

**SOHP Series: Bill Friday Documentary Film Project****Transcript: Felix Leon Joyner**

**Interviewee:** Felix Joyner

**Date:** Tuesday March 6, 2007

**Location:** Joyner's home in Chapel Hill, NC

**Interviewer:** Judith Van Wyk

**Interview Length:** Approx 1 hour 16 minutes

**Special Notes:** See also the "Abstract and Field Notes" document in the interview folder.

**Transcribed by/date:** Carrie Blackstock, March 2007

**Transcriptionist Notes:** This interview was videotaped and for that reason, timecode is included throughout the transcript. During the interview, Felix Joyner requested to go off the record briefly. The camera was not turned off so to honor his request, his statements are redacted from the transcript. The redacted section is a recounting of a personal story and of real import to the interview.

[Type text]

**01:00:48 Camera is turned on during a sound check**

Judy Van Wyk ...—telling us your name and telling us a little bit about where we are today.

Felix Joyner: OK, I'm Felix Joyner, and we're in my home in Chapel Hill. It's the middle of the day—. No, it's not the middle of the day. [Laughs] But it's in the morning of the sixth of March.

**Interview Begins 01:01:08**

JVW: OK. I'm going to introduce this interview. This is an interview with Felix Joyner. It is on March the sixth, 2007. Felix was the Vice President of Finance at the University of North Carolina under Bill Friday for how many years?

FJ: Oh, from 1968 until Friday retired.

JVW: In 1986

FJ: And then I worked for Spangler [C.D. Spangler was UNC President 1986 to 1997] and for Molly [Molly Corbett Broad succeeded Spangler and served as UNC President until 2006]. No, I did not work for Molly. I'm sorry. I'm confusing you, but I was there all of the time President Friday was president of the reconstituted university, and I worked for a few years after he left. [retired in 1995]

JVW: OK. I'm the interviewer, and my name is Judy Van Wyk. This is an interview for the Southern Oral History Program at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. It is part of the Bill Friday Documentary Project. We are here to talk to Felix Joyner about his time working with Bill Friday and the challenges that faced the university during those long years, and I think that's what—. As I said, going to be part of the Bill Friday Documentary Project. OK. [Laughter] It's my first introduction. OK, it's nice to be with you. [Laughs] Very informal. OK, let's begin, and you were the Vice President of Finance.

FJ: That's correct.

**01:03:01**

JVW: OK. You started in Kentucky, though. How did you first meet Bill Friday?

FJ: Well, I needed a job, and I was looking for a job. I had lost a job as Commissioner of Finance of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. A good friend of mine was

Jack Oswell, who was president of the University of Kentucky, and he suggested that I talk to Friday about coming here because he knew that they were looking for a new finance person. I spoke to Mr. Friday about coming. He was interested in talking to me. We talked for a little bit, and then Jack Oswell offered me a job at Kentucky. I lived there, and there was a lot of sort of confusion about the job, as there often is relating to the president and his board, and it turned out that I didn't really have a job in Kentucky at one given point. I said to Jack Oswell, "Why don't you call Bill Friday and tell him I don't have a job anymore?" And he did.

Bill Friday asked me to come visit with him again, and on a terribly icy day in the winter of sixty-seven [1967], I slid in and around Chapel Hill for some time and had a nice visit with President Friday. President Friday was not so hot for screening committees and search committees. He didn't have a search committee when he and I met, but two of the most distinguished members of his board just happened to drop by his office at the time I came to visit with him. So I visited with President Friday, with Watts Hill, [George Watts Hill who was called Watts, served from the 1950s through creation of the UNC Board of Governors to oversee the new UNC system. He and his son, the late George Watts Hill Jr., both served on the Board of Governors.] who was a longstanding member of the board, and Tom White, who's the most influential state senator that there probably was at that time. We had a nice visit, and to make a long story short, President Friday offered me a job and I took it. He indicated he would have to take that to his board, and I was nervous about taking things to boards in those days. So I said, "Well, I hope things work out all right, because I'm going to Pakistan. I did, and he called me in New York as I was getting on an airplane to tell me the board had approved my appointment and he was looking forward to my coming back from Pakistan and joining him. So it was a sort of short job search, and I came some six or eight weeks later because I had a previous commitment with some folks to go to Pakistan.

**01:06:02 Short Pause for technical reasons**

JVW: So describe what the university, just briefly, what the university was like when you first arrived in Chapel Hill in 1968.

**01:06:24**

FJ: Well, the major characteristic of the university system at that time is it was just

four schools. Charlotte had newly come into the old three men's three-institution system that was established in the thirties—State and Greensboro and Chapel Hill—and then joined by Charlotte, I think in 1967. At any rate, it was very new, so it had four schools in the university system at that time. Within the next couple of years, Wilmington and Asheville came in, so we went to six institutions. That was the size of the University of North Carolina until the restructuring in seventy-one.

**01:07:15 Pause...off camera voices dealing w/ technical issue**

JVW: So the time you came, there was alot student unrest. We don't need to go into ( ) So what was that like?

