don't think it is any necessary shortage of money as far as I can there is plenty of money there on both sides. I think that some of the people particularly the banks (as you know) hedge their bets after the election and gave to both candidates. The money as you ~~know~~ characteristically follows success , and if the Republican Party manifests continued success in getting people elected in N. C. and in the South I think that some of the traditional sources of support will go to the

party. But I'm not sure that it is significant in terms of damaging the Democratic Party's chances for congress.

J.B.: Where are the major sources of financial support politically in N. C.?

J.F.: I don't think that you can say.. I don't think that is a meaningful question. I think that the sources ~~xx~~ ... the basic sources of support have always been the upper and upper middle classes, professional people and business people. These people, many of them are or some of them are ideologically committed to the Democratic Party but most of them are not particularly. They contribute on the basis of personal loyalty, they contribute on the basis to achieve success, to receive likelihood of success. The banks have always given money, ~~xxxxxx~~ dominant bank figures have always given money and the insurance company people have given money but far more than they have given, then from business people some of them do business with the state, some of them don't. Lawyers. I don't sense that there is any major single source of money in the state.

J.B.: Is there an identifiable Jewish role in N. C. politics?

J.F.: No. Not to speak of. I think the Jewish community is by and large support, in fact in one of the numerically insignificant but ~~monetarily~~ monetarily significant. Not ~~h~~ even monetarily significant in terms of supporting candidates. At least that is my impression. Where Jews contribute they have contributed pretty much to the liberal candidates of the Democratic Party (within the Democratic Party), but an insignificant amount to speak of. There are a few individual Jewish businessmen and a few lawyers who have contributed regularly but it is not.. you know you talk about God knows there must not.. If I had to sit down and count them up I bet that I couldn't name more than 15 who have enough money to make a contribution or who

have made contributions in the vicinity of \$500 to \$1000 in an election.

Maybe more than that but that is based on my own limited knowledge.

W.D.: Key called N. C. ^{the} progressive [oligarchy]. All the people also describe N. C. as the further away you get the more progressive it looks. And when you check all the social and economic indicators like per capita income, education, mental health, etc. it is at the bottom or close to the bottom. Why does this state have that kind of interest in terms of the other southern states?

J.F.: With all things considered it is probably more enlightened in terms of its governmental ethos because of the kinds of governmental services ~~where~~ which it's given. Because ~~xxxxxx~~ in many ways ~~xxxxxx~~ the dominant factor in the South was and probably still is the question of race and because N. C. has been less bad than the other states. That is what really determines whether in terms of the categories that you are talking about whether a state is progressive or not progressive.

W.D.: you think race may have been a issue in the Lake primary and ~~h~~ perhaps even _____. It wasn't quite that liberal ~~was~~ it?

J.F.: In the Sanford race of course it was. It was much ~~x~~ closer to the Supreme Court decision than ~~h~~ we are now and he is still not a winning candidate. He opposed openly segregation in his ~~xxx~~ campaign.

J.B.: But wasn't Sanford playing lip~~xxxxxxx~~ service to segregation? Wasn't he occupying the middle road in that case?

J.F.: Oh no. Absolutely not. Any~~..~~ anybody ^{who} ~~to~~ tries to ^{not} Malcom Sewell as being to the left of Terry was crazy. That was just not the way the election ran.

W.D.: A little hypotheses is advanced, it looked progressive because it was really never tested from 1954 on. From 1960 on.

J.F.: Well from 1960 and on. After Terry's election it was not an issue.

It was not significantly an issue in the Moore election. It was not significantly an issue in the Scott election though ~~■~~ I think ~~■~~ to the extent that he made it an issue, he did what a lot of Southern politicians do. He made ~~xxxx~~ vague^{ly} allusions to how he would not tolerate crime in the streets and disorder and things like that. I don't ...

J.B.: It was an issue in the Helms race.