**01:07:38**

FJ: Well, it was already beginning in 1968, the discussion about the need to restructure the university, but there was not any really hard push on that until Governor Scott was elected. See, I came when Governor Moore was governor. [Dan K. Moore was governor of North Carolina 1965 – 1969] He was chairman of the Board of Governors, [Board of Higher Education] and of course he was replaced as chairman by Governor Scott. [Robert Scott was governor of North Carolina from 1969 to 1973. During his tenure, the University of North Carolina was restructured, becoming a 16-campus system with a strong Governing Board with 100 members]

**01:08:03**

Governors had not, apparently, as a rule been greatly concerned about the administration of the university. They regarded the chairmanship of the board as pretty much au performa, and then the president was the effective chairman of the board. Scott took a different view of it, partly because he became head on the Board of Higher Education, and that board pressed him to take an interest in higher education to an extent that governors probably hadn't taken for a long, long time. He decided that just quote, something had to be done. It was a thing that had been generated mostly by the Board of Higher Education for some several years. Some of the institutions were interested in some kind of restructuring. Almost none of the university institutions were pressing anyone for restructuring. And, you know, Chapel Hill people were specifically interested in there not being any.

JVW: As Vice President of Finance, you went before the legislature, so describe



what it was like before restructuring. I mean, it's my understanding that everybody campus came separately to present their budget.

**01:09:42**

FJ: Oh. Well, now that was not true of the campuses that were part of the university. See, there were no local boards of trustees. They all had the same large board and the same executive committee, and it was expected that the president would represent all of them before the legislature, and indeed he did that. The other campuses all had boards appointed by the governor, separate boards, and most of them had separate lobbyists. Principal lobbyists for most of the other schools were their presidents. And so every legislature was sitting there being hit on all sides, particularly for money, by the university with a relatively common approach by four schools, and then twelve other schools going at them head-on on the day the legislature started, particularly with respect to budget matters. So it was really, I think, in the long run the principle reason for restructuring to move to the fore, was that the legislature of that day was tired of having so many conflicting claims.[01:11:05] Now that changed some later, but I think at that time the legislature had no staff to speak of. They were just sort of at the mercy of everyone's lobbyists and everyone's importuning. It was a very tough kind of legislature to deal with, and they all met not forever, as they do today, but in relatively short sessions. So I think a frustration on the part of the General Assembly had as much to do with restructuring as with any impetus from the education apparatus.

JVW: Why was restructuring such a hard fought and sometimes personal battle?

**01:11:54**

FJ: Well, to start with, restructuring was a difficult and hard struggle, just a hard struggle, because the university people were probably the strongest political element involved in this strike. They were the Chapel Hill [UNC-Chapel Hill] advocates supplemented by the advocates of State [North Carolina State University], [UNC] Greensboro and [UNC] Charlotte. They simply didn't want anything done. You know, that's always a tough starting point for any kind of reorganization and government is if there's a substantial body of thinking that doesn't want any reorganization. That was the university position from the start, and that's the reason it was so hard. Now the reason it got to be a big battle in the face of that kind of power was that the governor did want it, and most

of the—. And after the governor went in that direction, the old Board of Higher Education, which had been stirring it all this time, and most of the other independent institutions recognized that something was going to happen. They became for restructuring because the government and Board of Higher Education were for restructuring. The antagonism between the university and all of the others was the sharpest thing with the governor in the middle—not in the middle, but strong for restructuring—for a coordinating board, was what the governor initially wanted.

**01:13:28**

JVW: So you had a very polarized situation between pro and con?

FJ: Well, no question about that, the very word, from the very start. Now the issue changed frequently. [Laughs] In the course of a long fight, it went from 1965 or six to the fall of 1971. There was some time for changes in position [laughs], and that was the difficulty of that long—. But it was sharp, and it was focused, and there were lots and lots of hard feelings among people that had been on the same side.

JVW: And people from the university didn't want it because it threatened—.

**01:14:17**

FJ: Well, I think that the old university thought that their position was pretty secure vis-à-vis the legislature, and that of course is the reason the other side wanted some change. It was also the general feeling that the university as the University of Chapel Hill/State/Greensboro were well off. They liked the organization the way it was, and they were not interested in any change. They particularly weren't interested in a coordinating board that would have some ill-defined oversight of the individual institutions. I think initially that was the principle problem that the old and more established campuses had.

JVW: What was Bill Friday's position? How did he negotiate this?

**01:15:17**

FJ: Well, Friday's position, certainly in the initial instance, was dictated entirely by his Board of Trustees position, because it was unanimous and clear that it wanted no change. And so President Friday was in no position to support any kind of change. Whether he was for a change or not was essentially immaterial. It was such a well-identified feeling on the part of the board that sometimes you would say, well, maybe the president or the chairman or

something ought to be relieving his board. There wasn't any relieving the board to be had by that time. This was a hundred-man board that probably ninety-two of them were for leaving things alone.

**01:16:16**

JVW: And what was his role then? How did he negotiate all that opposition to change?

FJ: Well, things kept changing by virtue of time. At a given point in this, the governor appointed a committee to make a recommendation to the legislature. A couple of schemes had been put before the legislature over time, a little effort here and a little effort there. then in the regular session, I think it was, of 1971, a hard proposal was put before the legislature, mostly developed by the Board of Higher Education, is my recollection. But it was essentially the governor's proposal. Well, it wouldn't fly. It bogged down. It was clear then that it was either going to be a long, long argument in the regular session, and the legislature decided to set the issue aside and come back in the fall of 1971 and discuss this issue, the issue of restructuring, alone. That was the session that finally dealt with restructuring. But even in that short session, there was one scheme devised, an amendment, another proposition would pass one house and would not have much luck in the other. There'd be amendments made in one body that weren't accepted in the other until—. The legislature went back and forth, essentially, several times right up until that last morning that it was finally passed. [01:17:54] In the middle of this thing, (he stumbles) the matter, initially there was a strong issue as to whether you have a coordinating board or a governing board. Now early on, that issue was resolved. It was clear that nobody wanted a coordinating board much. They either wanted a governing board or they didn't want anything at all.

**01:18:25**

JVW: What is the difference between a coordinating board and a governing board?

FJ: The governing board really runs the enterprise, and a coordinating board has a role that says a certain number of actions are going to have to go to the coordinating board for approval before they can be effected. It usually has to do with budget review or review of new programs. Now new programs were the key, in many ways, to the restructuring. Just

before 1968, all of the institutions suddenly had become universities. All of them had authorizations legislatively to establish doctoral programs, and a lot of them had ideas of doctoral programs they wanted to establish. That was the thing sort of brought the thing into focus for Governor Scott and the legislature, was that competition that I described earlier sitting there and everyone authorized to have the same kind of institution. That was need that hadn't ever—. Up until that time, you had the four-year schools, the teachers colleges, and big university, and no one else could give a doctor's degree, a doctoral degree, and hardly anyone could give a master's degree, except in education. So that was the focus for the program control that the legislature was looking for, and some folks thought that they could get it just by controlling the new offerings and commenting to the legislature on budget requests. That would by and large have been the job of a coordinating board. Now the job of a governing board was to prepare a budget, submit a budget, to approve programs, approve personnel appointments, to do the things that a corporate or any other governing board would do. 01:20:36

01:20:36

JVW: So it really consolidated all those campuses.

01:20:39

FJ: Yes, and once that issue was established, then that one was sort of set aside, and the next set of arguments had to do with what would be the form of this new organization if we have a governing board. How many people will be on the governing board? Will there be local boards of trustees? How will you select the executives of the local board? Are you going to have branch campuses, or are you going to have constituent institutions of a bigger enterprise? All these questions were harsh-pressed questions, and there were strong feelings on all sides. For instance, these campuses all had separate presidents. Were they going to have presidents anymore or were they not going to have presidents anymore? If we were going to have presidents, who was going to appoint them? Were they going to have local boards anymore? They all *had* boards. State, Chapel Hill, Greensboro, or Charlotte didn't have a board except one board, so all of these questions started being thought out. This is the reason I say things went back and forth, back and forth. And then what kind of governing structure beyond that were you going to have?

**01:22:04**

JVW: I get the sense that this was one of the first universities in the country that—. Traditionally, universities may all go to the legislature for money, but they hadn't had a consolidated system anywhere in any other state. Is this a new idea? Was that part of what made so difficult?

**01:22:23**

FJ: Well, it was a time when the idea of coordination and central governance was strong all through the country.[01:22:33] At the time, for instance, that North Carolina adopted a governing board, Wisconsin did precisely the same thing. University of Georgia in Georgia had always had a common governing board, board of regents, for the whole system. All of the public higher education community college and California had the three tiered system. All of the doctoral-granting institutions in California were part of the same system, and then the state university was the second layer, then community colleges the third. So it was not uncommon. It was not common by any means, but everyone in all the country almost was considering some need for restructuring. Florida was in the middle of this kind of thing. Some of the states that didn't have but one or two institutions didn't have that problem.

**01:23:29**

JVW: So a lot of this had to do about politics. Talk about the politics and Governor Scott and his role in this political (answer cut off)?

**01:23:37**

FJ: Well, the governor in this state is not historically or statutorily as strong as the governor in a lot of states, but he's still a strong governor. Once the governor was interested in this, he was certainly in a position to continue to push forward, and he did, as I say, with the appointment of a committee—.

**Pause to adjust audio problem**

JVW: OK.

**01:24:09**

FJ: Well, President Friday stayed very close to this thing all the time. Now his participation was different at different stages of the thing. Early on, we worked with the

Board of Higher Education people when it appeared that that could lead to something of use, and it did lead to something of use, and it didn't last very long. Then President Friday worked with the committee that the governor appointed, the so-called Lindsay Warren—. Lindsay was a state senator, is my recollection, and either then or had been. [Warren Commission was formed by Governor Bob Scott to develop a plan for restructuring the UNC system] The board had representatives on that committee, and the president worked very carefully with our board representatives that were on the gubernatorial committee. That committee wound up split right down the middle between the university members and the members of the other place. Other institutions had other interests, and on the question of whether there was going to be a governing board or a coordinating board.

At that point, the president and the Board of Governors came down on the fact that they would be for the governing board. Now they still took the position, and it was a strong Board of Governors position, that they didn't want anything. But if they had anything, they wanted a governing board. Now that was a phase in this. It was fairly important, and after that one sort of got over, the question was then how do you structure it? Who's going to be appointed? How many members are you going to have? There was generally a good bit of conflict on most points, and the president would be off and on those, certain sometimes to the extent of what was the subject matter, whether he regarded it as tremendously important or not. But there wasn't any way for him to be out of it as long as the board was in it. I mean, our board appointed a committee, rented space in one of the hotels in Raleigh, sat there with it and on it and following it day after day with a board member committee. So it was not anything that they walked away and said to the president, "Take care of it for us." They simply didn't do that."

**01:26:51**

JVW: It was a real raw power struggle.