J.F.: ~~xxxxxx~~ Yeah, I think it was an issue in the Helms race but that was really a peculiar race. It was peculiar in the sense that the strongest Democratic candidate again assumed that he ~~xxx~~ could win the election without campaigning and lost the Democratic nomination because of it. And the weaker of the Democratic candidates ended up winning the primary by default, and going into an election which was very heavily influenced by the Presidential election. I don't think that that race is any kind of indicator of anything. If the Democrats are going to win they are going to have to wage an effective campaign.

J.B.: How about this hypothesis, that N. C. ~~xxxxxx~~ was in fact more progressive than the other Southern states. Certainly institutionally it had its newspapers, it had Chapel Hill, it had the Frank Graham tradition, and blacks were participating to a far larger extent. It was both perceived and real at the time Key as writing. That as a result of that during the ~~■~~ whole civil rights revolution of the 60's N. C. got less attention, there was less tension here and less force for change. To some extent N. C. tended to be ignored during much of that conflict relative to the rest of the South. As a consequence N. C. has changed less where as the rest of the South has changed more and now N. C. no longer stands out as being different from the rest of the South. It is another one of the states. You have a smaller percentage of blacks who are registered.

W.D.: Yeah, things just kind of slipped by.

J.B.: You didn't have the kind of thing that Miss. and some of the other states had.

J.F.: I think that's right but what you are saying is that in fact now things are as good in Miss. as they are in N. C. and I don't think that is the case.

J.B.: Maybe not as good in Miss. as N. C. But certainly the two are far closer than they were in 1948. Or 1965.

J.F.: I think that is probably true. But look where Miss. had to come from.

J.B.: And between N. C. and S. C. is there really a distinction?

J.F.: Yeah, I think there is a distinction. I think that conditions and opportunities for blacks in N. C. are still much better than they are in S.C. I don't think that S. C. has ~~g~~ yet gone through the kind of really substantial black increase of ~~black~~ black opportunities here that N. C. probably had before the 60's and still does have in greater measure.

J.B.: ~~Is~~ Is that just an intuitive feeling or ...?

J.F.: I'm not sure how you can.. I think the fact that you have got black mayors in Chapel Hill and Raleigh and the fact that you have got ~~black~~ black city councilmen and members of the state legislature, I think is some evidence of that. Increasing black participation in state government and in employment. It is partially intuitive but I think that there are enough facts that once you get into it that you could in fact find that there was more than in S. C. at this point.

J.B.: S. C. has a much stronger human rights law than N. C. Much more aggressive commissioned implement.

J.F.: Well, that may very well be the case. But the question is not what the law is but what the practice is.

J.B.: In implementing in the practice there are actually more black legislators in N. C. than in S. C.

J.F.: More in N. C. than S. C.?

J.B.: More in S. C. than in N. C.

J.F.: Well, I would fall back on what the practice seems to be and what the actual opportunities for blacks would seem to be.

W.D.: The reason we are pursuing this is of course that Key's bases hypotheses for that, politics of the South and politics of race. If you understand race politics you understand Southern politics. Some people argue that things really haven't changed much.

J.F.: I don't think that is right.

W.D.: Maybe some of the language was changed but the situation has not changed.

J.F.: I don't think that is true. I don't think you can no longer say that politics of the South is a politics of the race. I think it is an element in Southern politics just as it is an element in the rest of the country but I think that there was a time when it was true but I don't think it is true.

J.B.: To the extent that it is true at all anymore is true in the reverse sense of what it was then. What effect race now has a much more positive effect than a negative from the standpoint of black participation.

J.F.: That's true too. From the standpoint of black participation but as long as blacks are in a minority which they are not in some of the large urban areas it still has enormous potential for making difference in certain kinds of races and perhaps in all races. Clearly what did make a difference although there were exceptional circumstances as I have said that clearly made a difference in the Jesse Helms race. Jesse Helms was elected because of his known anti-black attitudes and my guess is that

for a good number of years yet that is going to be one of the problems in statewide races in the South. And it is complicated even more because of the increasing visibility and activity of black organizations. On the one hand you want black organizations, black political organizations to be strong and take position and to ~~x~~ fill candidates. On the other hand the more they do so the more visible they become the more of a public saying of ~~xxx~~ threat they constitute to a very large group of people in the state so that as they become more vocal and open so does their opposition and under certain circumstances it becomes very, very difficult to elect a liberal candidate.

J.B.: Do you see the N. C. party as not really developed into any blacks into any firm coalition?

J.F.: Yes, I think that is right.

J.B.: Where do you see the Wallace vote heading in N. C.? In political terms?

J.F.: Probably into the Republican Party.

J.B.: Because of the race issue. Do you think race is predominate over economics.

J.F.: Oh yes, I think it is predominate over economics.

W.D.: Does that suggest to you that this going to be a strong two party state?

J.F.: It already is a strong two party state.

W.D.: You don't think that 1972 was an aberation?

J.F.: I think it ~~was~~ was an aberation. I don't think the Republicans will retain all the strength that they have got now but I think it is clear that the Republicans are clearly credible ~~opponents at this point~~ opponents at this point in some parts of the state and the statewide elections. I don't think... you know if you look back over the voting returns N. C. has always at least

for the last 20 to 30 years always had a fairly sizeable Republican vote in statewide elections. Usually the Republicans at least as I recall it for the last 15 or 20 years have managed to get somewhere between 35 and 45% of the votes in the general election. That is a credible two-part situation. ~~That~~ It may very well be that is peak REpublican strength barring a major national election in which the Republicans sweep. My guess is that it probably isn't, that in fact the Republican strength will continue to grow some as an inevitable result of industrialization and of ----- that people are going to have to pay more attention to party organization and matters of building a Democratic Party organization rather as they have done in the past of worrying only about the building factional organizations. The Deomcratic Party is ...

W.D.: Who can do that?

J.F.: Leaders.

W.D.: Anybody out of the scene that could do that?

J.F.: Well I think that Luther Hodges, Jr. could do it. I doubt very seriously that any of the other state officers could do it. I don't think that Bob Morgan could do it. Primarily because I think that he himself is too devisive. He could never be at enough of the middle group and I don't think Jim Hunt can either. I think that is the situation.

W.D.: So that leave someone that is new.

J.F.: Not necessarily. It leaves it to someone who isn't on the scene now at this point. I suppose that is the say thing as saying new.

Well, what I am saying is that the kind of leadership of the Democratic Party has been in fact factional. What I am saying is that you need someone .. that the kind of leadership that the only kind of leadership that can put the party together is essentially consensus leadership not factional

leadership. I think that Terry could have done that. I don't think he can anymore because he has got other things that he wants to do unless he was going to spend full-time at it or go at with some perceived goal of election. But I think it takes a certain kind of person to do it, of a basically the non-factional, much more/consensus figure and there aren't very many of those people around. I mean Luther happens to be one who is, I don't know of very many others.

J.B.: Would he have to take a more active political role in order to do that.

J.F.: Yes, I think ~~he~~ he would.

J.B.: What do you see as a legacy of the Sanford administration? Did it have a permanent impact in N. C.?

J.F.: That's a very hard question. I really don't know that I can answer it. There is no question in my mind about what the Sanford administration did with respect to a number of areas of state policies that has not been done before and subsequently have not been done since. Particularly a lot of the new innovative educational programs that Sanford started and are still going, and not only are still going but are in many cases the only kinds of things that are going like that in the country. The School of the Arts, the Governors School, the attempt to continue and improve the public schools and the system of higher education.

J.B.: In what sense was the attitude towards race in state government?

J.F.: Well, the attempt of the person in two ways: 1) the first significant black employment occurred during his administration in state agencies.

2) the role of state ~~agencies~~ agencies took the role that his administration through the Good Neighbor Council took in resolving disputes around the state locally. Now these things don't seem as important today ~~particulary~~ particularly on the race thing ~~because~~ because a lot has transpired since ~~then~~ that time. In a sense what he started in fact has spread considerably throughout the state government as a whole. In so many ways

the role a leader is to start things and you can measure his success on the basis of how the things which he started were in fact expanded and sustained and keep going over time. I think that in those two areas-- in education and race--I think he made a lot of difference in N. C. by starting some things which ~~have~~ have been continued. ~~The~~ And I think those are probably the main things that he did for the state. But most important I think is the example that he set for the election of the kind of thing that a person has to do if he is going to get elected as a liberal, which is essentially really being hard-nosed politically while at the same time having certain ideals. I think it is going to be very hard and continue to be very hard for liberals to get elected without either one of them. They can work as hard as they want too but if they fail to ~~fa~~ balance their hard work or augment it with a set of ideals to which they are dedicated then I think they are not going to win.