**01:27:01**

FJ: Yeah, first raw power is whether you're going to do anything or not, and that may have even been the rougher of the battles. But after Scott won that battle, the next one was clearly what kind of a governing board are you going to have, and then that morphed into a proposition: is it going to be a board that looks like—an organization that looks like a



university expansion?

JVW: What was at stake? I mean, why was that such a big—? You understand why the university maybe didn't want to lose any of its power, but why, at that point, was there such a big battle between the organization itself?

**01:27:52**

FJ: Well, it was really a battle about sort of who was going to control things. Was the governor going to control it? Was the board that had no association really with the old University Board of Trustees, was that going to be the control focus? How are you going to select campus executives? Who was going to appoint them? All this was mixed up in the battle for—maybe not for legislative money, but that was part of it. Where's the strength going to lie? Who's going to make up the budget? Who's going to submit the budget? What's going to be the apparatus for appearing to the public and appearing to the General Assembly? This meant a great deal to a whole lot of people.

JVW: Governor Scott again, coming back to him because Bill Link [Bill Friday biographer] makes it sound like Governor Scott really kind of had it in for the university.

**01:28:52**

FJ: Well, there's no question, I don't think, about that. I mean, he reflected a point of view that was sort of populist. That's probably not the right term. You got populist experts around, and so I don't need to say anything about it, but it was a—. [01:29:12] Scott did not feel comfortable in some ways with the same people that felt comfortable—that felt they ran the university. He just wanted to have an influence. Some people that he had an interest in wanted to have more of an influence in the matter of running the institutions than he thought they would have—that they had. Most of the institutions that were not in the university felt that they had been short-changed. No question about that, both for the historically white and historically black institutions. They probably overestimated the strength of the old university position, and so there was that. It was a University of North Carolina/anti-University of North Carolina thing that was probably the crux of the bitterness.

JVW: After the legislation passed, after this long bloody battle, was it a good legislation?

**01:30:31**



FJ: Yeah, I think everyone was—almost all of the parties were satisfied when they got through that they had a good organization. I've always been sure Scott was completely satisfied with what happened, although I don't think he would ever have come up with that precise configuration. My personal judgment is that President Friday was satisfied with what finally happened, and I'm not sure that he would have come up with that, given his board position, that he would have come up with that structure. But then the final—and I ought to note this—the final real battle was who was going to head this thing. That finally took the form of an amendment late at night and the last day and the last morning of the legislature that everybody has a different view of how it happened. But what, as I say [laughs], what really happened is who were you going to elect to be the new board member? That one had gone from the Senate to the House, in which there was just an absolute even, if not a little bit balanced on the side of the non-university people. The consensus generally would have been if Scott's running it, Bill Friday won't be appointed the head of it. [01:32:06] And there was some feeling that if one could get the School of the Arts [North Carolina School of the Arts in Winston Salem is part of the 16-campus UNC system] representative with a vote, that Bill Friday would be running it. That was really the last effective amendment that was made, was that the House added or substituted the School of the Arts member to the first Board of Governors. Then that ended that battle, effectively, as to who would be the first executive of the new system.

**01:32:50**

JVW: But Scott did lobby against Bill Friday as president.

FJ: Of course, of course.

JVW: Why of course? Why didn't ( )

**1:32:58**

FJ: Well, I mean hell, they'd been fighting for three or four or five years over this issue, and I don't know that President Friday wanted to be president as much as he was not confident about what kind of president Scott and his folks would appoint. When it finally came down to the fact that the organizational structure could follow the old university's organizational structure, I think President Friday recognized that he was the best fellow to do that. He wouldn't have done it if he hadn't have recognized that. But as far as getting into

the thing personally on a level of "I'm for it because I'm going to be head of it," that would have been unlike him and was not his position. But it was clearly the position of people that were looking to get—an unlikely circumstance of getting somebody on the School of the Arts board to be the deciding vote.

**01:34:03**

JVW: So you have this long prolonged—. There's a lot of resentment and I would say some hard feelings left, and all of a sudden Bill Friday's in charge of bringing all these really disparate campuses together. How does he do that?

**01:34:21**

FJ: Well, he had one stroke of luck, because the way the first board was appointed, it had a majority of Chapel Hill people on it. One way or another, they were people with whom Bill was familiar and with whom he had influence. The other members, just in a really blazing stroke of luck, took an interest in higher education and a much broader view than the institutions from whence they came, because almost half of the first board consisted of trustees off the old boards who'd been elected by those old boards to represent them, in a sense, on the new board. But person after person in that group suddenly moved from being a hard-nosed representative of Eastern Carolina or Western Carolina or some other institution. They took what folks called the state-wide view, which is what the statute called for them to have. [Laughs] Strangely enough, a lot of them took it, and so they were interested in making the system work from the start, instead of having every issue a crisis that had to be resolved one way or another. I've always regarded this as good luck on Bill's part and on the higher education part.

The other thing was that the board—. Scott served as board chairman, effectively, for about six months. After that, the governor went off and the board elected themselves a chairman. **[01:36:21]** They elected Bill Dees, probably another fantastic stroke of luck, and re-elected one of the really great moderators. Bill Dees [1<sup>st</sup> chairman of the UNC Board of Governors 1973 to 1976] brought people together in a way that he'd never had an opportunity to do before and very few people ever could since. Bill had been involved in higher education as private citizen. He'd been head of the board in his home town, and you probably know all this, but I mean, most people probably know this. But it was just a very

fortuitous thing for Bill Dees to be the first chairman and a fellow that most of the people that were on there from all of the institutions, other than the university, recognized that he was fair, even-handed, and he and President Friday could work very well together and always did.