W.D.: Is it ~~are~~ accurate to say that he fused in the N. C. politics to be a whole generation of people who at that point had not been involved in politics?

J.F.: They ~~were~~ were young at the time and therefore

W.D.: They ~~were~~ were still quite significant when you look at the political organization.

J.F.: I think that's true. It is a kind of ~~that~~ true in the terms of a certain number of people. Particularly young people, I think that is right. One of the main difference though it is hard.. I suppose it is more important ~~than~~ as a cause for a lot of other things than anything else. ~~There~~ There was a kind of ~~the~~ dynamics in state government that he introduced in N. C. that never occurred before with the kind of liveliness that was associated with the bringing in of young people, but it wasn't just that. It was a much closer ~~interfaced with~~ interfaced with the whole

academic community, with the constant involvement with faculty members from Duke and Chapel Hill and N. C. State and other places who were regularly a part ^{of} the ^{de}liberations there and regularly in the office at the mansion helping to develop his programs. That is something which pretty much passed out of existence with Dan Moore and Bob Scott. And I just don't know enough about the Holshouser administration to know whether in fact it is still occurring there or not.

J.B.: What were the.. you mentioned part of Preyer's problems lay both with some of his own deficiencies and also with some of the animosities that have been raised by the end of the Sanford administration. How would you analyze those problems? Why did Preyer not win?

J. F.: Well for just what I said. Preyer is a) he has no even modest constituency of his own, b) he is not a good campaigner, he is shy and ~~retiring~~ retiring, he doesn't reach out very well politically. Sanford the animosities were primarily two. One was race, a lot of reaction to his strong and public support of the legitimacy of black demands in a variety of areas, and secondly the sales tax. Both of which really served to activate the large and hostile or lower and middle income groups in society which are both like in an economic issues like the sales tax was hit hardest and where the race was hit hardest. If you knocked out and attempted to erode a lot of the support that Sanford had inherited from Scott which was one of the important ingredients in the campaign. I think that both of those issues, ^{not only the} ~~I don't think that the~~ race issue would have made much difference in the race with Wallace, but the sales tax issue I think continued to, at least the people I talked to around say that that really is still an important factor. I don't think it was anywhere near as important as the failure to organize was, by a long shot, but it was a residual factor which

would come into play in the absence of organization much more dominantly than it would if there'd been a real organization in that election.

J.B. But the theory of Preyer to get elected had the effect of killing the opportunity of having ~~the~~ sort of a continuous extension of what Sanford had begun.

J.F. Yes, without question.

J.B. So, to some extent that was a turning point in North Carolina Politics?

J.F. It's hard to characterize that as a turning point because every ~~en-~~
~~cumbant~~ governor has tried to elect his successor. And Luther Hodges tried to elect Malcom Sewell just as Terry tried to elect Preyer. And just as Dan Moore tried to elect, who was it that ran against Scott in the primary? Mel Broughton . Just as Scott tried to elect Pat Taylor. We have no, that is one of the ~~es~~ most peculiar things about N.C. politics. Governors have never been able to succeed themselves by picking their successors. I don't think it has ever worked. At least it hasn't ever worked starting as far back as 1948. That's not the situation in a lot of the other southern states and indeed, in northern states with strong organizations can't do it. I don't think it's fair to call that a turning point. It was a simple repetition of in a sense it was just like it made it impossible for the policies of the Hodges' administration to be carried on through Malcom Sewell, it was impossible for the Sanford administration to carry on through Rich Preyer.

J.B. Was it a turning point though for N. C. and its image of being of standing out as a progressive leader ~~in~~ the South? Or do you contend it still is?

J.F. I contend that it still is.

J.B. Do you have any supportive evidence to that, because everything we

see ~~xx~~ suggests otherwise. It's standing in per capita income and other social indices, education level, voting turn-out, rather a low percentage of blacks that vote, rather a low percentage of blacks that are registered to vote. And I see, except for the tradition of Chapel Hill, which remains the outstanding southern state university, and the other institutional things stand out in N. C. is the newspapers. There is no other southern state that has the kind of newspapers that N. C. has insofar as projecting a progressive image.~~xx~~ Most of them a fairly dynamic, fairly liberal editorial pages. To me I've always been struck by the difference in the Charlotte Observer, the image it has as a newspaper, ^{and} ~~the~~ the city of Charlotte.

J.F. I don't know. It's very hard to put one's finger on these things I suppose that part of the difference as I think about it, is it if you eliminated Atlanta from your consideration of Georgia, I think ~~I~~ you would want to ask yourself how liberal, how progressive the rest of the state was. Of course you can't eliminate Atlanta because it's a dominant influence in the state. We don't have any comparable situations like that. We have a lot of small to medium size cities with the liberal progressive forces spread all over the state and having considerable impact city by city. It's not surprising to me that the figures show what they show about each one of those items. Now we started as a very poor state, we continue to be a very poor state...

J.B. For example, the average manufacturing income in N.C. is lower than S. C.

J.F. Yes, but that's a function of the historically determined kind of industries that we've got. If you look at the three largest industries in N.C. are and have been they... ~~back~~ ^{back} to textiles and furniture and you look at the census of manufacturing and you find that those are the three lowest

literally, the three lowest paying industries in the country, which is determined pretty much by the market. Historically, that's the way the state developed, and it's not going to be an easy thing to break that kind of chain. I'm not sure how one ~~xxx~~ would even go about breaking that kind of chain. You'd have to have really some extraordinary income redistribution schemes even they would work. Even if you could get them through the legislature which of course, you can't. You can't anywhere. Those things tend to replicate themselves. I'm not sure that those are the factors that one can look to to make reliable judgments about the extent of opportunity. My clear impression, and I can't verify it with data, is that there is in fact greater black opportunities here in N. C. than there is in other southern states with exceptions like the city of Atlanta. I think the only way you can find out whether that is true or not is to interview blacks. That's my perception of it. That there is - I don't know what figures you can look to. The economic figures just don't show anything. At least they're not going to show any ~~thing~~ change, particularly. The fact that we are slowing industrialization, which constitutes, gave us the only chance to diversify our industry, made it even less likely that we're going to have any significant changes. We may very well be locked into that kind of low income condition for many, many more years.

J.B. Do you have any explanation for the , at least from the last decade in N. C.'s relatively uninfluential position in congress?

J.F. It hasn't been entirely uninfluential, where it's been influential it hasn't been happy. Harold Cooley dominated agricultural policy when ~~xx~~ he was in congress 20 years. Not clear that L.H. Fountain is not an important influence in the area in which he's chosen to be a chairman of the committee among the merchant marine fisheries. Sam Ervin is not uninfluential.

J.B.: Ervin of course is an exception in ~~h~~his area.

J.F.: You know, it is...

J.B.: In terms of the major committees and major influence in Congress, very little representation, appropriation, ways and means finance.

J.F.: Part of that, I guess, has to do in recent years in any event in the turn over. Part of it has to do with the fact that we have just never sent ~~xxx~~ very many distinguished people to Congress or people which wanted ambition. Congressional seats seem to me always to have been the kinds of position that we retired people to and forgot about them.

J.B.: One theory that we heard is that when the machine did dominate and it wanted to send people to Washington it could control you got second rate people.

J.F.: I don't have any great influence I suppose about that.

J.B.: Getting back to the racial issue. The question is this, except for the Sanford election the other elections since 1948 in which race has been an issue, the Frank Graham Race, the two N. C. Congressmen who refused to sign Southern manifesto and subsequently defeated.

Helms's race, the primary in 72 for president, the role of Lake in run-offs. Has N. C. really reacted that much differently from other Southern states?