**01:37:38**

JVW: Governor Scott has said that, looking back on it, he doesn't think anybody could have implemented restructuring as successfully as Bill Friday did. It was like a shotgun marriage. What about Bill Friday's leadership style made it possible to—?

**01:38:01**

FJ: Well, I think it's very difficult to know what about President Friday's leadership style fitted him for this thing at this stage of its development, especially because of the bitterness with which the issue had been fought. I think part of it is because Bill Friday is inherently fair, and that, strangely enough, became really the most important thing in the early stages of this thing, is that people did feel that all of a sudden—. A lot of people thought that the university really had won this battle, and they really had in many ways. Yet in the early budgeting stages and particularly in the budget stage, people thought that it had been handled by President Friday fairly, that their requests had been considered fairly, the recommendations to the General Assembly were fair. The other thing is that President Friday postponed the other issue that could have divided people. That was the establishment of new programs. He just said we're not going to do that for a couple years, and the board went along with that. That had a great deal to do with the ability to deal with a number of questions, deal with them in the budget sense that you didn't have the thing out here turning down fellows one after the other that wanted to start up another kind of school or other degree programs. I think that gave some stability for the board to function and for President Friday to function.

**01:39:54**

JVW: Bill Friday also had a great interpersonal style, which he was able to really get on the phone and get to know everybody. Can you—? Are you—?

FJ: Oh, there's no—. Yeah, **[01:40:08]** President Friday dealt starting from the base of fairness. He dealt with lots and lots of people. He recognized what everybody looks at that looks at it very much, is that higher education is not an organized enterprise. There are

just too many parts to it, too many participants in the system, faculty, stu—the whole range of things that a triangular organization doesn't do any good. You just can't call all the chancellors together and tell them what to do, and President Friday knew that and knew that from experience. I'd say that he had the respect of the chancellors that were heading the institutions at the time, even the ones that had been engaged in part in the struggle legislatively. A lot of people that had been head of the university system would not have known very much about Elizabeth City or Fayetteville, [Elizabeth City State University and Fayetteville State University were 2 of 5 historically black universities (HBCU's) in the reorganized 16-campus UNC system.] but President Friday knew about all of those folks, and he knew about people in all those communities that had an interest in it Bill Friday's great field of expertise in North Carolina. He knows more about North Carolina than anybody in North Carolina. He simply does. He may know more people than anyone else. But it doesn't make any difference where you go with him, when you got with him; there's somebody that knows him, wants to tell him something [laughs], and talk about it ( ).

[01:42:00] That's an invaluable resource, particularly, I think, in North Carolina, because I've never been anywhere where more people were interested in the university and higher education than in North Carolina. [01:42:16] All you have to do is look at the newspapers. You know, I haven't been in a lot of places, but hell, your president of the student body does something at Chapel Hill and they know about it in Elizabeth City because they read about it in the Norfolk paper. I mean, it's just that way. [Laughs] He's always cultivated that interest, understands that interest, and had that same kind of interest in schools that came into the university as he had in the old part. And I think that was a part of it. Nobody can describe anybody's administrative style, but I think when you think about the really dramatic things that have perhaps happened in his time here, folks usually start with the Speaker Ban and [Dixie Classic] basketball tournament, and then the HEW thing and the reorganization. [01:43:31] But the administrative chores that he exercised almost without there being any recognition, and it was an administrative chore, was establishing the new university. While the statute established the defined basis for governing board system, it didn't spell out much detail. The detail that had to be spelled out was at President Friday's direction. It depended largely on the adaptation of the code of the old university as its bylaws, but a budget system

that was totally and completely new that was established partly by statute, but mostly by practice. The statute did what we wanted it to do to give the board the requisite authority to really run an enterprise, and that was a careful and a sophisticated approach to dealing with the budget. I think that having done that and having brought together—

[01:44:35] You know, this is a big, big enterprise, and it's different. You know, I mean it's as different as it can be. Very few of the institutions are alike, not all as different as Chapel Hill is from the School of the Arts, but there's a lot of range [laughs] in between those for different kinds of institutions. He's been able to recognize those differences and pull them together to an extent that we have. When he left, there was an integrated university. It wasn't a university with a set of branch campuses; it was a university with a set of independent institutions, and they were all essentially going in the same direction. I think that was a greater illustration, in some ways, of his leadership ability than any of the more dramatic things. [01:45:48] Clark Kerr [Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley (1952–1958) and the 12th President of the University of California (1958–1967).] wrote a little old book a long time ago in which he said that he was looking at these multi-campus systems, that the secret of success of any of them was their leader, and that the president had to be good or they didn't make it. I think time's pretty well proved that they may make it without a good leader, but they won't prosper very much without a good leader. I don't think it could ever have been put together without very careful administrative leadership, and I think President Friday's knowledge of people was one of his—extreme patience is another. I don't think you can find a more patient administrator than he is. He just always has had good staff. Sometimes some of us haven't been so hot, but we helped, and he's had enough good ones [laughs] to make up for the rest of us. [01:46:59]

When I first came, it was one of the most interesting things that I ran into was the group of people that were the four chancellors that were working in the university with him. Very difficult to find people that were better than those four people that were heading State and Chapel Hill, Greensboro, and Charlotte. They were just superb administrators and great team people, and I think that not all, but most of the appointments that were made over long periods of time turned out to be fine institution executives. Certainly his personal staff here was great, and small. In some ways, you could almost say he didn't delegate a lot of things,

because he talked over a lot of things with most of his principle advisors. So he sort of arrived at the right way to go. That's a pretty casual administrative style. We didn't have many staff meetings.

**01:48:29**

JVW: Just real teamwork.

FJ: A lot of—and the teams weren't all the same teams every time. It is a very casual way of doing business. All you have to do is know him to know that would be the way he would do business, but that is true. I think that the several years in which you set up the operation of the central—the general administration of the university showed a lot of innovation. If you think about it, there weren't too many models to follow. Each one, you might think where they had the collection of institutions together had enough difference that you couldn't say, well, let's go look at California, although we did that, or let's go look at Wisconsin, although we did that. But there wasn't a one that was enough likes ours for us to say let's pick this piece, let's pick that piece.

JVW: You had made reference to Elizabeth State and Fayetteville and Elizabeth City and Fayetteville State. These are historically black schools. What was it like for them to be folded into this system?

**01:50:00**

FJ: Well, I think that they very quickly decided that it was good. I think it's entirely possible that they initially did not think it was good. For a lot of reasons, they had been sort of on the side of Board of Higher Education and on the side of the governor in the period of time when the conflict was the most sharp. They also didn't know how—you know, they knew how the black institutions were treated by the General Assembly, and they didn't think that was very good or very fair. But they didn't know whether in another setting they would get much help or not. I think that partly the president and the board settled that very early in the restructuring legislation, giving them a formal position in the governance structure had a great deal to do with easing their unease about what might happen to them. That was a relatively—. The legislature was very generous in that regard and came to a conclusion fairly early that they were going to provide statutory representation to women and to minorities. Of course, I think both of those have now been declared unconstitutional, but we



still have it.

**01:51:41**

JVW: That's the Board of Governors?

FJ: Yeah.

JVW: We're going to move on to just a few more questions about HEW. Are you still OK?

FJ: Oh, yeah.

JVW: OK. Just as they started, the HEW case came down. The university, it's my understanding, had a plan, and HEW came back and said the plan was not good enough. In HEW, what were the major fault lines between the federal government and the university? [For ten years, between 1972 and 1982, the University of North Carolina struggled with the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare over how to integrate the 16 campuses in the UNC system]

**01:52:24**

FJ: Well, to start with, the University had several plans, and that was the nub of some of the difficulty. I'm not sure whether it was two or three of our plans had been accepted by HEW, and then they reneged. That makes dealing difficult. Obviously, it was a choice by HEW to try to—in order to bring everybody in the country in line, the South, that they were going to whip North Carolina in line. Link, in his book, deals with this, and I think fairly, because I think that was the position of the Office of Civil Rights {at HEW}, whether it was in the Department of Education or whether it was HEW. These were people that were committed to one thing. Understandably, they were zealous in this direction. No one would argue about that. That was their job. This is a very personal feeling on my part, and I'm not even sure that it's shared by the ones that know a great deal more than I do about it. But I think that the President of the United States and (Joseph) Califano {Secretary of HEW from 1977 to 1979} and two or three or his subsequent cabinet members were the stupidest political people in the world on this issue. **[01:54:01]** Now they had the opportunity to look at North Carolina, which had clearly the biggest integration problem. We had the only set of black institutions in the country. Nobody else had anything even remotely comparable to the number of institutions that we had. We had a black higher education system, and they had



the opportunity—. If they had just looked a little bit, they could have said let's reach an agreement with North Carolina that's so good that we can say to the rest of the South: do it.

**[01:56:24]**

And they had just one set of zealots that wanted to promote an idea that was impossible for anybody to buy, and that was that you can move people around by moving programs around. And we said we can't do that. They knew we were going to say we can't do that. Every time they raised it, we said we can't do that. But in the long run, the consent decree was such a positive document with respect to the black institutions that if it had been adopted by HEW and the university on the front end, we could have said to every other enterprise in the South: get together and do something this good. It would have been better, in my judgment, than any other state responded to the need for dealing with integration. I blame [President Jimmy] Carter, and I blame all the people who were advising him, but the dumbest one was Califano. Califano didn't understand this issue, didn't want to understand it, and every time there was an opportunity to screw things up, he did it. Now you wouldn't want to use this kind of thing, but that's pretty close to Gospel, because we could have done it. My God, look at what we finally committed to do and what the state had already done.

**01:56:24**

JVW: What had the state already done?

FJ: The state had already—. I'll give you only one example, because I'm not going to run through this thing. The state had, two years before, looked at the expenses, the costs, the amounts of money that were being allocated to the institutions for current operating expenses, and we equalized them with their comparable white institution. Bang, I mean not sort of. Average money for salaries was the same at Elizabeth City that as it was at Asheville. It was the same at NC Central that it was at East Carolina [all institutions in the UNC system]. The per-student cost in all of these was at least as high as the comparable white institution and was larger in most instances than the smaller. I mean, it was there, and they saw this and hired some people to prove that it wasn't true. But that doesn't make it any difference. All I'm saying is there was an opportunity to do something as opposed to making a political decision that they were going to work on North Carolina and then there was a lot a sideways to this. I shouldn't have given you this lecture, because I don't have many people

agree with me on it. [01:57:52]

JVW: Well, are you saying that you think that if HEW had chosen to work with the University instead of working against the University that they could have come up with—that integration could have gone a lot further?