J.F.: No, well it hasn't acted.. the 1954 Senate race which Terry ~~which~~ managed and Kerr Scott was elected was an election in which race was an issue and which the liberals won. No southern state is going to react differently on the race issue, the difference is entirely in the quality of leadership that is on the other side and the confidence of leadership on the other side. The only elections that we have won have been elections in which there is real leadership. Leadership that has been unafraid to deal with the race issue in a constructive way. If anything it is a lesson in N. C. politics. Liberals can win in the state which means that they

mobilize more people on their side than the other side if they work at it and if they are ~~x~~ confident leaders and if they don't forget their principle and if they confront in a realatively open and positive way. I don't know whether it would have made any difference. I happen to think that it would have made a difference in Skipper's race if he had really been much more open about it and not shunned the blacks the way he did. It might not have given the influence that the presidential election had over that election. But given how close it was my instinct is to think that it could have made the difference in Skipper's race. It might have made the difference in Nick's election. The problem is that Nick is really mouth and needless to say none of this obviously I am not going to be quoted on.

W.D.: Do you know what my next appoint is?

J.F.: No. The problems is Nick is/^avery, very cautious person who runs at the ~~xxxx~~ slightest evidence of dialogue. In his whole term as a member of Congress he never took a controversial position and he never stood up but ~~xxx~~ what he claims he believes in. He is not a bad politician but he's not a great politician either in terms of the kinds of techniques and kinds of organizational skills that a ~~xxx~~ person has to have. He's a lousy campaigner in that sense. He was always running from it. The same way that ~~lo~~osing liberal politicians tend to do. So that is why I take exception to what you said about Terry. Terry never ran from the race issue, he faced it wide openly.

J.B.: Yeah, I was going to say this is the second question that I have is that in N. C. on the race issue even where the liberal progressive element lose, ~~there~~ they ~~always~~ always made a serious ~~challenge~~ challenge even when losing. I think is an area in which N. C. does stand out from the other states. The race issue is comfronted much earlier.

J.F.: entered the politics much earlier and it continues to be there. The basic.. North Carolina is not basically different from the rest of the South in that we have ~~a~~ the same kind of anti-black sentiments in a substantial proportion of the ~~xxxxx~~ population that all the other Southern states have. ~~Myxxxxxx~~ While my stress is on the other side. What has made a difference has been just that factor, that there has been on the other side from time to time a political leadership that ~~was~~ had the vision and the political organizational skills and had the guts to face the issue in a constructive open way and win thereby. But not that it takes a certain measure of political leadership, ~~xxxx~~ quality of political leadership to do that. My judgment is that we have had that more often than a lot of the other southern states and to that extent that's the extent that I would say that our politics has been more progressive--more potentially progressive than the politics of a lot of the other states. In the last 5 to 6 years you~~x~~ have developed in some of the other southern states that same quality of leadership and they ~~managed~~ managed to bring it off so that in that sense the question is whether it is enduring or not. I don't know. It varies.

J.B.: The question is not whether N. C. did stand out? The question is whether it does any more? And whether part of that is because of the fact that ~~xxxx~~ that there was less confrontation with change. The change itself was less ^{volatile} ~~volatile~~ in a sense. Less rapid and therefore ~~xx~~ there was less reaction to that change once that reaction became positive in the other states. There is a tendency elsewhere to catch up to where N. C. was.

J.F.: Well I think that the rest of the South has infact come much closer given the fact that they started so much farther behind. The question is whether they have caught up and I don't know that may be quibbling. I intuitively feel that there is more openness to the kind of change that

I think we would all like to occur among more people in and out of the political establishment in N. C. than I sense ~~XXXXXXXX~~ is true in most of the other southern states. Now that is an intuition and it may be colored because the fact that I am North Carolinian or it may be colored by the fact that I know more people in... In the little traveling that I've done in and out of the state, in South Carolina and Georgia and La. particularly, Tennessee less--that's what I perceive. But as I say, it is very hard to separate it out and to give you any concrete evidence.

J.B.: Is there anything else you want to comment on that we haven't covered.

J.F.: No.