**01:58:07**

FJ: Well, I think the thing about it is, it got off integration pretty quickly, and that's just the problem of what happened from the time of grade school integration to the time we were dealing with this thing. Everybody was trying to deal with an impossible situation. By the time we were trying to arrive at an agreement with respect to the desegregation of the schools, we had already arrived at a position that the black schools had to be preserved and we had to integrate the schools. In the going-in position, the obvious position was that you'd integrate all of the institutions and you do in a sense what you did for the public schools, let—. "Let" is not the right term, but have the white schools, the traditionally white schools available to the black people to go to. But that didn't last long. I mean, it lasted a period of time, and then all of a sudden the [NAACP] Legal Defense Fund said somehow you've got to do that and also enhance and strengthen the black institutions because they serve a purpose educating black students. That dichotomy always was a problem for everybody. [The NAACP Legal Defense Fund brought a class action suit against the federal government for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in *Adams v Richardson*. A federal appeals court approves a district court order requiring federal education officials to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (which bars discrimination by recipients of federal funds) against state universities, public schools, and other institutions that receive federal money.]

**01:59:45**

JVW: The fact that you would allow black students to come to white schools—was the fear that all these black students would want to come to the better white schools and not go to the black institutions?

FJ: No, no.

JVW: OK.

**01:59:56**

FJ: Nobody ever grappled with that problem, because by the time the issue reached

higher education, you already had the black community deciding that the black schools were in danger and they had to do something about protecting them. Now it was very hard to argue that you got to maintain all the black schools and integrate the white schools.

[02:00:23] I mean, that's a tough argument to deal with, and you only can deal with it as everybody finally dealt with it. And that was make the white schools available to them, recruit as best you could of black students, but strengthen the black institutions to where they're respectable black—where they're respectable educational institutions. That was where we were going to have to arrive, but some really interesting personalities involved in the Office of Civil Rights still were thinking if we can just find something like bussing, we'll solve this problem. [02:01:13] And what like bussing that will solve this problem is to quit offering business at this school and offer it over at this school, and the students will just march over there. You know, totally inconceivable, now proved inconceivable. I don't know how many places it's proved inconceivable, but nobody seems to have found the movement of educational opportunities from one place to the other—. And a good number of Southern states bought it and agreed to do it, and—.

JVW: And you're certainly not going to have forced integration ( ) in the higher education system with people (can't make out end of the question).

02:01:58

FJ: Well, this they seemed to forget, is that there was no mandatory [laughs]—there was no school law that said you've got to go to school, and that therefore you couldn't decide you could bus them. Now all this is extreme view. Let me talk to you about one other thing that I think is the hardest thing for everybody to deal with in our setting. All of us, including Bill Friday, probably from the start of the Civil Rights Movement, were on the side of the angels. It's just not a question about that. Bill Friday is not remotely a racist. Neither was any of the people that I know that worked with him and for him, and yet the first thing that sort of happened to us on this in the argument with HEW was we got on the other side. We didn't get there; they put us there. [02:03:01] There was just no way publicly for that issue to be dealt with other than a conflict, and so the position of the civil rights people in Washington that we weren't cooperative, that we weren't doing right by the historically black institutions—

**Camera is turned off for technical reasons and turned back on to resume interview.**

JVW: OK.

**02:03:29**

FJ: But this was tough to deal with. I mean, tough personally to deal with, for almost everybody that was dealing with it, because we were on the wrong side. I mean, this wasn't where we belonged, and this was illustrated a lot of times, particularly in the administrative hearings.

JVW: You were cast as being resistant to integration.

**02:03:56**

FJ: Sure, sure. I mean, at a given point, particularly in dealing with the Legal Defense Fund. I mean, that's the name of their game, and so if you weren't for what they were for, you're just bound to be some redneck from Alabama. If you spoke softly, didn't jump up and down, you just as well had a white shirt on and a white—. It was just terrible, a terrible thing for any of us to have to put up with.

**02:04:30**

JVW: So it sounds like there was some real intimidation going on.

FJ: Well, have you read Link's story of Mary Berry's trip through the state? [ Dr. Mary Berry was assistant secretary for education in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under Carter. See William Link's book **William C. Friday: Power, Purpose and American Higher Education**]

I mean, for God's sake, you can't do anything worse than that. Even as bad as Califano as, he recognized that was too much. It's just that that's the kind of thing, and we when we got in the setting of the administrative hearings right in the middle of the time we were trying to work something out with the consent decree, and just got over there and got beat up day after day—.

**02:05:15**

JVW: (Bill) Link [Bill Friday's biographer] talked about the fact that Bill Friday was constrained in part by the Board of Governors, that there were people on the Board of Governors that *were* resistant to integration.

FJ: There's not any question about that.

JVW: Can you talk about that—?

**02:05:30**

FJ: No, I can't, because it bothers me to talk about it. What happened was, there were people absolutely of good faith and good conscience that thought we ought not to do much of anything. These were good men, but they were people that—. Are you familiar with Carter's book about his father? Well, we had a lot of people like that, that they weren't racist. They just had grown up in a civilization that didn't deal with integration and didn't know how, and they were frightened and they were a lot of things. Now there weren't many of those on our board, but unfortunately, some of them were very strong personalities. They forced, in many ways, us up a tree in dealing with the thing. But I don't think that was nearly as compelling as the behavior of the Office of Civil Rights. I think that the combination of their arrogance and difficulty, it was clear to these people that I'm talking about that we were dealing with people that you couldn't depend on. These were people that accepted two or three long-range plans and then reneged. These were folks that we think we had an agreement with, and it disappeared in thin air. We had people that were accustomed to a judicial proceeding, or a judicial process by which when you arrived at a conclusion and arrived at an agreement, you kept it. This gave a lot of ammunition to people like that that said don't settle it, go to court, fight to the last, you know. **[02:07:42]** It was tough. Can I give you an example off the record here a minute?

JVW: Yes.

**Camera is turned off so Joyner can go off the record. It is turned back on immediately thereafter. In deference to Joyner's request, a section in which he relates a personal experience supporting his contention of bias has been redacted.**

**Co-producer, Steve Channing off camera:** That what as much an apology as (can't hear end of comment. )

**02:10:21**

FJ: Oh, I didn't even expect that. But I tell you this because that was the tone, often, of what we were dealing with when we were dealing with not only the lawyers for the Civil

Rights Office, but the people from Legal Defense Fund. Now in that I can give you this one instance for me because it bothered me, but now that kind of thing bothered me less than President Friday and Ray Dawson [UNC VP of Academic Affairs 1972-1992] can be bothered. I mean more, and I've been through more than they have with this kind of stuff. They really had a rough time with that attitude being laid out in front of them when we were in the middle of really working very hard. That's the other thing that sometimes people forget is that while we were spending about a full time dealing with the HEW question, we still had a substantial piece of work to deal with otherwise. But I only give you this illustrate my terrible bias.

JVW: One more question: what did Bill Friday do for civil rights and for integration?

**02:11:44**

FJ: Well, he had consistently tried to get the schools with what they were doing, not with any kind of formal programs of—for what am I thinking of? Well, anyway—.

JVW: Nonbureaucratic?

FJ: No, no, I'm thinking of what we dealt with legally about the rights of minorities later. The California case—tell me what you recall ( ).

**Joyner pauses as he searches for a word**

FJ: The quota thing....

**Off camera Channing:** The affirmative action.

**02:12:26**

FJ: Affirmative action, formal affirmative action plans is what I'm saying. As far as I know, we never supported early on any formal actions, but all of the historically white institutions were encouraged to make an effort to enroll black students. Now we didn't—I don't recall anybody making any particularly large effort to enroll white students at black institutions, because that really never was a terrible issue in our minds early on. But again, he was at Chapel Hill and working on that campus and working later on—literally on that campus when they did have some law students, did have some other things that very few Southern institutions had.

JVW: Is informal good enough, though, when you have an entrenched power

structure that you're trying to (Joyner interrupts... )

**02:13:36**

FJ: Oh, I don't know that it's good enough. I just don't know enough about the situation in early days, but I know enough about him that he wasn't trying to keep black students out of the schools. But it's just a—. I didn't mean to digress as much as I have on this, but that was a really rough, rough administrative situation to be in when you feel like you're on the wrong side. I mean, you feel like people have put you on the wrong side, and you're trying your best to do what's right.

JVW: You felt that you were really under attack.

**02:14:26**

FJ: Well, I don't think there's any question about—. I'm not ( ) particularly to say about Joe Ralph, but by the press. The press gave us a rough time. *The {Raleigh} News and Observer*, I think, finally got off our backs a little bit, but they were there pretty constantly, urging something be done, but they didn't know what to do, of course. But it was a hard period of time to be an administrator, put it that way.

JVW: Yeah, and you can talk to me about this.

**Pause as camera rolls. Steve Channing off camera makes an observation and asks Joyner a question about Julius Chambers.**

**02:15:42**

FJ: I thought that was very unfortunate, because Julius by and large had not participated much.

FJ: Had not participated very much in the life of—.

JVW: Yeah. We were going to—. I'll ask you the questions.

**(He is speaking to Steve off camera and not addressing the camera so the question is asked again so that he will speak into the camera.)**

( ) Yeah, sorry ( )

JVW: How did you feel when Julius Chambers resigned and (Joyner interrupts )

FJ: Well, I'm sorry. I'm sorry.

( )



JVW: Yeah, can you tell me what it was like and what you felt when Julius Chambers decided to step down from the Board of Governors in protest?

**02:16:16**

FJ: Well, I was disappointed when Julius did, because I knew what sort of reaction there would be to it. I didn't think that anything bad enough to have caused him to resign at that particular time—. I rather suspect he was looking for an opportunity to quit. It was more dramatic. That's more like Julius than anything else. It's certainly—. He had not really been a strong participant in the action of the board. I mean not actions, but in the—. He had a terrible record of attending meetings. That board has, I think, a statutory mandate to take a fellow off the board if he misses a certain number of meetings. Julius missed a certain number and was forgiven. He was on a committee that I served, and he was not a very good committee member. He represented something on the board, and I think he knew that and he utilized that in his resignation, but I don't think that produced anything very good from any standpoint that I know of.

**02:17:44 END OF INTERVIEW**

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